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Department of Defense

Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide


Version 1 Release 3 | 6 March 2017
Developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency for the Department of Defense
Trademark Information

Names, products, and services referenced within this document may be the trade names, trademarks, or service marks of their respective owners. References to commercial vendors and their products or services are provided strictly as a convenience to our users, and do not constitute or imply endorsement by DoD, DISA, the DISA Risk Management Executive (RME), or DISA RME Cybersecurity Standards Branch of any non-Federal entity, event, product, service, or enterprise.

1 Introduction


Cloud computing technology and services provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with the opportunity to deploy an Enterprise Cloud Environment aligned with Federal Department-wide Information Technology (IT) strategies and efficiency initiatives.  Cloud computing enables the Department to consolidate infrastructure, leverage commodity IT functions, and eliminate functional redundancies while improving continuity of operations.  The overall success of these initiatives depends upon well executed security requirements, defined and understood by both DoD Components and industry.  Consistent implementation and operation of these requirements assures mission execution, provides sensitive data protection, increases mission effectiveness, and ultimately results in the outcomes and operational efficiencies the DoD seeks.

The 15 December 2014 DoD CIO memo regarding Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services defines DoD Component responsibilities when acquiring commercial cloud services.  The memo allows components to responsibly acquire cloud services minimally in accordance with the security requirements outlined in Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) and this Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG).  Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) previously published the concepts for operating in the commercial cloud in the Cloud Security Model.  Version 1 defined the overall framework and provided initial guidance for public data.  Version 2.1 added information for Controlled Unclassified Information.  The CC SRG documents cloud security requirements in a construct similar to other SRGs published by DISA for the DoD.  This SRG incorporates, supersedes, and rescinds the previously published Cloud Security Model (CSM).

1.1 Key Terms


This CC SRG introduces terminology and concepts that are unique to cloud computing and DoD’s usage of the technology.  While this section lists some of the key terms, please refer to Appendix B; Glossary for their definitions before, or as, reading this document to realize a full understanding of the content and requirements.

The following is a list of key terminology which is used throughout this document:

  • Cloud Service Provider (CSP)
  • Commercial CSP
  • DoD CSP
  • Non-DoD CSP
  • Cloud Service Offering (CSO)
  • DoD Cloud Service Catalog[1]
  • DoD Component
  • Mission Owner (MO)
  • DoD Private CSO
  • C/CE (Control/Control Enhancement)
  • DoD Off-Premises
  • DoD On-Premises
  • DoD Virtually On-Premises


 

1.2 Purpose and Audience


This CC SRG outlines the security model by which DoD will leverage cloud computing along with the security controls and requirements necessary for using cloud-based solutions. 

This CC SRG applies to DoD provided cloud services and those provided by a contractor on behalf of the Department.

The CC SRG serves several purposes:

  • Provides security requirements and guidance to DoD and commercial Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) (DoD contractors) that wish to have their Cloud Service Offerings CSO(s) included in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog[2].
  • Establishes a basis on which DoD will assess the security posture of a DoD or non-DoD CSP’s CSO, supporting the decision to grant a DoD Provisional Authorization (PA) that allows a CSP to host DoD missions.
  • Establishes a basis on which a DoD Component’s Authorizing Official (AO) will assess the security posture of a DoD CSP’s CSO, supporting the decision to grant a DoD Component’s Authorization to Operate (ATO) for the CSP/CSO, and a DoD PA if the CSO might be leveraged by other DoD Components.  (e.g., DISA’s ATO/PA for milCloud)
  • Defines the requirements and architectures for the use and implementation of DoD or commercial cloud services by DoD Mission Owners. 
  • Provides guidance to DoD Mission Owners, Security Control Assessors (SCA), Authorizing Officials, (formerly Certification and Accreditation (C&A) officials), and others in planning and authorizing the use of a CSO.
  • Supports the DoD Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) Cloud initiative to migrate DoD web sites and applications from physical servers and networks within DoD networks and data centers into lower cost commodity IT services which typically include virtual servers and networks that are an integral part of most cloud services provided by both DoD and commercial CSPs.
  • Supports the DoD CIO’s and Federal Government’s Data Center Reduction initiatives.

The audience for this CC SRG includes:

  • ·         Commercial and non-DoD Federal Government CSPs
  • ·         DoD programs operating as a CSP
  • ·         DoD Components and Mission Owners using, or considering the use of, commercial/non-DoD and DoD cloud computing services
  • ·         DoD risk management assessment officials and Authorizing Officials (AOs)


 

1.3 Authority


This document is provided under the authority of DoD Instruction 8500.01 and DoD Instruction 8510.01.

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01, entitled Cybersecurity, directs Director DISA, under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO to develop and maintain Control Correlation Identifiers (CCIs), Security Requirements Guides (SRGs), Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), and mobile code risk categories and usage guides that implement and are consistent with DoD cybersecurity policies, standards, architectures, security controls, and validation procedures, with the support of the National Security Agency Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), using input from stakeholders, and using automation whenever possible.

DoDI 8500.01 further directs DoD Component heads to ensure that all DoD IT under their purview comply with applicable STIGs, [NSA] security configuration guides, and SRGs with any exceptions documented and approved by the responsible AO.

DoDI 8510.01 implements NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, NIST SP 800-53, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction (CNSSI) 1253, and the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) by establishing the DoD Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD IT, establishing associated cybersecurity policy, and assigning responsibilities for executing and maintaining the RMF.

1.4 Scope and Applicability


DoDI 8510.01, para 2a states: “This instruction applies to: (2) All DoD IT that receive, process, store, display, or transmit DoD information. These technologies are broadly grouped as DoD IS, platform IT (PIT), IT services, and IT products. This includes IT supporting research, development, test and evaluation (T&E), and DoD-controlled IT operated by a contractor or other entity on behalf of the DoD.”

DoDI 8510.01, Encl 3, para 3b (page 13) defines internal and external IT Services (formerly "Outsourced IT-based Processes").  Cloud computing by its nature fits this definition which is as follows:

"3b. IT Services. IT services are outside the service user organization's authorization boundary, and the service user's organization has no direct control over the application or assessment of required security controls. DoD organizations that use IT services are typically not responsible for authorizing them (i.e., issue an authorization decision).

(1) Internal IT services are delivered by DoD ISs. DoD organizations that use internal IT services must ensure the categorization of the IS delivering the service is appropriate to the needs of the DoD IS using the service, and that written agreements describing the roles and responsibilities of both the providing and the receiving organization are in place.

(2) DoD organizations that use external IT services provided by a non-DoD federal government agency must ensure the categorization of the IS delivering the service is appropriate to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability needs of the information and mission, and that the IS delivering the service is operating under a current authorization from that agency. In accordance with Reference (h) [ed. DoDI 8500.01], interagency agreements or government statements of work for these external services must contain requirements for service level agreements (SLAs) that include the application of appropriate security controls.

(3) DoD organizations that use external IT services provided by a commercial or other non-federal government entity must ensure the security protections of the IS delivering the service is appropriate to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability needs of the DoD organization's information and mission. DoD organizations must perform categorization in accordance with Reference (e) [ed. CNSSI 1253] and tailor appropriately to determine the set of security controls to be included in requests for proposals. DoD organizations will assess the adequacy of security proposed by potential service providers, and accept the proposed approach, negotiate changes to the approach to meet DoD needs, or reject the offer. The accepted security approach must be documented in the resulting contract or order.

(4) DoD organizations contracting for external IT services in the form of commercial cloud computing services must comply with DoD cloud computing policy and procedural guidance as published."

This CC SRG, in support of DoDI 8510.01, Encl 3, para 3b, establishes the DoD security objectives to host DoD mission applications and DoD information in internal and external IT services in the form of CSP’s CSOs.  The sensitivity of the DoD information may range from publicly releasable up to and including SECRET.  Missions above SECRET must follow existing applicable DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) policies and are not covered by this CC SRG.

NOTE: The IC offers approved Cloud Services at classification levels above SECRET. Contact the DoD CIO Cloud team for additional information at: osd.cloudcomputing@mail.mil.   

This CC SRG applies to all CSPs/CSOs hosting DoD systems/information/data/applications, regardless of who owns or operates the environments. Owners/operators can be DoD Components, Federal Government agencies, or commercial entities.

This CC SRG supports the responsibilities of DoD Component heads, per 44 USC 3534 (a) (1) (ii) (Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)), to provide protections for "information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency". CSPs not operated by the Mission Owner are essentially “a contractor of an agency” which operates an information system on “behalf of an agency". Mission Owners contracting with a CSP are outsourcing all or a portion of their information technology workloads to the CSP. This is the same as the use of “IT services” under DoDI 8510.01, Encl 3, para 3b. 

This CC SRG also applies to all DoD mission owners using cloud services and all parties involved in the provisioning of cloud services to DoD mission owners. This includes integrators or brokers and CSPs serving as prime contractor as well as any supporting CSP or facilities provider (i.e., sub-contractor) that an integrator/broker/CSP might leverage or contract with to provide a complete service or set of services under a DoD contract.  For example, if CSP A instantiates their SaaS offering in CSP B’s IaaS offering, which is located in CSP C’s data center, the CC SRG is applicable to all three CSP/CSO entities for the applicable requirements.  Similarly, for a cloud services integrator/broker which uses or resells one or more CSPs/CSOs to full contract requirements, the CC SRG is applicable to all cloud services.  While the CSP’s overall service offering may be inheriting controls and compliance from a third party, the prime CSP, the CSP with a DoD contract for service, is ultimately responsible for complete compliance.  This applicability statement and associated requirements are consistent with DoD and Federal acquisition requirements and clauses which state that DoD contractors, in this case integrators/brokers/CSPs must include all security requirements incumbent upon them in all subcontracts.

The authorization process for commercial and non-DoD CSPs is based on FISMA and NIST RMF processes through the use of FedRAMP, supplemented with DoD considerations as outlined in Section 4, Risk Assessment Of Cloud Service Offerings of this document.  These requirements and considerations are a subset of the requirements in the DoD RMF. The authorization process for DoD enterprise service programs providing cloud capabilities or service offerings (e.g. milCloud, Defense Enterprise Email) is based on the DoD RMF requirements and processes which are similar to the FISMA and NIST RMF processes.  Both processes utilize similar baselines of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls as the basis of the assessment, providing a common framework under which DoD can determine the level of risk.  

This SRG establishes the DoD baseline security requirements for DoD Mission Owners when contracting for and using non-DoD Software as a Service (SaaS) offering, and when implementing their systems and applications on DoD or non-DoD Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Platform as a Service (PaaS) offerings.  Since IaaS and PaaS involve CSP customers building a system or application on top of these service offerings, this release of this CC SRG considers IaaS and PaaS as being similar and treats them in the same manner, unless stated otherwise.  SaaS is addressed to the extent of the other service models, with specific application requirements being identified in other application-related SRGs and STIGs.

NOTE: Recognizing that PaaS CSOs can range from very close to IaaS where the mission owner is only provided with a few unsecured programming environments and an OS that the Mission Owner must secure to very close to SaaS where the CSO is a mostly complete application that mission owner can only customize its interface, PaaS will be better addressed in a future release of this CC SRG.

NOTE: While this CC SRG applies to all DoD use cases of cloud computing, one of the primary focus points of this SRG is to facilitate the migration of DoD systems and applications hosted on physical infrastructure (virtualized or not) owned by DoD Components and connected to DoD Defense Information System Network (DISN) services (i.e., Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) to DoD or non-DoD Cloud Services (as defined by NIST.  See Section 2.1, Cloud Computing, Cloud Service, and Cloud Deployment Models for this definition).  This SRG does not address all DoD systems and applications unless they are migrating to or leveraging DoD or non-DoD Cloud Services nor does it address approved DoD or non-DoD systems and applications used by DoD that are already approved for direct access via the Internet (not traversing the DISN) unless they are migrating to commercial cloud services directly accessed via the Internet.  While this SRG may be used to assess/approve such cloud services and the applications that use them, it is not intended to change the approved network access or connectivity methods they use.

1.4.1 Applicability of CC SRG vs DoDI 8550.01


DoDI 8550.01, “DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities,” September 11, 2012,[3] addresses the “Use of Internet-based capabilities (IbC) to collect, disseminate, store, and otherwise process unclassified DoD information.” The intent of this policy is to permit the use of various established public services on the Internet by DoD Components and users. One of the primary use cases is for the dissemination of publicly released information on these services (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) as part of a Public Affairs communications campaign. Secondary use cases include the publication of Blogs. The DoD Information Impact Level of all information covered by the DoDI 8550.01 is Impact Level 2.

While the services addressed by the DoDI 8550.01 may be considered cloud services, the typical funding model is that such services are free to use and are widely used by the general public under that model. Additionally these services are not managed by DoD or managed by the provider for DoD, therefore DoD RMF requirements do not apply and such services do not require an ATO for DoD to use them.  Conversely, the CC SRG is applicable to all cloud services that require a DoD ATO under DoD policy.  This includes all IaaS and PaaS CSOs on which a DoD system is built (by or for DoD).



 

1.5 Security Requirements Guides (SRGs) / Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)


Security Requirements Guides (SRGs) are collections of security requirements applicable to a given technology family, product category, or an organization in general.  SRGs provide non-product specific requirements to mitigate sources of security vulnerabilities commonly encountered across IT systems and applications.

While the SRGs define the high level requirements for various technology families and organizations, the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) are the detailed guidelines for specific products.  In other words, STIGs provide product-specific information for validating, attaining, and continuously maintaining compliance with requirements defined in the SRG for that product’s technology area.

A single technology related SRG or STIG is not all inclusive for a given system.  Compliance with all SRGs/STIGs applicable to the system is required.  This typically results in a given system being subject to multiple SRGs and/or STIGs.

Newly published SRGs and STIGs generally consist of a technology/product overview document and one or more eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (.xml) files in Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) containing the security requirements.  Security requirements are presented in the form of Control Correlation Identifiers (CCIs) and include product specific configuration and validation procedures.  Requirements in this CC SRG are not being published in an XCCDF XML format at this time. 

The security requirements contained within SRGs and STIGs, in general, are applicable to all DoD-administered systems, all systems connected to DoD networks, and all systems operated and/or administrated on behalf of the DoD.  This requirement remains in force for all Mission Owners building systems in a cloud service.  CSP systems must comply with configuration guidance consistent with the NIST SP 800-53 control CM-6 by utilizing STIGs/SRGs or a configuration guide deemed equivalent by DoD.

1.6 SRG and STIG Distribution


Interested parties can obtain the applicable SRGs and STIGs from the Information Assurance Support Environment (IASE) website.  The unclassified website is http://iase.disa.mil and the classified website is http://iase.disa.smil.mil

NOTE: Some content requires a DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificate for access.  The IASE web site does NOT currently accept External Certificate Authority (ECA) certificates for entry into the PKI-protected area.  Industry partners needing PKI restricted content may request it through their DoD sponsor.

1.7 Document Revisions and Update Cycle


DISA Risk Management Executive, Cybersecurity Standards Branch develops, revises, updates, and publishes SRG and STIG documents on a quarterly maintenance release schedule as needed.  These publications reflect new or changed policies, requirements, threats, or mitigations; reorganized content; corrected errors; and/or, to provide additional clarity.  The fiscal year based release schedule can be found at http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/fso-schedule.aspx

Major updates to an SRG or STIG result in a version change rather than an incremental release.  New SRGs and STIGs and major updates will be released as soon as they are approved and ready for publication at any time during the year.

1.7.1 Comments, Proposed Revisions, and Questions


Comments, proposed revisions, and questions are accepted at any time via email at disa.stig_spt@mail.mil.

DISA Risk Management Executive, Cybersecurity Standards Branch coordinates all change requests with relevant DoD organizations before inclusion and subsequent publication in a maintenance release or major update.

1.8 Document Organization


This SRG is organized into six major sections with supporting appendices.  Sections 1-4 address general information including the processes for authorizing a particular CSP’s cloud offering. Remaining sections outline specific security requirements to be addressed in authorizing and operating cloud capabilities.  In addition to specifics on SRG roles and responsibilities and required control parameter values, the appendices provide the references and definitions used throughout the document.

Section 1, Introduction:  Provides general information on the purpose and use of this document. 

Section 2, Background: Contains a primer on several terms and supporting concepts used throughout the document.

Section 3, Information Security Objectives / Impact Levels: Explains the concept of “Information Impact Levels” based on the type of data being hosted in the cloud and outlines security objective considerations in the areas of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 

Section 4, Risk Assessment of Cloud Service Offerings: Provides an overview of the RMF processes used for granting a DoD PA and explains how a PA can be leveraged by a Mission Owner and its AO in support of an ATO decision. 

Section 5, Security Requirements: Details the requirements associated with enabling CSP capabilities. 

Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response: Outlines the requirements for defending information systems operating in the cloud along with the Command and Control (C2) processes necessary to defend and operate DoD mission systems.

2 BACKGROUND


This section outlines several concepts, terms, and supporting processes, providing a primer for the remainder of this document.

2.1 Cloud Computing, Cloud Service, and Cloud Deployment Models


NIST SP 800-145[4] defines cloud computing as having five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.  This SRG adheres to these NIST definitions to characterize and standardize the discussion of Cloud Computing. Cloud Computing is defined as follows:

Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”

The Essential Characteristics are:

“On-demand self-service.  A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring human interaction with each service provider.

Broad network access.  Capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations).

Resource pooling. The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand.  There is a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or datacenter).  Examples of resources include storage, processing, memory, and network bandwidth.

Rapid elasticity.  Capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate with demand.  To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be appropriated in any quantity at any time.

Measured service.  Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts).  Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the utilized service.

The NIST defined cloud service models include Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and are defined as follows:

“Software as a Service (SaaS).  The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure.  The applications are accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings. 

Platform as a Service (PaaS).  The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment. 

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).  The capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).

NIST defines cloud deployment models as follows. 

“Private cloud.  The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units).  It may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. 

Community cloud.  The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a specific community of consumers from organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations).  It may be owned, managed, and operated by one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises. 

Public cloud.  The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general public.  It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government organization, or some combination of them.  It exists on the premises of the cloud provider. 

Hybrid cloud.  The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing between clouds).

This SRG uses private and community to mean the following: “DoD private/community cloud” refers to a cloud service that is built for the exclusive use of DoD users or tenants.  “Federal Government Community cloud” is one that includes both DoD and other Federal Government tenants.  For example, a cloud used exclusively by Army and Air Force tenants would be considered DoD private/community, while one utilized by DISA and the Department of State would be a Federal Government community cloud. 

While vendors may market and name their offerings as they wish, DISA will categorize them into one of the three NIST cloud service models when listing them in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog. Vendors are encouraged to market their services using the NIST cloud service model terminology.  Service offerings that provide data storage without also providing computing services will be considered to be a subset of IaaS.  Furthermore any other service models proposed by the vendor (such as Data as a Service (DaaS)) will have to be aligned to one the three standard service delivery models and meet the appropriate controls.  As used in this SRG the terms cloud computing and cloud services refer to a service offering from a provider organization to one or more organizational customers or tenant organizations.  These terms do not refer to classic forms of IT services delivery where dedicated hardware (whether it is virtualized or not) is employed or assembled by organizations for their own use.  A service offering from a provider organization to a customer must be part of the construct. 



 

2.2 Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and Cloud Service Offering (CSO)


A Cloud Service Provider (CSP) is an entity that offers one or more cloud services in one or more deployment models.  A CSP might leverage or outsource services of other organizations and other CSPs (e.g., placing certain servers or equipment in third party facilities such as data centers, carrier hotels / collocation facilities, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)).  CSPs offering SaaS may leverage one or more third party CSO’s (i.e., for IaaS or PaaS) to build out a capability or offering.

A Cloud Service Offering (CSO) is the actual IaaS/PaaS/SaaS solution available from a CSP.  This distinction is important since a CSP may provide several different CSOs.

2.3 DoD Risk Management Framework (DoD RMF)


DoDI 8510.01 is the implementing policy for the DoD RMF, establishing associated cybersecurity policy, and assigning responsibilities for executing and maintaining the RMF.  This DoD policy is consistent with NIST SP 800-37, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework, which defines RMF for the Federal Government.  CNSSI 1253 and NIST SP 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations are incorporated into this DoD policy, which outline the controls and control baselines used in the assessment process.  Of critical importance to this SRG, DoDI 8510.01 "provides procedural guidance for the reciprocal acceptance of authorization decisions and artifacts within DoD, and between DoD and other federal agencies, for the authorization and connection of information systems (ISs)."

2.4 Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)


The Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program[5], or FedRAMP, is a government-wide program that provides a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and services used by the Federal Government.  The use of FedRAMP is mandated for all Federal Agencies by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as their systems and applications are migrated to the commercial cloud under the Federal Government’s Cloud-First initiatives.  The December 2011 OMB FedRAMP policy memo[6] requires Federal departments and agencies to utilize FedRAMP approved CSPs and share Agency ATOs with the FedRAMP Secure Repository.

FedRAMP uses a “do once, use many times” framework that intends to reduce cost, time, and staff required for security assessments and process monitoring reports.  The FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB) is the primary governance and decision-making body for the FedRAMP program.  JAB-approved standards and processes result in the award and maintenance of a PA to host Federal Government missions. 

DoD leverages FedRAMP JAB PAs and non-DoD U.S. Government Federal Agency ATO packages residing in the FedRAMP Secure Repository, including all supporting documentation when assessing a CSO for a DoD PA.  However, DoD will only accept non-DoD Agency ATOs where the CSP/CSO was assessed by a FedRAMP accredited Third Party Assessor Organization (3PAO).

NOTE: The American Association for Laboratory Accreditation[7] (A2LA) accredits FedRAMP 3PAOs with the FedRAMP Program Management Office (PMO) providing final approval. 



[7] American Association for Laboratory Accreditation: https://www.a2la.org/

 

2.5 FedRAMP Plus (FedRAMP+)


FedRAMP+ is the concept of leveraging the work done as part of the FedRAMP assessment, and adding specific security controls and requirements necessary to meet and assure DoD’s critical mission requirements.  A CSP’s CSO can be assessed in accordance with the criteria outlined in this SRG, with the results used as the basis for awarding a DoD provisional authorization.  

2.6 DoD Provisional Authorization


A DoD Provisional Authorization (PA) is an acknowledgement of risk based on an evaluation of the CSP’s CSO and the potential for risk introduced to DoD networks.  The DoD PA process follows the same “do once, use many times” framework as FedRAMP does.  DoD PAs are granted at all information impact levels.  A PA provides a foundation that AOs responsible for mission applications must leverage in determining the overall risk to the missions/applications that are executed as part of a CSO. 

Since all CSOs offered by a CSP may not have been submitted for assessment, a DoD PA is granted to the CSP for a CSO, not the CSP itself.  Furthermore, if a CSP’s CSO leverages another CSP’s CSO (e.g., CSP A instantiates their SaaS offering in CSP B’s IaaS offering) then the DoD PA for CSP A’s CSO includes inherited compliance of CSP B.  In this case, CSP A will be contractually responsible for CSP B and must have accountability for controls in their sub-contracts.  It is therefore highly recommended that CSPs offering service to DoD only utilize other CSOs that have a DoD PA.  In the event a leveraged CSP/CSO does not have a PA, it will be assessed as part of the prime CSO. Such subtended assessments will not automatically grant the leveraged CSP/CSO an independent PA.  CSPs must disclose subcontracted CSOs used in the CSOs offered to DoD when assessed for a DoD PA.

NOTE: DoD PAs are not granted to physical facilities by themselves (e.g., a data center) that support cloud infrastructure even if it might be considered a CSO if the facility supports multiple CSPs or multiple tenants’ equipment.  These are assessed for the physical and environmental controls as part of the CSP’s CSO by the 3PAO for unclassified facilities.  Classified processing facilities are addressed later in this CC SRG.

A DoD PA is revocable in the event a CSP/CSO loses its FedRAMP PA or if the CSP does not maintain compliance with its security responsibilities identified in this CC SRG, associated requirements found in other referenced documents, or contract requirements. Additionally, a CSP’s CSO with a DoD PA which leverages another CSP’s CSO with a DoD PA may lose their PA if the leveraged CSO loses its PA.  CSPs acting as prime contractor must maintain the PA for their CSO and require all sub contracted CSPs to maintain the PA for their CSOs for the term of the contract.  This flow-down is also applicable to cloud services integrators and brokers acting as prime contractors. If a prime or subcontracted CSO losing a PA and refuses to correct or cannot correct the reason(s) for it, such a condition may constitute a breach of contract.  While revoking a PA is an extreme measure, DoD will work with the CSP to resolve the issues leading to revocation.  Consistent with the December 2014 DoD CIO Memo,[8] the DISA AO is responsible for approving and revoking DoD PAs.

CSOs possessing a DoD PA are listed in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog[9].  DoD Component services may also implement approved CSP/CSO listings for their agency’s use.



 

3 INFORMATION SECURITY OBJECTIVES / IMPACT LEVELS


Cloud security information impact levels are defined by the combination of: 1) the sensitivity or confidentiality level of information (e.g., public, private, classified, etc.) to be stored and processed in the CSP environment; and 2) the potential impact of an event that results in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of that information.  DoD Mission Owners must categorize mission information systems in accordance with DoDI 8510.01 and CNSSI 1253 then identify the Cloud Information Impact level that most closely aligns with the defined categorization and information sensitivity. The Cloud Information Impact Levels are further defined in Section 3.2,  Information Impact Levels.

3.1 Security Objectives (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability)


Information Impact Levels consider the potential impact should the confidentiality or the integrity of the information be compromised. 

According to Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems,[10] confidentiality is “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information…” [44 U.S.C., Sec.  3542][11].  A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.

FIPS Publication 199 defines integrity as “Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity…” [44 U.S.C., Sec.  3542]. A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of information.  It is important to note that the unauthorized destruction of information will result in the loss of availability of that information.

FIPS-199 defined three levels to designate the impact of a loss of confidentiality or a loss of integrity (refer to Table 1).  The security control baseline for all Impact Levels is based on moderate confidentiality and moderate integrity. If a Mission Owner has high potential impacts, specific requirements must be included in the contract/SLA to address/mitigate this risk or deploy to DoD facilities assessed using CNSSI 1253 high baselines through the DoD RMF.  In the future DISA will consider incorporating a FedRAMP High Baseline into this SRG after one becomes available.

Table 1 - Potential Impact Definitions for Security Objectives (FIPS-199)

 

Potential Impact

Security Objective

Low

Moderate

High

Confidentiality

The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The unauthorized disclosure of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

Integrity

The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a serious adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.

The unauthorized modification or destruction of information could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.


While the FedRAMP baseline addresses availability, the DoD Cloud baseline objectives do not additionally address the impact of availability; it is expected that the Mission Owner will assess the CSO’s stated availability rating(s) during CSP selection.  Any specific or additional availability requirements must be included in the contract or a service level agreement with the CSO.   Mission Owners must ensure the language is specific and inclusive for their required availability.  For example, if the requirement is “CSP maintenance affecting system availability must be coordinated 4 weeks in advance and shall not exceed 4 hours per month,” then the contract / SLA should detail the requirement.  Recommended contract / SLA availability controls are provided under the FedRAMP+ Controls/Enhancements in Section 5.1.6, Security Controls/Enhancements to be optionally addressed in the Contract/SLA.

CSOs will be evaluated as part of the assessment process for availability. The assessed level of availability will be listed in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog. This evaluation does not prevent a CSO from receiving a PA or being included in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog; it is only used to facilitate the matching of a DoD Mission Owner to one or more appropriate cloud services meeting their needs.



 

3.2 Information Impact Levels


The previously published (and now superseded) Cloud Security Model[12] defined 6 information Impact Levels.  In order to simplify the selection process, the number of levels was reduced from 6 to 4.  This was accomplished by integrating levels 1 (public information) and 3 (low impact CUI) into levels 2 and 4, respectively.  The numeric designators for the Impact Levels have not been changed in order to remain consistent with previous versions of the Cloud Security Model, leaving Impact Levels 2, 4, 5, and 6.  Note that a higher level can process data from a lower level.

Additionally, the categorization for the information being stored, processed, or transmitted in the cloud for all levels has been changed to moderate confidentiality and moderate integrity as defined by CNSSI 1253.  This modification for Impact Levels 5 and 6 from high confidentiality and high integrity is intended to better align with the categorization of most DoD customer systems that will be deployed to commercial CSP facilities. 

Mission owners with systems and information categorized at high confidentiality or integrity impact levels must deploy to facilities assessed using CNSSI 1253 high baselines through the DoD RMF (typically a DoD facility) or contract for the added security from a commercial CSP.  DISA is considering how to incorporate the FedRAMP High Baseline into this SRG.

Figure 1 provides a summary of the current information impact levels coupled with some of the distinguishing requirements and characteristics. 

NOTE: See Section 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements for the explanation of “US / US outlying areas”
NOTE: ADP-1 and ADP-2 Personnel Requirements apply to both impact levels 4 and 5. See 5.6.2, .1,.2,.3
NOTE: Level 4/5 off-premises CSO connectivity will be via a BCAP on any DISN network (e.g., DREN) it serves.

Figure 1 – Impact Level Comparison

 

The following subsections describe the impact levels, to include those used previously, and the type of information to be stored or hosted in CSOs by Mission Owners. 



 

3.2.1 Level 1: Unclassified Information approved for Public release


Level 1 is no longer used and has been merged with Level 2.

3.2.2 Level 2: Non-Controlled Unclassified Information


Level 2 includes all data cleared for public release (i.e., , as well as some low confidentiality unclassified information NOT designated as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or critical military/contingency operations mission data, but the information requires some minimal level of access control (e.g., user ID and password) .  This level accommodates Non-CUI information categorizations based on CNSSI-1253 up to low confidentiality and moderate integrity (L-M-x).

Commercial Level 2 CSP/CSO customers include whomever the CSP chooses to market the CSO to, which may include government customers, commercial customers, and the general public.  Access to the CSO is via the Internet.

3.2.3 Level 3: Controlled Unclassified Information


Level 3 is no longer used and has been merged with Level 4.

3.2.4 Level 4: Controlled Unclassified Information


Level 4 accommodates CUI and/or other mission critical data to include that used in direct support of military or contingency operations.   CUI is information the Federal Government creates or possesses that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy requires, or specifically permits, an agency to handle by means of safeguarding or dissemination controls.  CUI requires protection from unauthorized disclosure as established by Executive Order (EO) 13556, Controlled Unclassified Information (November 2010)[13], Part 2002 of 32 CFR[14], the CUI Registry [15]and DoDM 5200.01, Vol 4[16], which is currently being updated.  CUI does not include classified information, or information a non-executive branch entity possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not come from an executive branch agency or entity acting for an agency.  Designating information as CUI or critical mission data to be protected at Level 4 is the responsibility of the owning organization.  Determination of the appropriate impact level for a specific mission with CUI and mission data will be the responsibility of the mission AO.  Some types of CUI may not be eligible to be hosted on Impact Level 4 and 5 CSOs without a specific qualifier in the DoD PA. (e.g., for Privacy.) This level accommodates CUI information categorizations based on CNSSI-1253 up to moderate confidentiality and moderate integrity (M-M-x)

CUI contains a number of categories[17], including, but not limited to the following:

  • Export Controlled--Unclassified information concerning items, commodities, technology, software, or other information whose export could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the United States national security and nonproliferation objectives.  This includes dual use items; items identified in Export Administration Regulations (EAR)[18], International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)[19] and the munitions list; license applications; and sensitive nuclear technology information.

NOTE: ITAR data may not be placed on shared infrastructure managed by non-US-Persons or alongside other organizations who do not have a license to export as defined in 22 CFR 120.17[20] and 22 CFR 120.123[21].

  • Privacy Information--Refers to personal information or, in some cases, personally identifiable information (PII)[22] as defined OMB M-07-16[23] or means of identification as defined in 18 USC 1028(d)(7)[24].
  • Protected Health Information (PHI)[25] as defined in 45 C.F.R. §160.103)[26].
  • Other information requiring explicit CUI designation (i.e., For Official Use Only, Official Use Only, Law Enforcement Sensitive, Critical Infrastructure Information, and Sensitive Security Information).

Level 4 CSOs may support a US Government Community or a DoD only community (i.e., the CSO is DoD Private).

Commercial Level 4 CSP/CSO customers include all US government customers (Federal, State, Local, and Tribal) and commercial customers which support them.  In some cases a Level 4 PA may be granted to CSOs that support other commercial entities, but not the general public.

Commercial Level 4 CSO customers include the following:

  • NIPRNet based DoD Components
  • DoD contractors operating a system or application for the DoD. This is primarily for the fulfilment of the contract, not for the contractor’s general storage/processing of CUI/CDI or the contractor’s internal corporate cloud use cases. In this case, the contractor is operating on the behalf of a Mission Owner and must fulfil all Mission Owner requirements as specified in the CC SRG.
  • NIPRNet connected but separate COI Mission Partner networks; e.g., MedCOI, DREN
  • Non-NIPRNet based DoD Components; e.g., Commissary, .edu organizations
  • Federal, State, Local, Tribal government agencies
  • DoD contractors required to store/process DoD CUI or Covered Defense Information (CDI) as part of their DoD contract. This is primarily for the fulfilment of the contract, not for the contractor’s internal corporate cloud use cases.

Level 4 customer CSO connectivity:

  • NIPRNet based DoD Components connect via DoD provided, DoD CIO approved, NIPRNet boundaries and associated private connectivity.
  • Non-NIPRNet based DoD Components connect via DoD Component provided, DoD CIO approved, NON-NIPRNet boundaries and associated private connectivity.  Alternate connectivity methods must be approved by DoD CIO.
  • All other CSO customers establish their own boundaries and private or internet based connectivity.

See section 5.10.1, Cloud Access Point (CAP) for information on DoD NIPRNet to CSO boundaries.



[21] 22 CFR 120.-130 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Part 123 - Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html

 

3.2.5 Level 5: Controlled Unclassified Information


Level 5 accommodates CUI that may require a higher level of protection than that afforded by Level 4 as deemed necessary by the information owner, public law, or other government regulation.  The determination if CUI fits this category is up to the AO responsible for categorizing the information and choosing the Cloud Impact Level.  

Level 5 also supports unclassified National Security Systems (NSSs) due to the inclusion of NSS specific requirements in the FedRAMP+ C/CEs.  As such, NSS must be implemented at Level 5.  Some types of CUI may not be eligible to be hosted on Impact Level 4 and 5 CSOs without a specific qualifier in the DoD PA. (e.g., for Privacy.)  This level accommodates NSS and CUI information categorizations based on CNSSI-1253 up to moderate confidentiality and moderate integrity (M-M-x).

Level 5 CSOs may support a Federal Government Community or a DoD only community (i.e., the CSO is DoD Private).

Commercial Level 5 CSP/CSO customers include all Federal Government customers (Federal Agencies only) which includes DoD Components and certain DoD contractors operating a DoD system for the benefit of the DoD. 

Commercial Level 5 CSO customers include the following:

  • NIPRNet based DoD Components
  • NIPRNet connected but separate COI Mission Partner networks; e.g., MedCOI, DREN
  • Non-NIPRNet based DoD Components; e.g., Commissary, .edu organizations
  • Federal Agencies operating an unclassified NSS
  • DoD contractors operating a system or application (to include an unclassified NSS) for the DoD. This is primarily for the fulfilment of the contract, not for the contractor’s general storage/processing of CUI/CDI or the contractor’s internal corporate cloud use cases. In this case, the contractor is operating on the behalf of a Mission Owner and must fulfil all Mission Owner requirements as specified in the CC SRG.

Level 5 customer CSO connectivity:

  • NIPRNet based DoD Components connect via DoD provided, DoD CIO approved, NIPRNet boundaries and associated private connectivity.
  • Non-NIPRNet based DoD Components connect via DoD Component provided, DoD CIO approved, NON-NIPRNet boundaries and associated private connectivity.  Alternate connectivity methods must be approved by DoD CIO.
  • All other CSO customers establish their own boundaries and private or internet based connectivity.

See section 5.10.1, Cloud Access Point (CAP) for information on DoD NIPRNet to CSO boundaries.

3.2.6 Level 6: Classified Information up to SECRET


Level 6 accommodates information that has been determined: “(i) pursuant to EO 12958, Classified National Security Information (April 17, 1995) as amended by EO 13292[27], or any predecessor Order, to be classified national security information; or (ii) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (P.L. 83-703)[28] to be Restricted Data (RD).”  At this time, only information classified as SECRET or below, in accordance with the applicable EOs, is permitted to be hosted at this level.    This level accommodates classified information categorizations up to moderate confidentiality and moderate integrity (M-M-x).

Level 6 CSOs may support a Federal Government Community or a DoD only community (i.e., the CSO is DoD Private). Due to the requirement of the entire CSO infrastructure be dedicated and separate from other CSP/CSO infrastructure Level 6 CSOs may only be provided by CSPs under contract to the DoD or a Federal Agency. In this sense the CSO is not considered “commercial”.

Level 6 CSO customers include the following:

  • SIPRNet based DoD Components and Federal Agencies
  • SIPRNet connected but separate COI Mission Partner SECRET networks; Federal Agency SECRET networks.
  • DoD contractors operating a SECRET NSS for the DoD. This is primarily for the fulfilment of the NSS contract, but might also be used (if approved) for the contractor’s general storage/processing of SECRET CDI.

Access to the CSO is via one or more private SIPRNet connections.



 

4 RISK ASSESSMENT OF CLOUD SERVICE OFFERINGS


The shift to cloud computing necessitates adjustments to the DoD Risk Management processes, which typically address physical on-premises systems and applications, to accommodate the use of commercial CSOs.  The goal is to address the security requirements and controls, relative to the criticality of DoD information in the cloud, in a cost effective and efficient manner, while still assuring the security of DoD’s core missions and networks in accordance with the DoD RMF.  To support the relationship of missions to cloud capabilities, DoD has defined information Impact Levels (discussed in Section 3.2, Information Impact Levels) that broadly align to the criticality and sensitivity of data, and missions that would operate in a cloud environment.  The DoD PA risk assessment process is focused on evaluating the requirements for the impact level(s) which a CSP’s CSO is capable of supporting. When choosing a CSP’s CSO, the mission owner must pick a CSO that fits their operational needs and that possesses a DoD PA at the information impact level corresponding to the categorization of the information to be processed or stored in the CSO.  The PA and supporting documentation must then be leveraged by the Mission Owner’s Authorization Official in granting the required ATO for the mission system operating within the cloud. 

NOTE: For the purpose of the CC SRG, the use of the term “Assessment and Authorization (A&A)” refers to the collection of RMF processes which includes “Security Control Assessment, Risk Assessment (informed by Security Control Assessment), Ongoing Assessment (continuous monitoring), and System Authorization.

4.1 Assessment of Commercial/Non-DoD Cloud Services


The 15 December 2014 DoD CIO memo regarding Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services, states “components may host Unclassified DoD information that has been publicly released on FedRAMP approved cloud services.” The memo also states “FedRAMP will serve as the minimum security baseline for all DoD cloud services.”

Impact Level 2: Using the definitions outlined in Section 3.2, Impact Level 2 information may be hosted in a CSP that is government assessed as FedRAMP compliant at the moderate level.  The two acceptable government assessments include:

  • JAB PA – Based on a determination by the JAB that an acceptable level of risk exists for leveraging across the Federal Government.  DoD is an active participant in the technical reviews of the JAB PA security assessment artifacts.
  • FedRAMP listed Agency ATOs – Based on an assessment and ATO issued by a Federal Government agency where the CSP was assessed by a FedRAMP accredited/approved 3PAO. 

DoD will not perform additional NIST 800-53 RMF control assessments at Level 2 before awarding a DoD PA and listing in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog[29].

Impact Level 4/5: RMF assessments for Impact Levels 4 and above are based on a combination of the security controls in the FedRAMP Moderate or High baselines and the DoD specific controls/requirements outlined in Section 5.1.2, DoD FedRAMP+ Security Controls/Enhancements and other requirements throughout this SRG. Where possible, DoD leverages documentation and artifacts from previous FedRAMP-JAB or non-DoD Agency authorizations in the FedRAMP Secure Repository and additional CSP proprietary artifacts provided by the CSP.  FedRAMP+ requirements will be assessed by a FedRAMP accredited/approved 3PAO.  An overall determination of risk is prepared by the DISA Cloud Security Control Assessor (SCA) organization to support a DoD PA decision. The DISA AO (formerly the DISA DAA) approves DoD PAs. 

There are three paths that can be followed in assessing a CSP for a Level 4/5 DoD PA and subsequent listing in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog[30] available to DoD personnel. These are:

  • CSPs with a FedRAMP JAB PA or in the process of obtaining a JAB PA: DoD leverages the documentation and artifacts produced as part of the FedRAMP process, supplemented with an assessment of the DoD-specific security controls and requirements not addressed by FedRAMP for Impact Levels 4 and above.  CSPs having a FedRAMP JAB PA have been assessed by an accredited/approved 3PAO against the FedRAMP Moderate or High Baseline.  For those in the process of obtaining a JAB PA, DoD promotes the use of parallel activities (FedRAMP and FedRAMP+) to minimize cost and create efficiencies in the assessment process.

NOTE: This is the DoD preferred path to a DoD PA because the DoD SCA and the DoD CIO have already been involved in the assessments and authorization activities.

  

  • FedRAMP listed Non-DoD Agency ATO: CSPs having a non-DoD Federal agency authorization based upon security controls assessed by an accredited/approved 3PAO can be assessed for a DoD PA provided that the authorization is accepted and listed in the FedRAMP agency authorizations. The acceptable minimum baseline is FedRAMP Moderate.  The information from the non-DoD agency ATO will be supplemented with an assessment of the DoD-specific controls and requirements.  This additional assessment should be performed by the CSP’s 3PAO and submitted to the DISA SCA for review toward awarding a PA.

NOTE: Mission Owners, their AOs, and/or the DISA SCA need to carefully assess Agency ATOs as the non-DoD agency may have accepted risks that are not appropriate for DoD to accept. 

 

  • DoD Component Assessed PA: The CSP’s CSO is fully assessed, independent of the FedRAMP PMO, by a FedRAMP accredited/approved 3PAO (highly recommended), the DISA Cloud SCA organization, or other approved DoD SCA organization** in coordination with the DISA Cloud SCA organization.  The CSP’s CSO must be assessed against both the FedRAMP Moderate (or High) Baseline and FedRAMP+ requirements. 

 

When a FedRAMP PA or 3PAO assessed non-DoD Agency ATO does not exist, a DoD Component assessment of a CSP’s CSO may only be performed under two circumstances.  These are:

  1. If a DoD organization has a validated mission requirement that only the specific CSP’s CSO can fulfill requiring it to be authorized, or
  2. If a DoD organization acting as a CSP develops and instantiates a CSO. 

The DoD organization with a need for that CSP’s CSO to be authorized will be required to support resourcing for the full assessment, in coordination with the DISA cloud security assessment team.  This assessment of the FedRAMP, FedRAMP+ security controls, and other SRG requirements determines whether to grant a DoD PA and the appropriate impact levels. 

If a CSP receives a DoD assessed PA and that service offering may be leveraged by other Federal Agencies, the CSP’s assessment package will be shared with and be available through the FedRAMP secure repository as well as the DoD Cloud Services Catalog. If the service offering will only be used by DoD customers the CSP’s assessment package will only be available through the DoD Cloud Service Catalog, since private clouds are ineligible for inclusion in the FedRAMP catalog.

While DoD CSP IaaS/PaaS/SaaS CSOs will be assessed for a full ATO under the DoD RMF to support their approval for connection to the DISN, DoD CSP IaaS/PaaS CSOs will also be assessed for a PA IAW the requirements for commercial CSPs in this SRG. The award of a PA to DoD CSP IaaS/PaaS CSOs enable the Mission Owners AOs to leverage the PA in the same manner as a PA for a commercial CSP toward granting an ATO for the systems and applications built on the CSO.  For assessment information for DoD SaaS CSOs see Section 4.2, Assessment of DoD Cloud Services.

** “Other approved DoD SCA organizations” include those DoD Component level organizations that routinely perform Security Control Assessment activities in support of the Component’s AO.  Examples are DISA’s Risk Management Executive (RME) Certification and Assessment Division RE5, Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) and Air Force Space Command AFSPC.

CSOs may (should) be assessed for both FedRAMP and DoD requirements simultaneously by the same 3PAO. This permits CSPs to avoid redundancies in assessments when they seek to have a CSO included in both the FedRAMP and DoD Cloud Catalog.

Any change of ownership involving a CSP, whether the primary CSP or an underlying CSP on which a CSO was built, will be reviewed by the DISA AO to assess the impacts and risks associated with the continuation of the DoD PA.  Furthermore, DoD CIO, the DISA AO, and Mission Owners must be notified of any potential change of CSP ownership six months before the change occurs to allow for the PA review and for Mission Owners to off-board from the CSP and retrieve their information/data if they desire.   Mission Owners must address CSP ownership in their SLAs/Contracts.  The major concern for DoD is a sale to a non-US organization.   

A CSO with a DoD PA does not eliminate the requirement for a given application using the CSO to have an ATO (or IATT) prior to commencing operations as addressed in Section 4.3.3, Mission Risk

NOTICE: DoD Cloud SCA organizations must be experienced in assessing NIST SP 800-53 C/CE. To standardize the quality of assessments across Cloud SCA organizations and the quality of DoD PAs for use by all DoD Components and Mission Owners, DoD SCA organizations should become accredited by American Association for Laboratory Accreditation (A2LA)[31] and approved by FedRAMP as a 3PAO[32]. Alternately all assessments leveraged for a DoD PA should be done by a FedRAMP approved 3PAO. Furthermore, since DoD PAs are based on the RMF, CSP CSOs assessed under the outdated DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) using DoDI 8500.2 IA controls do not qualify for a DoD PA as this would break the standardization of the basis for the PA and thereby its quality.

Impact Level 6: Assessment and Authorization of off-premises DoD contractor facilities and information systems that process, store, transmit classified information (i.e., Non-DoD commercial CSPs and their Level 6 CSOs) must be performed in conjunction with the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) (as defined in Executive Order 12829[33]) and the Industrial Security Regulation (ISR) (DoD 5220.22-R)[34] in accordance with 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subpart 4.4 - Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry[35] and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) section 52.204-2 - Security Requirements[36].  NISP policies are the purview of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) Industrial Security division and, for DoD, the Defense Security Service (DSS).  DoDI 5220.22[37] assigns DoD responsibilities for administration of the NISP IAW E.O. 10865 and 12829 to ensure classified information disclosed to industry is properly safeguarded.  NISP responsibilities for DoD components are found in the DoD 5220.22-R and DoDI 5220.22; whereas, commercial CSPs with Level 6 offerings must adhere to the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DoD 5220.22-M) [38].  Together the ISR, NISPOM, and Office of the Designated Approving Authority (ODAA) Process Manual[39] provide guidance.

NOTE: It is the intent of the DoD CIO that all CSPs and CSOs are assessed against the same set of requirements and Cybersecurity control baselines as defined in the DoDI 8510.01- DoD RMF, and CNSSI 1253- Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems and the CC SRG. Requirements and processes supporting the authorization of off-premise Commercial CSPs and their CSOs for Impact Level 6 will be coordinated with OUSD(I) and DSS as NISP policies and procedures are updated.  Updated guidance and requirements for off-premises CSPs and their CSOs for a DoD Level 6 provisional authorization may appear in a future release of the CC SRG.



 

4.2 Assessment of DoD Cloud Services and Enterprise Services Applications


DoD operated CSOs (e.g., milCloud IaaS/PaaS) are subject to the same requirements found in this SRG and the same security controls as commercial CSOs.  However, DoD CSP/CSO programs and services must also follow DoD Risk Management procedures in accordance with DoDI 8510.01, which is based on the full sets of controls and control enhancements listed in CNSSI 1253 commensurate with the service’s information categorization.  This means the DoD CSO must be assessed against the aggregate baseline made up of the appropriate FedRAMP baseline (minimally Moderate) and the appropriate CNSSI 1253 baselines (as tailored).  DoD CSOs require a full ATO which may be used in lieu of a PA or to generate a PA that can be leveraged by Mission Owner’s and their AOs.

DoD enterprise service programs that might be considered cloud services under the SaaS model (e.g., Defense Enterprise Email (DEE), Defense Collaboration Service (DCS), DoD Enterprise Portal Service (DEPS)), are also subject to the DoDI 8510.01 requirements and CNSSI 1253 baselines.  Such programs are DoD assessed as noted above and not subject to being assessed through the FedRAMP program and do not share DoD ATOs with the FedRAMP secure repository. 

DoD is transitioning to the DoD RMF from the DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP).  DIACAP is based on a set of DoD defined security controls, not the NIST SP 800-53 security control catalog. Cloud services initiated and authorized under the DIACAP will be assessed and authorized using the RMF in accordance with DoD transition guidance as defined in DoDI 8510.01 or supplemental DoD guidance. 

Impact Level 6: Assessment and Authorization of On-Premises Level 6 CSOs (i.e., DoD or DoD Contractor managed CSOs in a DoD data center) will be performed by DoD Component SCAs in the same manner as any other SIPRNet enclave, service, or application in accordance with DoD established policies and processes IAW DoD RMF for DoD classified facilities, applications, connection approval, and clearances for DoD and DoD contractor personnel.  In conjunction with this A&A the CSO may receive a DoD PA if the CSO will be offered to DoD Components other than the authorizing component and the CSO meets the standards defined in this CC SRG for all CSOs. In the event the on-premises CSO is operated/managed by a commercial CSP or other DoD contractor, the CSP/contractor will be required to have the appropriate facilities clearance and cleared personnel as is the case with any DoD contractor that handles classified information. The details of clearing contractors is well known and beyond the scope of the CC SRG.

To receive a DoD PA, DoD On-Premises Impact Level 6 CSOs will be minimally assessed IAW the FedRAMP Moderate or High Baseline, the Level 6 FedRAMP+ C/CE and the CNSSI 1253 Appendix F, Attachment 5 Classified Information Overlay C/CEs. Such CSOs may need to meet additional CNSSI 1253 C/CE in the baselines associated with the categorization of the information to be processed/stored in the CSO.

NOTE: See Section 5.6.2.2, CSP Personnel Requirements – PS-3: Background Investigations under the Level 6 topic for additional requirements related to on-premises contractor- managed CSOs WRT organizational facilities clearances and cleared personnel.

4.3 Cloud Service Offering and Mission Owner Risk Management


Risk management must consider both the CSO and the supported mission (i.e., the Mission Owner’s system or application).  Each CSO must be granted a DoD PA in order to host DoD mission systems.  The PA and supporting documentation will then be used by the Mission Owner’s risk management officials as a basis of reciprocity for the controls provided by the CSP, recognizing the controls will vary based on the service model (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) and could also vary based on requirements such as privacy or classification controls.  Additionally, there are controls that are “shared controls” where both the CSO and the Mission Owner need to address a requirement.  The responsible AO leverages the PA information, supplemented with an assessment of the risks within the Mission Owner’s responsibility, in granting an authorization to operate. 

Understanding the distinction between what’s provided and addressed with the CSO versus what’s addressed by the Mission Owner is critical to implementing the DoD cloud security requirements as defined in this SRG.

4.3.1 Cloud Computing, Authorization Boundaries


In Cloud Computing, there are two primary Authorization Boundaries.  These are generally determined by the division of control between CSP and Mission Owner. (See Figure 2 – Notional Division of Security Inheritance and Risk) and are generally defined as follows:

  1. CSP and CSO  Authorization Boundary addressed by the FedRAMP and DoD PAs consists of two parts:
  1. The CSP organization, their operating/security policies and procedures, physical facilities, network(s), hardware server platforms, hypervisors, VMs, applications, etc., that serves their corporate network and indirectly supports their CSOs.  CSOs inherit the C/CEs that the CSP implements along with any resulting residual risk based on how well the C/CEs are implemented   
  2. The CSO includes the infrastructure directly supporting the CSO and the following for each service type:
  • IaaS: includes the network, storage, computing platforms, and hypervisors that compose the IaaS service offering.
  • PaaS: may build on the devices and platforms or constructs used in IaaS and includes the VMs, their OSs and platform applications.  Some or all of these and those listed for IaaS are included in this Authorization Boundary if the CSP manages/secures the OS and platform applications. 

NOTE: Some PaaS services may not employ virtualization and the platform application offered by the service may be built from the ground up.  This does not match the NIST definitions for cloud services.

  • SaaS: may build on the devices, platforms, applications, or constructs used in IaaS and PaaS to encompass the final application that constitutes the CSP's service offering and everything that supports it.  Some or all of these and those listed for IaaS and PaaS are included in this Authorization Boundary for SaaS. 

NOTE: Some SaaS services may not employ virtualization and the application offered by the service may be built from the ground up. This does not match the NIST definitions for cloud services.

  1. Mission Owner’s system/application Authorization Boundary which is addressed by the Mission Owner’s ATO.  Mission Owner’s system/applications inherit the C/CEs that the CSP implements for their organization and CSO(s) along with any resulting residual risk based on how well the C/CEs are implemented.  The Mission Owner’s ATO covers these inherited C/CEs along with the following based on service type:
  • IaaS: the Mission Owner operated/maintained system of virtual networks and VMs along with their OSs, applications, and associated data storage. 
  • PaaS: the portion of the system of virtual networks and VMs along with their OSs, platform applications, and associated data storage managed by the Mission Owner along with the application(s) implemented by the Mission Owner on top of the CSO.
  • SaaS: The portion of the CSO managed by the Mission Owner (e.g., user accounts) along with the Mission Owner policies and procedures for using the CSO and the Mission Owner’s compliance with DoD security policies related to the use of the CSO and Cloud in general.

All service types: data in transit encryption methods used by the Mission Owner, any additional layers of access control implemented by the Mission Owner for access to the service for users and management, data at rest encryption implemented or managed by the customer, and any other DoD requirements that must be met by the CSP’s customer.

4.3.2 Cloud Service Offering (CSO) Risk


The DoD PA provides a provisional or partial risk acceptance determination for the CSO against the appropriate DoD security requirements.  The DoD PA assessment process assesses and highlights CSO risk based on its supported impact level.  At level 4 and above, it’s important to recognize that the DoD PA evaluation process also assesses the risk to DoD of permitting CSPs to connect to DoD networks.

4.3.3 Mission Risk


Mission refers to the information system and functions for which a DoD entity acquires or uses a CSO.  This may be the direct use of a SaaS CSO in performing an IT-enabled mission, or the instantiation of an IT system or application on an IaaS/PaaS CSO. 

Any DoD or Non-DoD CSO used by Mission Owners must have been issued a DoD PA by DISA.  Overall mission risk will continue to be assessed and authorized by the Mission Owner’s AO through the issuance of an ATO. The Mission Owner’s system/application/cloud use case must be issued an ATO by their Component's AO or other component authorized subordinate AO directly responsible for risk acceptance for the Mission Owner’s system/application/cloud use case.  This is applicable at all information impact levels.  This mission system ATO requirement extends to DoD CSP IaaS/PaaS CSOs where its ATO only permits its connection to the DISN since such an ATO cannot address full mission system/application risk when built on the CSO. 

The requirement that a Mission Owner must only utilize CSOs that have a DoD PA extends to CSOs provided by a third party integration contractor or reseller of CSP CSOs.  Any CSO being integrated into a solution for use by DoD or resold to a DoD entity must have a DoD PA.

Mission Owners categorize mission systems and/or applications in accordance with (IAW) DoDI 8510.01 defined processes.  Mission owners then select CSOs from the DoD Cloud Service Catalog based on their security posture and the risk tolerance of the Mission Owner and their AO.  While CSOs will have been assessed and provisionally authorized for use, the Mission Owner must proceed IAW the RMF to obtain an Authority to Operate (ATO) from their assigned AO. 

The Mission Owner inherits compliance from the CSO for the security controls (or portions thereof) that the CSP meets and maintains.  A Mission Owner’s system or application built on an IaaS or PaaS offering will be subject to meeting many of the same security controls within the system/application.  Mission Owners contracting for SaaS offerings inherit the bulk of compliance with the security controls from the CSO.  Inheritance will be different between CSPs operating within a given service model and thus must be evaluated separately.  It should also be noted that the number of controls increases with higher impact levels and additional overlay controls (e.g. privacy).  While Figure 2 depicts the division of management and ergo responsibility shared between the CSP and Mission Owner, it also illustrates the concept of inheritance.

Figure 2 – Notional Division of Security Inheritance and Risk [40]

 

The benefit of starting with a provisionally authorized CSO is that much of the security controls assessment work is already accomplished.  Mission Owners and their AOs must still review the FedRAMP and DoD PA artifacts to understand the risks that the mission will inherit when using the selected CSO for the mission system/application.  Mission owners may need to implement, or request that the CSP implement, compensating controls for any risk deemed unacceptable prior to obtaining an ATO. Additional compensating controls must be reflected in the Mission Owner’s SLA/contract with the CSP.



[40] Figure 2: Graphic courtesy of Microsoft

 

4.4 CSP Transition from CSM v2.1 to CC SRG v1r1 and Subsequent Updates


FedRAMP provides a transition strategy[41]for migrating CSP assessments from the FedRAMP v1 baselines based on NIST SP 800-53 rev3 to the FedRAMP v2 baselines based on NIST SP 800-53 rev4.  This strategy went into effect on June 6, 2014.  The key points are as follows:

  • Any new assessment starting after June 1, 2014 will immediately transition to FedRAMP v2 baselines based on NIST SP 800-53 rev4.
  • CSPs in the process of being assessed against FedRAMP v1 baselines based on NIST SP 800-53 rev3 prior to June 1, 2014 will continue on this track, but must transition to the FedRAMP v2 baselines within one year of their authorization date.
  • CSPs currently in continuous monitoring will have until their next annual assessment to complete the transition to FedRAMP v2 baselines.

NOTE: In accordance with the original transition plan, FedRAMP updated its transition plan on 9 Sept, 2015[42] to state:

“FedRAMP requires all CSPs to transition to the FedRAMP Revision 4 requirements by the end of the 2015 calendar year. As of January 1, 2016, the FedRAMP PMO will not accept Revision 3 system documentation as FedRAMP compliant.”

The requirements in this SRG become effective immediately upon final publication.  However, the DoD migration plan for CSP assessments will mirror the FedRAMP plan as follows:

  • Any new assessment starting after the release of this CC SRG will be assessed against these requirements. 
  • CSPs currently in the process of being assessed against the requirements in the CSM v2.1 will continue on this track, but must transition to compliance with the CC SRG requirements in coordination with their next FedRAMP/DoD annual assessment.
  • CSPs currently in continuous monitoring under CSM v2.1 will have until their next FedRAMP/DoD annual assessment to complete the transition to compliance with the CC SRG control requirements.

A DoD PA issued for a CSP using the CSM v2.1 and based on FedRAMP v1 remains in effect for the duration of the DoD PA (unless revoked), so long as compliance is achieved within the timelines described above.  DoD mission owner’s systems leveraging a CSO may experience a period of time where risks based on FedRAMP v2 or new FedRAMP+ security controls have not yet been assessed.  Mission owners and their AOs must review the controls to determine if the risk is acceptable until such time the CSP is required to comply or include the required compliance in the SLA/contract. 

NOTE: CSPs wishing to transition sooner than later may do so at any time. 

NOTICE: the use of the term FedRAMP v2 in the CC SRG refers to the FedRAMP baselines that were updated to NIST SP 800-53 rev4 from rev 3. This is not to be confused with the pending revision of FedRAMP designated as FedRAMP 2.0.



 

4.4.1 CSP Transition from CC SRG Version/Release to Updated CC SRG Version/Release


The requirements in CC SRG updates, whether they are a major version update or minor release update, become effective immediately upon final publication.  However:

  • Any new CSP/CSO assessment starting after the release of a CC SRG update will be assessed against the updated requirements. 
  • CSPs/CSOs currently in the process of being assessed against the requirements in the previous CC SRG will continue on this track, but must transition to compliance with the current CC SRG update in coordination with their next FedRAMP/DoD annual assessment. i.e., one year from award of the PA.
  • CSPs/CSOs currently in continuous monitoring under the previous CC SRG will provide a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) within 30 days for becoming compliant with the current CC SRG requirements as soon as possible, but no later than, their next FedRAMP/DoD annual assessment if scheduled six months after the CC SRG update is released, not to exceed one year.  i.e., transition is to occur as soon as practical but no longer than between six months and one year.

A DoD PA issued for a CSP using the previous CC SRG and based on FedRAMP v2 remains in effect for the duration of the DoD PA (unless revoked), so long as compliance is achieved with the timelines described above.  Due to the transition period, DoD mission systems leveraging a CSO may experience a period of time where risks based on the current CC SRG security controls have not yet been assessed.  Mission owners and their AOs must review the controls to determine if the risk is acceptable until such time the CSP is required to comply or include the required compliance in the SLA/contract. 

NOTE: CSPs wishing to transition sooner than later may do so at any time.

4.5 DoD PA in Relation to RFP Response and Contract Award; DFARS Interpretation


This section provides information relative to PAs and ATOs in relation to contract awards.  The following points, in no way, alter any contract clauses currently defined in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) or may be defined in the future, but is intended to provide additional clarity primarily regarding on-premises CSOs.

This topic must be addressed from two viewpoints. These are:

  1. When the commercial CSO infrastructure is off-premises (where it is typically already in existence), vs
  2. When the CSO infrastructure is contracted to be on-premises either physically or virtually (where it typically will need to be built using dedicated hardware). 

Off-Premises Commercial Service: IAW DFARS SUBPART 239.76—CLOUD COMPUTING,[43] 239.7602-1, a CSP must have a DoD PA at the appropriate Information Impact Level (IIL) before contract award.  In essence this means the CSP/CSO must typically have a DoD PA before responding to a DoD cloud services RFP. 

This extends to integrators and resellers of CSP CSOs responding to RFPs.  Any CSO being integrated into a solution for use by DoD or resold to a DoD entity must have a DoD PA at the appropriate IIL.

DFARS 239.7602-1 provides 2 exceptions:

  1. The requirement is waived by the DoD CIO.
  2. “The cloud computing service requirement is for a private, on-premises version that will be provided from U.S. Government facilities. Under this circumstance, the cloud service provider must obtain a provisional authorization prior to operational use.” This is clarified below.

Additionally in the case of a Mission Owner leveraging a commercial off-premises CSO and its PA, the Mission Owner’s AO provides the ATO for their usage of the CSO to meet DoD RMF policy. This is also covered in the DoD CIO’s cloud memo.

On-Premises (physically or virtually): While the general DFARS rule applies to on-premises CSOs in that it is beneficial to DoD that the commercial instantiation of the CSP’s CSO has been assessed and awarded a DoD PA, proving the commercial service and infrastructure is capable of hosting DoD information and systems at the appropriate IIL, this PA is not directly useable for a separate on-premises instantiation of the CSO. 

An on-premises CSO is DoD private which will be connected to a DISN service (i.e., NIPRNet or SIPRNet) as described elsewhere in the CC SRG.  As such, the CSO must have a DoD Interim Authority to Test (IATT), conditional ATO, or PA to connect to the network for testing and a DoD ATO with or without conditions before going into production IAW normal DoD policy.  A previous DoD PA for the off-premises commercial instantiation will only inform the assessments for the on-premises IATT and ATO.  Certain portions of the previous PA assessment will have to be re-assessed due to the new infrastructure and different location(s), while some C/CE compliance will be inherited from the DoD and specific facility where the CSO infrastructure is located rather than the commercial facility.  In a virtually on-premises scenario, the instantiation might inherit some C/CE compliance from the DoD PA for the commercial service and the commercial datacenters where it is hosted, providing the private instantiation is hosted in the same datacenter(s) as were reviewed for the PA. See Section 5.2.1.1, DoD Off-Premises Vs On-Premises Vs Virtually On-Premises for additional information.

As noted above, DFARS clause 239.7602-1.(b)(2)(ii), provides for an exception to the general rule that a CSP/CSO must have a DoD PA before award.  It states that a contract may be awarded for a private, on-premises CSO that will be provided from U.S. Government facilities.  It further states that the CSO must obtain a PA prior to operational use.  On-premises DoD systems to include CSOs require an ATO before operational use.  This ATO may be used in lieu of a PA or to generate a PA to be leveraged by Mission Owner’s and their AOs.

 



[43] DFARS SUBPART 239.76: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/239_76.htm#239.76

 

4.6 Cloud Service vs a Managed IT Service


In accordance with industry norms, a Managed IT Service is one where the customer dictates the technology and the operational procedures while for a Cloud Service the provider (i.e., CSP) dictates the technology and the operational procedures. A physically or virtually on-premises DoD private CSO operated by a contractor, whether that contractor is the original CSP or other organization, in reality can be a Managed Service rather than a Cloud Service in the usual sense.  This can happen when DoD contracts for a “copy” or “version” of a CSP’s commercial cloud service to be built on DoD premises (virtually or physically) and operated/managed as a private CSO.  Whether it is a managed service vs cloud service depends on how many of the requirements for the service, its infrastructure, and management DoD specifies or dictates. 

DoD private Managed Services are subject to normal DoD security requirements and RMF policy rather than DoD policy addressing commercial cloud services. That being said the applicable security requirements for a Managed Cloud Service will include requirements in this CC SRG and standard DoD RMF security requirements.

5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS


This section of the CC SRG defines the security requirements for DoD’s use of cloud computing. It covers several areas as follows:

  • Security requirements for assessing CSOs for the award of a DoD PA and inclusion in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog.
  • Security requirements for CSP’s/CSOs while hosting DoD missions.
  • Security requirements for Mission Owner’s systems/applications using or built on CSOs.

NOTICE: All CSP and CSO requirements in this CC SRG apply to all CSPs and CSOs offered to or contracted by the DoD.  DoD recognizes that CSOs may be offered by a CSP or an Integrator as the prime contractor on a DoD contract.  DoD also recognizes that prime contractors may subcontract for multiple CSOs to meet contract capabilities requirements and may subcontract systems maintenance.  Therefore all requirements in this CC SRG apply to all CSOs provided by prime contractors and their subcontractors to include systems maintenance contractors who may have access to CSP customer information or who may have the capability of affecting the security of the CSO.  This flow down to subcontractors is also covered in cloud and contractor associated DFARS clauses. 

5.1 DoD Policy Regarding Security Controls


DoDI 8500.01 requires all DoD Information Systems to be categorized in accordance with CNSSI 1253 and implement a corresponding set of security controls and control enhancements (C/CEs) that are published in NIST SP 800-53, regardless of whether they are National Security Systems (NSS) or non-NSS. 

The CNSSI 1253 baselines are tailored from the NIST SP 800-53 recommended baselines, as are the FedRAMP baselines.  These baselines are a starting point for securing all DoD systems, which can be tailored further to address specific systems and situations. 

See NIST SP 800-59, Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System,[44] for a definition of NSS and further information. 



 

5.1.1 DoD use of FedRAMP Security Controls


The FedRAMP Low, Moderate, and High baselines are a tailored set of C/CEs based on the Low, Moderate, and High baselines recommended in NIST SP 800-53 catalog of security controls.

The 15 December 2014 DoD CIO memo regarding Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services states “FedRAMP will serve as the minimum security baseline for all DoD cloud services.”  This SRG uses the FedRAMP Moderate baseline at all information impact levels and considers the High Baseline at some. 

Level 2: The 2014 DoD CIO memo further states “components may host Unclassified DoD information that has been publicly released on FedRAMP approved cloud services”.  Using the definitions defined in Section 3.2, Impact Level 2 information may be hosted in a CSP that minimally holds a FedRAMP Moderate PA and a DoD Level 2 PA; subject to compliance with the personnel security requirements outlined in Section 5.6.2, CSP Personnel Requirements and acceptance by the Mission Owner and the responsible AO.  Only FedRAMP Moderate baseline controls will be assessed for DoD PAs for impact level 2.  This in no way alleviates the CSP from meeting other security and integration requirements for CSP’s/CSOs as required by the Mission Owner while hosting DoD IT missions or the Mission Owner from securing their systems/web sites/applications in Level 2 CSOs.

Level 4: The FedRAMP Moderate baseline, supplemented with DoD FedRAMP+ C/CEs and other requirements in this SRG, are used to assess CSPs toward awarding a DoD PA at information impact level 4. 

An alternate path to a DoD Level 4 PA is available due to coordination of the FedRAMP High baseline and DoD Level 4 FedRAMP+ C/CE. A FedRAMP High PA will be accepted for a DoD Level 4 PA without additional C/CE assessment, however, assessment of non C/CE based requirements in this SRG is required.

Levels 5/6: The FedRAMP Moderate or High baseline, supplemented with DoD FedRAMP+ C/CEs and requirements in this SRG, are used to assess CSPs toward awarding a DoD PA at information impact levels 5 and 6.

No matter what C/CE baseline is used as the basis for a FedRAMP PA, additional considerations and/or requirements will need to be assessed and approved before a DoD PA can be awarded at Levels 4/5/6.  These considerations and/or requirements can be found throughout this SRG, while a summary can be found in section 5.1.7, Additional Considerations and/or Requirements for L4/5 DoD PA Award.

5.1.2 DoD FedRAMP+ Security Controls/Enhancements


DoD FedRAMP+ refers to a tailored baseline of security C/CEs which has been developed for each DoD information impact level, except for level 2.  These baselines incorporate, but are not limited to, the FedRAMP Moderate or High baselines.  The FedRAMP+ C/CEs include NIST 800-53 security controls and enhancements not included in the FedRAMP Moderate baseline.  FedRAMP+ also includes tailored values and selections for most FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CEs which require definition.  The FedRAMP+ C/CEs were selected primarily because they address issues such as the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) and/or Insider Threat, and because the DoD, unlike the rest of the Federal Government, must categorize its systems in accordance with CNSSI 1253, use its baselines, and then tailor as needed. 

The CNSSI 1253 baseline used in support of DoD PAs is based on Moderate Confidentiality and Moderate Integrity.  It does not include a baseline for Availability (categorization designated as M-M-x).  Availability is addressed in the FedRAMP baseline and may also be addressed by the Mission Owner in the contract/SLA.  The resulting M-M-x baseline was compared to the FedRAMP Moderate baseline to derive a tailored set of FedRAMP+ security controls/enhancements for each level.  This comparison indicated that the FedRAMP Moderate Baseline includes approximately thirty two (32) C/CEs that are also contained in the CNSSI 1253 M-M-x baseline, but not in the NIST 800-53 Moderate baseline incorporated in both.  The comparison also indicated that eighty-eight (88) of the C/CEs in the CNSSI 1253 M-M-x baseline are not in the FedRAMP Moderate baseline.  These 88 were analyzed for their security benefit in the CSP environment and projected cost if the CSP were required to implement the C/CE. Approximately half were selected for the DoD cloud baselines for assessing CSPs.  The number of control enhancements selected varies by impact level.

More recently, with the development of the FedRAMP High baseline, a portion of the DoD Level 4 FedRAMP+ C/CE were accepted for inclusion into the FedRAMP High baseline along with several value adjustments.

Table 2 provides a listing of the FedRAMP+ C/CEs applicable to each information impact level, which includes only three additional base controls.  The rest are control enhancements.  This table does not include controls added by the Classified Information or Privacy overlays.  More information on the assessment of the C/CE in these overlays is provided in the sections following this one.

NOTE: This table does not include the FedRAMP Moderate or High baseline C/CEs, tables of which can be obtained from the FedRAMP website on the Documents page[45].

Table 2 - DoD FedRAMP+ Security Controls/Enhancements

SP 800-53r4 Cont./Enh.  ID

FedRAMP+ for FedRAMP

Moderate Baseline

FedRAMP+ for FedRAMP

High Baseline

 

Level 4

Level 5

Level 6

Level 4

Level 5

Level 6

AC-06 (07)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AC-06 (08)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AC-17 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AC-18 (03)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AC-23

X

X

X

 

 

 

AT-03 (02)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AT-03 (04)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AU-04 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AU-06 (04)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AU-06 (10)

X

X

X

 

 

 

AU-12 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

CA-03 (01)

 

X

n/a*

 

X

n/a*

CM-03 (04)

X

X

X

 

 

 

CM-03 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

CM-04 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

CM-05 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IA-02 (09)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IA-05 (13)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-04 (03)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-04 (04)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-04 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-04 (07)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-04 (08)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-05 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

IR-06 (02)

X

X

X

 

 

 

MA-04 (03)

X

X

X

 

 

 

MA-04 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

PE-03 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

PL-08 (01)

 

X

X

 

X

X

PS-04 (01)

 

X

X

 

X

X

PS-06 (03)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SA-04 (07)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SA-12

X

X

X

 

 

 

SA-19

X

X

X

 

 

 

SC-07 (10)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SC-07 (11)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SC-07 (14)

 

 

X

 

 

X

SC-08 (02)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SC-23 (01)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SC-23 (03)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SC-23 (05)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SI-02 (06)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SI-03 (10)

 

X

X

 

X

X

SI-04 (12)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SI-04 (19)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SI-04 (20)

X

X

X

 

 

 

SI-04 (22)

X

X

X

 

X

X

SI-10 (03)

X

X

X

 

 

 

Total

Also see 5.1.5

Also see 5.1.4      5.1.5

Also see 5.1.4    5.1.4.1

 

 

 

* Most Level 5 FedRAMP+ C/CEs are also applicable at Level 6. The use of n/a in Level 6 for CA-03 (01) is because the CE addresses “Unclassified National Security System Connections” and is therefore not selectable or applicable for Classified NSS.

 

NOTE: CSPs may offer equivalent controls or mitigations which will be considered on a case-by-case basis.



 

5.1.3 Parameter Values for Security Controls and Enhancements


Both FedRAMP and the DoD have defined minimum requirements in security controls and enhancement parameters.  However, in some circumstances, the specifics of the implementation are left to the CSP and assessed as to whether the implementation is appropriate for the CSO and government.  For those controls required by FedRAMP and the DoD, the parameter values are defined in Appendix D - CSP Assessment Parameter Values for PA. Also see Section 5.1.5.2, Effects of the Privacy Overlay on CSPs and Mission Owners for additional parameter guidance.

5.1.4 National Security Systems (NSS)


Although the control baselines for all levels are based on those from CNSSI 1253, only impact Level 5 and 6 are designed to accommodate NSS categorized up to M-M-x.  NSS-specific C/CEs have been included at these levels along with those required for the slightly higher impact of these systems at the moderate level (short of a full high baseline).  Thus, unclassified NSS must be instantiated at level 5 if a CSO is used.  This, however, does not preclude an unclassified non-NSS from operating at Level 5 if the mission/information owner requires the added security.

5.1.4.1 NSS Level 6 Classified Overlay Applicability


Impact Level 6 is for classified systems which by definition are NSS. As such and IAW the DoD RMF, on-premises CSOs  are subject to the CNSSI 1253 Classified Information Overlay in addition to FedRAMP and FedRAMP+.  This overlay is an attachment to Appendix F of the CNSSI 1253 entitled CNSSI 1253F, Attachment 5, Classified Information Overlay.[46]  It is available from the CNSS Library on the Instructions page.

This overlay imposes 94 additional C/CEs which must be assessed for a CSP’s CSO Level 6 PA.  For all CSOs, there may only be a portion of these C/CEs applicable to the CSP with the balance of the C/CEs being fulfilled by the Mission Owner.  This division of responsibility will be addressed in a future release of this document or in a companion document.



 

5.1.5 CNSSI 1253 Privacy Overlay


The CNSSI 1253 Privacy Overlay is an attachment to Appendix F of the CNSSI 1253 entitled CNSSI 1253F, Attachment 6, Privacy Overlay.[47]  It is available from the CNSS Library on the Instructions page. 

The Privacy Overlay was developed in accordance with Federal privacy requirements found in laws, policies, and standards that apply to government agencies, such as the Privacy Act of 1974 [48]and HIPAA[49], leveraging experts and lawyers in both fields.  Legal references are included as the basis for all control specifications in the Privacy Overlay, including whether to select or exclude C/CE as well as the provision of supplemental guidance and control extensions.  It is supported by DoD and the IC as well as other Federal agencies that are part of the CNSS.  The Privacy Overlay was written by CNSS to protect PII and PHI in NSS, however, many of the requirements the overlay specifications are based on apply to any Federal information system that contains PII or PHI, regardless of whether the system is an NSS or not. All Federal agencies including DoD must comply with public laws that apply to the Federal government’s collection, use and maintenance of PII, thus DoD invokes the CNSS Privacy Overlay since it is the best resource we know of. 

This overlay addresses Low, Moderate, and High sensitivity PII and PHI. It invokes most of the 36 privacy specific C/CEs from NIST SP 800-53 rev4, Appendix J, Privacy Control Catalog and invokes additional C/CEs from the Security Control Catalog.  It also modifies many of the already selected C/CEs in the FedRAMP Moderate and FedRAMP+ baselines by providing supplemental guidance along with parameter value changes and control extensions.  Quantities of additional C/CEs and guidance depend on both the PII sensitivity level and whether the PII meets the definition of PHI.



 

5.1.5.1 PII/PHI at Level 2


PII and PHI are categorized as CUI and as such must minimally be stored and processed in a Level 4 CSO.  While the Privacy Overlay provides a Business Rolodex Exception (BRE) which exempts a subset of low sensitivity PII from the protection of the overlay, this does not remove this PII from the CUI category.  Therefore at this time, no PII/PHI is permitted to be processed or stored in Level 2 CSOs.

5.1.5.2 Effects of the Privacy Overlay on CSPs and Mission Owners


To limit the affect the listing of Privacy Overlay C/CE and their Parameter Values on the size of the main portion of the CC SRG, this section provides pointers to tables in Appendix E of Privacy Overlay C/CE in the following categories:

  • FedRAMP Moderate and FedRAMP+ C/CE that are modified through Control Extensions or altered via implementation guidance or value specifications. These tables also include C/CE that are required by law or regulation:
    • Table 10 - FedRAMP M C/CE Modified or Required by Regulation
    • Table 11- FedRAMP+ C/CE Modified or Required by Regulation
  • C/CE not included in the DoD cloud baseline which includes FedRAMP Moderate and FedRAMP+ C/CE.  This includes some C/CE designated as SLA C/CE as shown in Section 5.1.6, Security Controls/Enhancements to be optionally addressed in the Contract/SLA and some CNSSI 1253 C/CE that were not selected for inclusion in the FedRAMP+ or SLA C/CE sets:
    • Table 12 - Privacy Overlay C/CE Not Included In FedRAMP M or FedRAMP+
  • C/CE that are in the FedRAMP Moderate and FedRAMP+ C/CE baselines that have parameter values defined by the overlay which may modify the parameter values defined in Table 8 – FedRAMP M / FedRMP+ Control / Enhancement Parameter Values for PA Assessment:
    • Table 13 - PII/PHI Parameter Values for FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CE
  • C/CE not included in the DoD cloud baseline which includes FedRAMP Moderate and FedRAMP+ C/CE that have parameter values defined by the overlay.
    • Table 14 - PII/PHI Parameter Values for C/CE Not Included In FedRAMP M or FedRAMP+

NOTE: a comparative analysis of the Privacy Overlay C/CE to various other baselines is provided in Appendix F.  This comparison provides statistics or counts of C/CE in various categories.  This is provided for informational purposes only and may be removed from the final document or a future release of the CC SRG.

5.1.5.3 CSO Assessment of Privacy Overlay Control/Control Enhancements


CSP CSOs that are intended to store and process PII and/or PHI (e.g., certain SaaS and PaaS offerings and potentially others) must be additionally assessed against the C/CEs that the Privacy Overlay adds to, or modifies in, the FedRAMP Moderate baseline as well as the FedRAMP+ C/CEs to receive a DoD PA for the CSO.  This includes all SLA C/CEs and the Deselected C/CE from the CNSSI 1253 M-M-x baseline (used to select the FedRAMP+ C/CEs) that show a + symbol in the overlay which are to be added to the FedRAMP+ table at the appropriate level. 

Successful Privacy Overlay assessments may result in a qualifier in the DoD PA that will reference the level of PII or PHI the CSO was successfully assessed for.  E.g., CSO xyz is granted a Level 4 PA with the additional provisional authorization to handle up to Moderate sensitivity PII, or to handle some level of PII and PHI.  Privacy Overlay C/CE that are clearly the responsibility of the CSP’s customer i.e., DoD Mission / Information Owner (e.g., the required Systems of Record Notice (SORN) per TR-2), will not be assessed and will not affect the award of a DoD PA or a PA qualifier. 

It is also recognized that while IaaS and some PaaS CSOs have the potential to store and process PII and/or PHI, this is mostly at the customer’s discretion, and is not typically the intent of the CSP.  As such, Privacy Overlay assessment will not be required for the IaaS and some PaaS CSO to receive a DoD PA. 

Additionally, while a CSP’s IaaS and some PaaS CSOs will not normally be assessed against the Privacy Overlay, it is recognized that there may be some C/CE that may become the responsibility of the CSP if the Mission Owner chooses to store and process PII and/or PHI in the CSO.  Typically, assessment of these C/CEs would be negotiated by the Mission Owner with the CSP.   

NOTE: Some PaaS CSOs are intended to handle PII/PHI like some SaaS CSOs. These are typically very much like a SaaS CSO and as such must be assessed against the Privacy Overlay.

DISA is not assessing CSOs for privacy or including privacy qualifiers in DoD PAs.  Mission Owners are responsible for Privacy overlay assessments of the P/SaaS CSOs used and any applications built on I/PaaS.  Specific guidance regarding what Privacy overlay C/CEs apply to CSPs vs Mission Owners will be provided in a future release of this SRG.

5.1.5.4 Mission System / Application Assessment of Privacy Overlay Control/Control Enhancements


If the Mission Owner’s cloud system/application is intended to store and process PII and/or PHI, the system/application must already comply with the privacy requirements which are codified in the Privacy Overlay.  Therefore, Privacy Overlay assessment to include PA riders must be incorporated into a Mission Owner’s CSP evaluation /selection/acquisition process and into their assessment process for their mission system’s ATO. 

NOTE: more specific guidance regarding what Privacy overlay C/CEs apply to CSPs vs Mission Owners will be provided in a future release of this SRG.

5.1.6 Security Controls/Enhancements to be optionally addressed in the Contract/SLA


Table 3 shows the C/CEs designated for the Mission Owner to optionally address in the contract or SLA, over and above the FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CEs which must be included by default.  While these C/CEs generally address system availability, they apply to the availability of information related to continuous monitoring, incident response, and other security issues.  It must be noted that this listing does not preclude the Mission Owner from addressing any control or enhancement from any CNSSI 1253 baseline or the NIST SP 800-53 rev4 in the contract/SLA if they need the control/enhancement to be provided/met by the CSP to secure their system or application.  Assessment and continuous monitoring of compliance with these C/CEs is the responsibility of the Mission Owner as negotiated with the CSP in attaining and maintaining the mission’s ATO.  These C/CEs are not assessed toward the award of a DoD PA at this time.

Table 3 - Security Controls/Enhancements to be addressed in the Contract/SLA

SP 800-53r4 Cont./Enh.  ID

Level 4

Level 5

Level 6

AC-02 (13)

X

X

X

AC-03 (04)

X

X

X

AC-12 (01)

 

X

X

AC-16

X

X

X

AC-16 (06)

X

X

X

AU-10

 

X

X

IA-03 (01)

X

X

X

PS-04 (01)

X

 

 

PS-06 (03)

X

 

 

SC-07 (11)

X

 

 

SC-07 (14)

X

 

 

SC-18 (03)

 

 

X

SC-18 (04)

 

X

X

Total

9

10

9

 

5.1.7 Additional Considerations and/or Requirements for L4/5 DoD PA Award


The following is a list of considerations and/or requirements that must be assessed or reviewed in addition to or in conjunction with the security control assessments for AO acceptance before a Level 4/5/6 PA will be awarded.  The listing may not be all inclusive, and specific requirements may not have been fully developed at this time.

The considerations and/or requirements that DoD will assess include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • How support for DoD PKI authentication by DoD privileged and non-privileged users is implemented. This is to include the processes and protocols used along with their implementation. For example if SAML assertions are used, what servers are involved, want are the assertion flows/steps, and how the use case is secured.

NOTE: No SAML guidance is provided in the CC SRG at this time.

  • Related CC SRG sections:
    • 5.4, CSP use of DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and subsections.
    • 5.10.7, Active Directory Integration for Cloud and subsections.
  • How support for DoD IP addressing will be implemented.
    • Related CC SRG section:
      • 5.10.4.1, IP Addressing. This consideration addresses any need to route commercial IP addresses across the NIPRNet
  • CSP Data center locations hosting the CSO for which the PA is to be awarded.
    • Related CC SRG section:
      • 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements
  • CSO management/monitoring plane (and/or specific devices/systems) and its integration with the CSP’s corporate network or the general commercial CSO management plane.

NOTE: No specifics are provided regarding this consideration at this time however see the next item for related concerns.

  • Related  CC SRG section:
    • 5.10.2.3, Management Plane Connectivity
  • CSP personnel managing and/or monitoring the CSO infrastructure.  This is primarily related to US Persons constraints in regard to the previous item.
    • Related CC SRG section:
      • 5.6.2, CSP Personnel Requirements.
  • The availability of a private connection capability between the off-premises CSP’s/CSO’s network and DoD networks in support of connections through the BCAP and meet-me points.
    • Related  CC SRG section:
      • 5.10.1, Cloud Access Point (CAP) and subsections.
      • 5.10.1.1.2, NIPRNet BCAP Meet-Me Points
      • 5.10.1.1.3, CSP Support for BCAP Connectivity
  • Reliance of the CSO or user experience on Internet based capabilities such as the public DNS or content delivery networks. All such capabilities must be available via the CSO infrastructure and the connections to it via the DISN BCAPs. The CSO must be able to function if DoD limits access to or disconnects from the Internet in times of conflict or when the DISN/DoDIN is being attacked.

NOTE: No specific requirements other than those noted here are provided.

  • Related  CC SRG section:
    • 5.10.4.2, Domain Name Services (DNS).
  • Reliance on Internet access to reach the CSO management/service-ordering portal or API endpoints from either NIPRNet or from within the CSO.  All such access must be via the CAP if from the NIPRNet or must remain on the CSP’s/CSO’s network if from within the CSO.  These requirements must be minimally configurable if not inherent.

NOTE: No specific requirements other than those noted here are provided.

  • Related  CC SRG section:
    • 5.10.1, Cloud Access Point (CAP) and subsections.
  • The protections in place in the CSP’s network and CSO to prevent any Internet connection to the CSP’s/CSO’s network and CSO from becoming a back door to the NIPRNet via the private connection through the BCAP.
    • Related  CC SRG section:
      • 5.10.1.1.4, CSP/CSO Network Connectivity to Internet and BCAP.
  • The robustness of the CSP’s required boundary protection (defense-in-depth security / protective measures) implemented between the Internet and the CSO for its protection from Internet based threats. This protection is expected to be different depending on whether the CSO is I/PaaS or P/SaaS and whether the Mission Owner has control over their portion of the CSO.
    • Related  CC SRG section:
      • 5.10.3, CSP Service Architecture and subsections.
  • All other requirements as defined in the rest of this SRG

Other considerations as realized while assessing the CSO or as a result of lessons learned.

5.2 Legal Considerations


This section deals with legal requirements revolving around the location of DoD information as well as who may have access to it in CSP facilities and CSOs.

5.2.1 Jurisdiction/Location Requirements


Legal jurisdiction over information controls where DoD and US government data can be located. This is nuanced by the information being on DoD Premises.

To protect against seizure and improper use by non-US persons and government entities, all data stored and processed by/for the DoD must reside in a facility under the exclusive legal jurisdiction of the US.  CSPs will maintain all government data that is not physically located on DoD premises within the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and outlying areas of the US (as defined at FAR 2.101[50]), unless otherwise authorized by the responsible AO, as described in DoDI 8510.01.  The contracting officer shall provide written notification to the contractor when the contractor is permitted to maintain Government data at a location outside the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and outlying areas of the United States. 

CSPs will provide the agency a list of the physical locations where the data could be stored at any given time and update that list as new physical locations are added.

On-premises CSOs implemented by a DoD or non-DoD CSP which utilizes a hybrid model employing off-premises CSPs and CSOs to augment the on-premises CSO or by virtually extending the DoD fence-line (DISN boundary) must also meet the location requirements stated here.

Corresponding Security Controls: SA-9(5)



 

5.2.1.1 DoD Off-Premises Vs On-Premises Vs Virtually On-Premises


DoD On-Premises Vs Off-Premises relates to the physical or virtual location of a facility or IT infrastructure.

DoD Off-Premises: A facility (building/container) or IT infrastructure is Off-Premises if it is NOT physically or virtually on DoD owned or controlled property (i.e., On-Premises).  See DoD On-Premises and DoD Virtually On-Premises below and their definitions in Appendix B for additional details.

DoD On-Premises: A facility (building/container) or IT infrastructure is On-Premises if it is physically on DoD owned or controlled property. That is, it is within the protected perimeter (walls or “fence line”) of a DoD installation (i.e., Base, Camp, Post, or Station (B/C/P/S) or leased commercial space) which is under the direct control of DoD personnel and DoD security policies.

DoD On-Premises includes DoD data centers, other facilities located on a DoD B/C/P/S, or in a commercial or other government facility (or portions thereof) under the direct control of DoD personnel and DoD security policies.  A commercial facility, in this sense, means a building or space leased and controlled by DoD.  Such facilities are considered to be within the protected perimeter or “fence line” of a DoD controlled installation or property.  Physical facilities may be permanent buildings or portable structures such as transit/shipping containers.  An example of the latter might be a shipping container housing a commercial CSP’s infrastructure located adjacent to a Core Data Center (CDC) and connected to its network as if it were inside the building.

DoD CSPs will, and commercial CSPs may (under DoD contract), instantiate their CSO architecture on DoD premises (DoD on-premises).  Interconnection with DoD networks will be interoperable IAW engineering requirements that meet cybersecurity guidance and controls.  Such implementations will be considered DoD Private. 

DoD Virtually On-Premises: A DoD Private IT and/or CSO infrastructure located in a physically off-premises location (facility) such as a Federal Government or commercial data center (i.e., facilities under the direct control of  non-DoD personnel using non-DoD security policies) may be considered Virtually On-Premises under specific conditions as listed below.  These conditions apply certain physical security controls and extend the DISN accreditation boundary.  In essence this construct virtually extends the DoD protected perimeter or “fence line” around the infrastructure. It also places the IT/CSO infrastructure and its management plane in one or more DISN enclaves thus enabling alternative approaches for boundary protection such as using CSO provided infrastructure in lieu of a dedicated DoD ICAP/BCAP.

An IT/CSO infrastructure may be considered Virtually On-Premises under the following conditions:

  • The CSO infrastructure is DoD Private/Community and its infrastructure, devices, monitoring/support infrastructure, and management plane are dedicated to it; physically separate from other infrastructure, devices, and network enclaves in the data center.
  • DISN Transport is extended to the CSO’s network enclave(s) supporting the CSO infrastructure, CSO monitoring/support infrastructure, and CSO management plane. 
  • Enclave / datacenter boundary protections are implemented to protect the CSO operational enclave(s) (which may include the CSO monitoring/support infrastructure) IAW DISN enclave boundary or Core Data Center (CDC) protection requirements.
  • The CSO infrastructure is managed from one or more enclave(s) dedicated to managing the CSO. This can be done using dedicated workstations in the enclave or remotely using dedicated Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI).
  • Enclave boundary protections are implemented to protect the dedicated CSO management/monitoring/support enclave(s) IAW DISN enclave boundary protection requirements.
  • The CSO infrastructure is housed in a physically separate/protected space such as a cage or room (or minimally one or more locked cabinets with closed non-removable sides closing the DoD space) within the commercial data center used to house the DISN network device(s) and CSO infrastructure.  Related C/CE: PE-3, PE-3(1)*, PE-3 (4)*, PE-4
  • This physically separate space is minimally protected as follows:
    • Physical access to the data center is compliant with all required physical and maintenance personnel access security controls in the FedRAMP moderate or high baseline as appropriate to include but not limited to personnel role based access control, access auditing, visitor access control and escorting as needed, etc. Related C/CE: MA-5, MA-5(1), PE-2, PE-2 (3)*, PE-3, PE-3(1)*, PE-6, PE-6(1). PE-6(4)*, PE-8,
    • Physical access to the DoD space is compliant with all required physical and maintenance personnel access security controls in the FedRAMP moderate baseline or high baseline as appropriate (as described above for the data center) and/or appropriate CNSSI 1253 baselines.

NOTE: additional or alternate physical security and personnel controls may be required for facilities housing classified systems.

  • Personnel access is controlled by an automated Entry Access Control System (AECS) that is token and/or biometric based. This system may be under DoD control or under the control of the facility owner, but must limit access to only authorized individuals, must log/audit all accesses to include the identities of the personnel accessing and departing, and must provide and log alerts for unauthorized accesses and failed attempts. Related C/CE: PE-6, PE-6(1) and PE-6(4)*
  • Access to the physical space is externally monitored by the facility owner using video cameras and Physical Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) (i.e., intrusion alarm system). Related C/CE: PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-6(3)*, and PE-6(4)*
  • It is highly recommended that the internal space be monitored by an automated motion activated PIDS and video cameras operated by DoD. In this manner DoD can monitor all physical activities within the space, authorized or unauthorized. Related C/CE: PE-6, PE-6(1), PE-6(2)*, PE-6(3)*, and PE-6(4)*

5.2.2 Cloud Deployment Model Considerations / Separation Requirements


The risks and legal considerations in using virtualization technologies further restrict the types of tenants that can obtain cloud services from a virtualized environment on the same physical infrastructure and the types of cloud deployment models (i.e., public, private, community, and hybrid) in which the various types of DoD information may be processed or stored. 

While shared cloud environments provide significant opportunities for DoD entities, they also present unique risks to DoD data and systems that must be addressed.  These risks include exploitation of vulnerabilities in virtualization technologies, interfaces to external systems, APIs, and management systems.  These have the potential for providing back door connections and CSP privileged user access to customer’s systems and data.  While proper configuration of the virtual and physical environment can mitigate many of these threats, there is still residual risk that may or may not be acceptable to DoD.  Legal concerns such as e-discovery and law enforcement seizure of non-government CSP customer/tenant’s data pose a threat to DoD data if it is in the same storage media.  Due to these concerns, DoD is currently taking a cautious approach with regard to Level 5 information. 

Infrastructure (as related to cloud services), is the physical hardware (i.e., servers and storage), and the network interconnecting the hardware that supports the cloud service and its virtualization technology (if used).  This includes the systems and networks used by the CSP to manage the infrastructure.  While the physical space in which this infrastructure is housed is part of the CSP’s infrastructure, this is not a factor in DoD’s separation restrictions except at Level 6. 

Dedicated infrastructure (as related to cloud services) refers to the cloud service infrastructure being dedicated to serving a single customer organization or a specific group of customer organizations.  A private cloud service implements dedicated infrastructure to serve one customer organization.  This SRG considers DoD as the organization which consists of all DoD components.  This SRG restricts private cloud for DoD as meaning dedicated infrastructure that serves DoD users and tenants, and designates this as a DoD private cloud.  DoD private clouds or cloud service offerings may be multi-tenant serving all or some DoD components or may be single tenant serving a single mission.  A community cloud service implements dedicated infrastructure to serve a specific group or class of customer organizations.  Since the definition of DoD private could also be considered a DoD community cloud, this SRG will use the term DoD private/community.  This SRG will also use the term Federal Government community, meaning dedicated multi-tenant infrastructure that serves both DoD components and mission owners as well as other Federal Government agencies and their mission owners. 

Corresponding Security Controls: SC-4

5.2.2.1 Impact Level 2 Location and Separation Requirements


Impact Level 2 cloud services can be offered on any of the four deployment models.  Information that may be processed and stored at Impact Levels 2 can be processed on-premises or off-premises, as long as the physical location of the information is restricted as described in Section 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements.

For a Level 2 PA, at this time, DoD is accepting the risk that this is adequately covered by a FedRAMP Moderate PA such that the requirement will not be additionally assessed for a Level 2 PA.

5.2.2.2 Impact Level 4 Location and Separation Requirements


Impact Level 4 cloud services can be offered on any of the four deployment models.  Information that may be processed and stored at Impact 4 can be processed on-premises or off-premises, as long as the physical location of the information is restricted as described in Section 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements.  

For a Level 4 PA, the CSP must provide evidence of strong virtual separation controls and monitoring in support of the ability to meet “search and seizure” requests for non-DoD information and data without the release of DoD information and data and vice-versa. Additionally the strong virtual separation controls must prevent/mitigate/eliminate the potential vulnerability whereby one CSP customer using the same physical hardware as another CSP customer can gain access to the other’s information/data, virtual network, or virtual machines. Monitoring must detect such unauthorized accesses and/or attempts so that incident response can occur.

5.2.2.3 Impact Level 5 Location and Separation Requirements


Information that must be processed and stored at Impact Level 5 can only be processed in a DoD private/community or federal government community cloud, on-premises or off-premises in any cloud deployment model that restricts the physical location of the information as described in Section 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements.

The following also applies:

  • Only DoD private/community or Federal Government community clouds are eligible for Impact Level 5.
  • Each deployment model may support multiple missions or tenants / missions from each customer organization.
  • Virtual/logical separation between DoD and Federal Government tenants / missions is sufficient.  Virtual/logical separation between tenant/mission systems is minimally required.
  • Physical separation from non-DoD/non-Federal Government tenants (i.e., public, local/state government tenants) is required. 
  • The CSP restricts potential access to DoD’s and the community’s information to CSP employees that are U.S. Citizens

NOTE: While multi-tenant CSOs marketed as ITAR compliant”, “government clouds”, or “clouds for government” might restrict data location to US jurisdiction, and might restrict the personnel that manage the CSO to , they do not necessarily meet the standard for “dedicated” to the Federal Government or DoD.  If the cloud service, or the underlying infrastructure it resides on, hosts any non-Federal US government tenant, (such as state, local, or tribal governments, industry/academic partners, or foreign governments) it is considered a public cloud for purposes of this SRG. As such, while DoD sees this as adequate for Level 4, this alleged attribute is not sufficient for CSP selection by DoD Mission Owners for Level 5 missions. This restriction might be waived by DoD if the CSP and CSO can demonstrate sufficient separation between tenant’s workloads and data and/or the general government community and Federal Government Community.

5.2.2.4 Impact Level 6 Location and Separation Requirements


Impact Level 6 is reserved for the storage and processing of information classified up to SECRET.  Information that must be processed and stored at Impact Level 6 can only be processed in a DoD private/community or Federal Government community cloud, on-premises or off-premises in any cloud deployment model that restricts the physical location of the information as described in Section 5.2.1, Jurisdiction/Location Requirements.

The following applies:

  • Impact Level 6 information up to the SECRET level must be stored and processed in a dedicated cloud infrastructure located in facilities approved for the processing of classified information, rated at or above the highest level of classification of the information being stored and/or processed.
  • Impact Level 6 CSO infrastructure is considered to be a SIPRNet enclave and as such will be a closed self-contained environment for the CSO processing, storage, and management planes only connected to SIPRNet.
  • Each deployment model may support multiple SECRET missions from multiple customer organizations.
  • Virtual/logical separation between DoD and Federal Government tenants / SECRET missions is sufficient.
  • Virtual/logical separation between tenant/mission systems is minimally required.
  • Physical separation from non-DoD/non-Federal Government tenants (i.e., public, local/state government tenants) is required.

5.2.2.5 Separation in Support of Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation and E-Discovery


Under Federal law, the Federal government reserves the right for law enforcement officials to perform criminal investigations of Federal Government employees and elected officials as well as anyone with access to Federal Government information for misconduct, misuse of such data, or for incident investigation.  Such criminal investigations may include a need for E-Discovery on Federal government information to collect digital evidence. As such the CSP must be able to segregate Federal government information from non-Federal Government information within the CSO.  The granularity of separation must be at the Federal government Mission Owner level.  The CSP must also ensure this segregation requirement flows down to all CSP/Integrator subcontracted CSP/CSOs.  The CSP and subcontractors must then be capable, upon request of the contracting officer(s) or in response to a subpoena, of isolating one or more Federal Government Mission Owner’s data into an environment where it may be reviewed, scanned, or forensically evaluated in a secure space or via secure remote connection with access limited to authorized Government personnel identified by the Contracting Officer, and without the CSP’s involvement or provide a forensic digital image of the requested Federal government information. See Section 6.5.4, Digital Forensics in the Cloud and Support for Law Enforcement/Criminal Investigation for additional information on capturing and protecting forensic digital images. 

5.2.3 DoD Data Ownership and CSP Use of DoD Data


All DoD information/data placed or created by DoD users in a CSP’s CSO is owned by the DoD, the Mission Owner, and/or their Information Owner unless otherwise stipulated in the CSP’s contract with the DoD.  The CSP has no rights to the DoD’s information/data.  DoD information/data includes logs and monitoring data created within and by a Mission Owner’s system/application implemented in IaaS/PaaS CSOs as well as logs created for and provided to the Mission Owner related to their usage and management of the CSO.  DoD also maintains ownership of all information/data created by the CSP/CSO for DoD if such activities are part of the contract.  CSPs seeking a DoD PA must agree that DoD remains the owner of all DoD data in a CSO. 

CSPs are prohibited from using DoD data in any way other than that required to provide contracted services to DoD (e.g., customer access/usage logs used for billing)  This means that the CSP may not “data mine” DoD email, files, information in data bases, or communications for any purpose other than that stipulated in the contract.  

The CSP maintains ownership of all logs and monitoring data created within the CSO related to the Mission Owner’s usage and management of the CSO.  This includes logs related to customer access and usage used for billing, data used for capacity planning for the CSO, monitoring data related to malicious activities or CSO health. This also includes all audit content specified by the AU-2 security control for the time period specified by AU-11. While the CSP retains ownership of this information, some or all must be shared with the Mission Owner for the purpose of planning, forensics, billing validation, retention, etc.  The ownership of the copies of this information shared with the DoD/Mission Owner is maintained by the DoD/Mission Owner.

Additionally, all DoD information/data and CSP information/data shared with the Mission Owner must be made available for off-boarding and backup IAW sections 5.8, Data Retrieval and Destruction for Off-boarding from a CSO and 5.12 - Backup

Mission Owners must address data ownership in the contract.

Related Security Controls: AC-23

5.3 Ongoing Assessment


Both FedRAMP and DoD require an ongoing assessment and authorization capability for CSOs providing services to the DoD.  This capability is built upon the DoD RMF and the FedRAMP continuous monitoring strategy, as described in the Guide to Understanding FedRAMP [51]and FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide.[52]  These ongoing assessment processes which are discussed in the following sections include continuous monitoring and change control.

Ongoing assessment processes do not differ by impact level, though the artifacts produced as part of those processes may.  (e.g., Level 2 CSOs will have fewer controls to monitor than Level 4 CSOs.)  These processes will differ, however, based on whether or not CSOs are part of the FedRAMP catalog or have a FedRAMP JAB PA.  These differences are based on the division of responsibility over the set of security controls and the ability of DoD to access the artifacts produced as part of the FedRAMP processes.

Ongoing assessment responsibility mirrors the divided responsibilities and control inherent in cloud systems.  FedRAMP’s processes will be leveraged for all CSOs in the FedRAMP catalog. This process, however, only covers the portion of the system that is governed by the FedRAMP PA, such as the FedRAMP Moderate security controls.  The DoD change control process will cover the portion of the system that is governed by the DoD PA, such as the FedRAMP+ security controls.  Ongoing assessment of controls that are levied by the Mission Owner, such as those specified in the SLA, and do not fall under the FedRAMP or DoD PAs is the responsibility of the Mission Owner.  This division of assessment responsibility is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 - Ongoing Assessment Division of Responsibility



[51] Guide to Understanding FedRAMP: https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/

[52] FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide: https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/

 

5.3.1 Continuous Monitoring


This section pertains specifically to continuous monitoring of security controls, as defined by CNSSI 4009 and NIST SP 800-137.  Further information on monitoring activities performed as part of Computer Network Defense, are described in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response.

Once a DoD PA is granted, the CSP is expected to maintain the security posture of the CSO through continuous and periodic vulnerability scans, DoD annual assessments, incident management, and effective implementation of operational processes and procedures.  Integral to this is periodic reporting to the appropriate AO. The continuous monitoring artifacts required to maintain a DoD PA are the same as those required by FedRAMP. (Annual assessments, monthly vulnerability scans, etc.)  However, those artifacts must include additional information for FedRAMP+ controls and DoD requirements.

Continuous monitoring data flows will differ for CSPs depending on whether their CSOs have a FedRAMP JAB PA, a 3PAO assessed non-DoD Federal Agency ATO, or DoD Assessed PA (as described in Section 0).  These data flows are reflected in Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 respectively. 

In some cases, CSPs such as, but not limited to, DoD Private CSOs or CSOs in the FedRAMP catalog with a non-DoD Agency ATO will provide continuous monitoring artifacts directly to DISA.    In such cases, the CSP will utilize commercial standard formats (e.g., comma-separated values, XML) that enable DoD to automate the ingest of continuous monitoring data. 

NOTE: For XML exchanges, National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) based XML is the preferred format IAW DoDI 8320.07[53], August 3, 2015. Additional information regarding this format can be found at www.niem.gov

All CSP CSOs are required to have FedRAMP annual assessments performed by a 3PAO for the maintenance of their FedRAMP PA.  DoD also requires annual assessments performed by a 3PAO or approved DoD SCA organization for the maintenance of their Level 4 and above DoD PA.  It is expected that CSOs in both the FedRAMP and DoD catalogs will have a single annual assessment to cover this requirement for both FedRAMP and DoD.  CSOs in the FedRAMP catalog will follow the process described in the FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide[54].  DoD Annual assessments will minimally include the set of controls listed in Appendix A of that document, as well as any other controls specified by the DISA AO.  CSOs with a DoD PA that are not in the FedRAMP catalog will follow the DoD RMF process for continuous monitoring and associated assessments.

Corresponding Security Controls: CA-7



[54] FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide: https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/

 

5.3.1.1 Continuous Monitoring for CSOs in the FedRAMP Catalog with a DoD PA


As described in Section 4.1, Assessment of Commercial/Non-DoD Cloud Services, the CSOs in the FedRAMP catalog that are eligible for DoD PAs include CSOs having a JAB PA (which is 3PAO assessed) or a 3PAO assessed Federal Agency ATO.  All reports required by the FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide, including self- assessments, for these CSOs will be provided to the FedRAMP Information System Security Officer (ISSO).  These will be reviewed by the FedRAMP TRs (which include DoD personnel) and approved by the JAB if necessary. 

Continuous monitoring requirements for DoD are the same as those for FedRAMP, except that all reports and artifacts for FedRAMP+ C/CEs will be provided directly to DISA AO representatives as the DoD single point of CSP contact for this information.  DISA will share appropriate continuous monitoring information (FedRAMP and FedRAMP+) with Mission Owners, AOs, and Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSPs).

The information will be used by Mission Owners, their AOs, and the DISA AO to assess and authorize the CSO.  Those evaluations will inform decisions to continue the ATO for the Mission Owner’s system and the PA for the CSP respectively.  The DISA AO will coordinate closely with Mission Owners in the event that the withdrawal of a PA must be considered upon the basis of this requirement.

Figure 4 shows the normal flow of continuous monitoring information if the CSP has a FedRAMP JAB PA.

Figure 4 – DoD Continuous Monitoring for CSOs with a FedRAMP JAB PA

Figure 5 shows the flow of continuous monitoring information if the CSO has a 3PAO assessed non-DoD Federal Agency ATO listed in the FedRAMP catalog. Since the FedRAMP JAB does not control the Agency ATO, information may not flow from the CSP to the FedRAMP PMO.

Figure 5 – DoD Continuous Monitoring for FedRAMP CSOs with a 3PAO assessed Non-DoD Federal Agency ATO

5.3.1.2 Continuous Monitoring for DoD Assessed CSOs


Figure 6 shows the flow of continuous monitoring information for DoD private/community CSOs that have a DoD PA and ATO, but are not in the FedRAMP catalog. Continuous monitoring will be directed by the DoD RMF, rather than the FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide.  As part of the RMF authorization process, CSPs will create a continuous monitoring strategy that meets DoD requirements in the System Security Plan.  All reports and artifacts required by that continuous monitoring strategy will be provided by the CSP to DISA.  DISA will, in turn, disseminate those artifacts to all Mission Owners utilizing that CSO, the DISA AO, and the Cybersecurity Service Provider (CSSP) entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response..

6 – DoD Continuous Monitoring for DoD Assessed CSOs

5.3.2 Change Control


The DoD change control process for CSOs mirrors that of FedRAMP, with a focus on how changes affect the DoD PA and the security of hosted mission systems/applications and information.

The FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide, dated June 6, 2014, states:

“Systems are dynamic and FedRAMP anticipates that all systems are in a constant state of change.  Configuration management and change control processes help maintain a secure baseline configuration of the CSP’s architecture.  Routine day-to-day changes are managed through the CSP’s change management process described in their Configuration Management Plan.

However, before a planned significant change takes place, CSP’s must perform a Security Impact Analysis, consistent with control CM-4, to determine if the change will adversely affect the security of the system.  The Security Impact Analysis is a standard part of a CSP’s change control process as described in the CSP’s Configuration Management Plan.”

As with FedRAMP, CSPs must give DoD 30-day notice prior to significant changes.  If a change is made without approval that affects the risk posture of the system, the DISA AO can revoke the DoD PA.  As with continuous monitoring, the change control process will differ for CSPs depending on if they are in the FedRAMP catalog and if they have a DoD assessed PA or ATO.  Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 show these change control processes.

NOTE: NIST SP 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F February 2010[55] defines a significant change as follows: “a change that is likely to affect the security state of an information system.” Examples are provided as follows: “Significant changes to an information system may include for example: (i) installation of a new or upgraded operating system, middleware component, or application; (ii) modifications to system ports, protocols, or services; (iii) installation of a new or upgraded hardware platform; (iv) modifications to cryptographic modules or services; or (v) modifications to security controls. Examples of significant changes to the environment of operation may include for example: (i) moving to a new facility; (ii) adding new core missions or business functions; (iii) acquiring specific and credible threat information that the organization is being targeted by a threat source; or (iv) establishing new/modified laws, directives, policies, or regulations.”

Corresponding Security Controls: CM-3, CM-4, CA-6



 

5.3.2.1 Change Control for CSOs in the FedRAMP Catalog with a DoD PA


The FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Guide defines a significant change as a change to the scope of an approved PA or an impact to the authorization boundary of the CSO.  The CSP will follow procedures defined in the FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide by submitting a FedRAMP Significant Change Security Impact Analysis Form[56]  to the FedRAMP PMO. The review of the security implications of significant changes will be performed at multiple layers, as reflected in Figure 7.  The planned change will be reviewed by the FedRAMP ISSO and/or JAB Technical Representatives (TRs), and then forwarded to the JAB for approval.    Simultaneously the DoD JAB TR will notify DISA, who will in turn notify all Mission Owners utilizing that CSO, the DISA AO, and the CSSP entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response. During FedRAMP ISSO review, the DoD JAB TR will collect comments from DoD stake holders and inform the FedRAMP ISSO if planned changes will adversely affect the security of the information hosted by the CSO for DoD cloud customers. DoD may communicate directly with the CSP and their 3PAO regarding change approval or concerns over the impact on DoD’s FedRAMP+ C/CEs.

FedRAMP requires a security assessment be performed by a 3PAO after a significant change is implemented, with a corresponding Security Assessment Report created.  CSPs must also include all FedRAMP+ C/CEs in post-change assessments to meet DoD requirements.  DISA will notify affected Mission Owners of proposed significant changes and provide its assessment of the change within the scope of the CSO PA.  Mission Owners are responsible for assessing the effects of proposed changes for effects that fall within the scope of their SLAs. 

Figure 7 shows the normal flow of significant change information if the CSP has a FedRAMP JAB PA. 

Figure 7 - DoD Change Control Process for CSPs CSOs with a FedRAMP JAB PA

When a CSO having a DoD PA is included in the FedRAMP catalog, but does not have a JAB PA, the CSP will notify DISA directly in addition to any other required points of contact.  (e.g., A CSP with a non-DoD agency ATO would notify both that agency and DISA).   This is required because the FedRAMP JAB does not control the Agency ATO, and information may not flow from the CSP to the FedRAMP PMO and DISA.  DISA will in turn notify all Mission Owners utilizing that CSO, the DISA AO, and the CSSP entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response. The Security Impact Analysis must additionally cover the FedRAMP+ C/CEs.  Once informed, DISA will review the proposed change to assess if it will, and ensure it will not, adversely affect the security of the DoD Information Network (DoDIN) as a whole or the DISN with respect to the impact level at which it is authorized.  Any updates to the FedRAMP Security Package will be forwarded to DISA.

As with FedRAMP, DoD requires a security assessment be performed by a 3PAO after a significant change is implemented, with a corresponding Security Assessment Report created.  CSPs must also include all FedRAMP+ C/CEs in post-change assessments to meet DoD requirements.  DISA will notify affected Mission Owners of proposed significant changes and provide its assessment of the change within the scope of the CSO PA.  Mission Owners are responsible for assessing the effects of proposed changes for effects that fall within the scope of their SLAs

Figure 8 shows the normal flow of significant change information if the CSO has a 3PAO assessed Non-DoD Federal Agency ATO listed in the FedRAMP catalog. Since the FedRAMP JAB does not control the Agency ATO, information from the CSP may not flow from the authorizing agency to the FedRAMP PMO.  To avoid the possibility of DoD not being informed of potential changes, CSPs must send change requests to DISA in addition to the authorizing agency.

Figure 8 - DoD Change Control Process for FedRAMP CSPs CSOs with a 3PAO assessed Federal Agency ATO



 

5.3.2.2 Change Control for DoD Assessed CSOs


Figure 9 shows the flow of significant change for non-FedRAMP CSOs having a DoD PA or ATO assessed by a DoD SCA organization and authorized by a DoD AO.  The review of significant change information will be directed by the DoD RMF, rather than the FedRAMP change control process.  CSPs will have similar responsibilities, but will report directly to DISA.  DISA will, in turn, disseminate those artifacts to all Mission Owners utilizing that CSO, the DISA AO, and the CSSP entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response. These entities will review the proposed change to ensure it will not adversely affect the security posture of the CSO with respect to its PA or ATO.  The planned change will also be reviewed by the Mission Owners utilizing the CSO for any adverse impact with regard to their specific usage of the CSO.

Figure 9 - DoD Change Control Process for DoD Self-Assessed CSPs/CSOs

5.4 CSP use of DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)


In accordance with FedRAMP's selection of IA-2(12) which states “The information system accepts and electronically verifies Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials” and the FedRAMP supplemental guidance which states “Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12”, CSPs are required to integrate with and use the DoD PKI for DoD entity authentication.  (E.g., a web portal that DoD and Federal Government Mission Owner’s privileged users log into to configure the CSO.) 

The following sections describe how the CSP fulfills its responsibilities with additional detail in the supporting subsections:

 

Impact Level 2: Whenever a CSP is responsible for authentication of entities and/or identifying a hosted DoD information system, the CSP will use DoD PKI certificates in compliance with DoDI 8520.03.  CSPs will enforce the use of a physical token referred to as the “Common Access Card (CAC)” or “Alt Token” for the authentication of DoD privileged users.  CSPs must make use of DoD Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or Certificate Revocation List (CRL) resources for checking revocation of DoD certificates and DoD Certificate Authorities; and must follow DoD instructions and industry best practices for the management and protection of cryptographic keys.

Impact Levels 4/5: Whenever a CSP is responsible for authentication of entities and/or identifying a hosted DoD information system, the CSP will use DoD PKI certificates in compliance with DoDI 8520.03.  CSPs will enforce the use of a physical token referred to as the “Common Access Card (CAC)” or “Alt Token” for the authentication of DoD privileged and DoD non-privileged users.  CSPs must make use of DoD OCSP or CRL resources for checking revocation of DoD certificates and DoD Certificate Authorities; and must follow DoD instructions and industry best practices for the management and protection of cryptographic keys.  DoD issued PKI server certificates will be used to identify the CSP's DoD customer ordering/service management portals and SaaS applications and services contracted by and dedicated to DoD use. 

Impact Level 6: Whenever an on-premises CSO is responsible for authentication of DoD entities and/or identifying a hosted DoD information system, the CSP will use NSS PKI certificates in compliance with DoDI 8520.03 and CNSSP-25.  CSPs will enforce the use of a physical token referred to as the CNSS Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) Hardware Token for the authentication of DoD Mission owner and CSP privileged and non-privileged end users.  When implementing NSS PKI, CSPs must make use of NSS OCSP or CRL resources for checking revocation of NSS certificates and NSS Certificate Authorities; and must follow CNSS / NSA instructions for the management and protection of cryptographic keys.  CNSS issued PKI server certificates will be used to identify the CSP's DoD customer ordering/service management portals and SaaS applications and services contracted by and dedicated to DoD use. 

NOTE: A CSP must PK enable their customer ordering/service management portals for all service offerings and their SaaS service offerings for general DoD user access at levels 4 and up or provide a customer configurable service offering to permit PK enabling and integration with the required PKI.  For complete compliance the CSP will integrate with the DoD PKI and the Federal PKI for levels 2 through 5.  For Level 6 the CSP will integrate with the NSS (SIPRNet) PKI.  Both the DoD and NSS PKI are operated by DISA[57] while the Federal PKI is operated by GSA[58].  PK enabled customer ordering/service management portals may require a separate URL or dedicated application / application interface as best determined by the CSP to meet the Federal Government requirement.

Corresponding Security Controls: IA-2, IA-2(1), IA-2(2), IA-2(3), IA-2(8), IA-2(11), IA-2(12), IA-5(2), IA-5(11), IA-7, IA-8

NOTE: NSS PKI and SIPRNet token requirements for off-premises Level 6 CSPs and CSOs need to be coordinated with OUSD(I) and DSS. Associated policies are addressed above in Section 4.2, Assessment of DoD Cloud Services and Enterprise Services Applications under the Impact Level 6 topic.  Coordinated guidance and requirements for off-premises CSPs and their CSOs for a DoD Level 6 provisional authorization may appear in a future release of the CC SRG. This note applies to all subsections in Section 5.4.



 

5.4.1 Identification, Authentication, and Access Control Credentials


DoDI 8520.03, Identity Authentication for Information Systems is the DoD policy that defines the credentials that DoD privileged and non-privileged users must use to identify themselves to DoD information systems to be authenticated before being granted access.  It also defines the credentials that DoD information systems use to identify themselves to each other.  This is fully applicable to DoD information systems instantiated on cloud services.  Additionally, CNSS Policy #25 and CNSSI 1300 provide similar guidance for NSS.  For the purpose of this discussion, the process of identification and authentication will be referred to as I&A.

5.4.1.1 Mission Owner Credentials for CSP and Mission System Interfaces


This section defines the Mission Owner access control credentials required at each information impact level IAW DoDI 8520.03 in the following categories:

  • Mission Owner privileged user access to the CSP’s customer ordering and service management interfaces or portals for all service offerings (IaaS/PaaS, SaaS).
    • Integration with DoD PKI is typically a CSP responsibility.  Minimally, the CSP is responsible for providing capabilities that enable Mission Owners to configure a CSP service offering that integrates with DoD PKI.
  • Mission Owner Non-privileged user (i.e., mission application end-users) access to CSP SaaS offerings.
    • Integration with DoD PKI is typically a CSP responsibility.  Minimally, the CSP is responsible for providing capabilities that enable Mission Owners to configure a CSP service offering that integrates with DoD PKI.
  • Non-privileged user access to Mission Owner’s systems and applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS.  (i.e., mission application end-users)
    • Implementation is a Mission Owner responsibility.
  • Mission Owner privileged user access to their systems and applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS for the purpose of administration and maintenance.
    • Implementation is a Mission Owner responsibility.

Table 4 lists the Mission Owner credential types required at each impact level for various use cases and the policy under which they are required.  The DoD Policy column identifies the authentication methods that Mission Owners must implement for use in the systems and applications they instantiate in a CSP’s CSO.  This is primarily applicable to IaaS/PaaS.  The IA-2(12) column identifies the authentication methods that CSPs must implement for use in the service offerings they provide to their DoD customer.  This primarily applies to SaaS and CSP's customer ordering/service management portals.

Table 4 - Mission Owner Credentials

Impact Level

Implemented by Mission Owner

 IAW DoD policy

Implemented by CSP

IAW FedRAMP's selection

of IA-2(12):

Level 2

  • Non-privileged user access to publicly released information requires no I&A, unless the information owner requires it.  If required, the Mission Owner determines the type of I&A to be used. 
  • Non-privileged user access to non-publicly released non-CUI and non-critical mission information minimally requires I&A through the use of a User Identifier (UID) and password that meets DoD length and complexity requirements.  The Mission Owner is encouraged to require the use of a stronger I&A technology in accordance with the sensitivity of the private information (e.g., UID/Password with two-step verification, two-factor token based onetime password, DoD-approved PKI token/certificate, CAC/PKI, etc.)

 

  • Mission Owner Privileged users’ access to administer Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or Alt Token/PKI. 

 

  • Non-privileged user access to non-publicly released non-CUI and non-critical mission information in the CSP’s SaaS offering minimally requires I&A through the use of a User Identifier (UID) and password that meets DoD length and complexity requirements.  The Mission Owner is encouraged to require the use of a stronger I&A technology in accordance with the sensitivity of the private information (e.g., two-factor token based onetime password, DoD-approved[59] PKI token/certificate, CAC/PKI, etc.)

 

 

 

 

  • Mission Owner’s privileged users’ access to the CSP's customer ordering/service management portals for all service offerings requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or Alt Token/PKI. 

 

Level 4

and 5

  • Non-privileged user access to CUI, non-CUI critical mission data, and/or unclassified NSS (L5) requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or other DoD-approved PKI[60]

 

 

  • Mission Owner Privileged users’ access to administer Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or Alt Token/PKI. 

 

  • Non-privileged user access to CUI, non-CUI critical mission data, and/or unclassified NSS (L5) information in the CSP’s SaaS offering requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or other DoD-approved PKI[61]

 

  • Mission Owner’s privileged users’ access to the CSP's customer ordering/service management portals for all service offerings requires the use of DoD CAC/PKI or Alt Token/PKI. 

 

Level 6

  • Non-privileged user access to classified information requires the use of NSS SIPRNet Token/PKI.

 

  • Mission Owner Privileged users’ access to administer Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS requires the use of NSS SIPRNet Token/PKI.

 

  • Non-privileged user access to classified information in the CSP’s SaaS offering requires the use of NSS SIPRNet Token/PKI.

 

  • Mission Owner’s privileged users’ access to the CSP's customer ordering/service management portals for all service offerings requires the use of NSS SIPRNet Token/PKI.

NOTE: Mission Owner personnel that are involved in managing any portion of a CSP’s service offering or who are able to order services from the CSP (i.e., possesses accounts on the CSP’s customer ordering and service management interfaces or portals for any service offering (IaaS/PaaS, SaaS)), are considered Privileged Users by DoD and therefore are required to authenticate using DoD CAC, or Alt Token IAW DoDI 8520.03.

NOTE: It is recognized that some Level 4/5 systems must support some non-privileged user populations (e.g., retirees) that cannot receive a DoD CAC/PKI or other DoD-approved PKI authenticator to gain access to CUI (e.g., PII/PHI) for which they have a legal right to access.  In cases such as these the Mission Owner will seek AO approval to categorize such data as Unclassified Sensitivity Level 1 IAW DoDI 8520.03, which would permit the use of Credential Strength A.  (E.g. A password as an authenticator)  While such populations must typically use a UID and strong password managed IAW DoD password policy, the Mission Owner is encouraged to implement stronger measures such as two-step verification where an access code is sent to the user via a different communications path than the one accessing the web site or application after entering the UID/password combination. In effect, this becomes a two-factor authentication system.



 

5.4.1.2 CSP Privileged User Credentials


This section defines the I&A and access control credentials that the CSP privileged users must use when administering the CSP’s infrastructure supporting Mission Owner’s systems.

Impact Levels 2/4: IAW the separation requirements for Levels 2 and 4 described in Section 5.2.2.1, Impact Level 2 Location and Separation Requirements, and 5.2.2.2 ,Impact Level 4 Location and Separation Requirements, and FedRAMP's selection of IA-2(1) and IA-2(3), the CSP must minimally implement two factor authentication for CSP privileged user access to administer and maintain CSP infrastructure supporting Federal and DoD contracted services.  While the best practice of using a hardware token technology implementing a multi-factor one-time password or PKI certificate technology solution similar to DoDI 8520.03 Credential Strength D is preferred, these identity credentials minimally use a multi-token solution or a multi-factor one-time password solution similar to DoDI 8520.03 Credential Strength C. 

Impact Level 5: IAW the separation requirements for Level 5 described in Section 5.2.2.3, Impact Level 5 Location and Separation Requirements and DoD policy, the CSP must implement a strong two-factor I&A capability for CSP privileged user access to administer and maintain dedicated CSP infrastructure supporting Federal and DoD contracted services.  The strong two-factor I&A capability must be dedicated to the dedicated CSP infrastructure.  These identity credentials minimally use a hardware token technology implementing a multi-factor one-time password or PKI certificate technology solution similar to DoDI 8520.03 Credential Strength D. 

NOTE: While DoDI 8520.03 requires that all administrators of DoD or partner managed systems use identity Credential Strength E (i.e., hardware token PKI technology issued by an identity credential service provider that is either a Federal agency, an approved shared service provider under the Federal PKI Policy Authority Program, or an identity credential service provider that has been specifically approved by the DoD CIO as a Credential Strength E service provider e.g., DoD CAC or ALT) for privileged access to DoD systems, DoD is not enforcing this requirement on CSP infrastructure administrators / privileged users managing CSP assets at this time.

Impact Level 6: IAW the separation requirements for Level 6 described in Section 5.2.2.4, Impact Level 6 Location and Separation Requirements and CNSS policy, the CSP must implement SIPRNet Token/PKI authentication for CSP privileged user access to administer and maintain dedicated CSP infrastructure supporting Federal and DoD contracted Level 6 services connected to SIPRNet.

5.4.2 Public Key (PK) Enabling


Public Key (PK) enabling refers to the process through which hosts and applications are enabled to hold or use PKI certificates for the following:

  • Identifying themselves to other hosts. 
  • Establishing secure communications paths.
  • Accepting DoD PKI certificates for system and user authentication. 
  • Validating the validity of PKI certificates while making use of the DoD OCSP responder resources and/or CRL resources.

The IASE web site page Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key Enabling (PKE)[62] provides information needed to PK-enable Mission Owner’s systems/applications instantiated on CSP’s IaaS/PaaS offerings and CSP’s PK-enabling of SaaS offerings and service ordering/management portals/interfaces. 



 

5.5 Policy, Guidance, Operational Constraints


DoD-specific policy, guidance and operational constraints must be followed as appropriate by CSPs.  DISA will evaluate CSP submitted equivalencies to any specific security control, SRG, or STIG requirement on a case by case basis.

5.5.1 SRG/STIG Compliance


Mission Owners must utilize all applicable DoD SRGs and STIGs to secure all Mission Owner systems and applications instantiated on CSP’s IaaS and PaaS at all levels.

CSP’s CSOs are subject to the FedRAMP selected SP 800-53 security control CM-6.  This is applicable to all infrastructure, hardware and software, which constitutes and supports the CSP’s CSO whether it is IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS.  CSOs are assessed under FedRAMP in accordance with the security configuration checklists specified in the FedRAMP value. 

All STIGs and SRGs can be found on DISA’s IASE web site[63] along with an SRG/STIG Applicability Guide[64].

DoD recommends that STIGs and/or SRGs be used by CSPs to fulfill the CM-6 baseline configuration requirement for systems that support DoD systems as follows:

Impact Level 2:  While the use of STIGs and SRGs by CSPs is preferable, industry standard baselines such as those provided by the Center for Internet Security (CIS) benchmarks are an acceptable alternative to the STIGs and SRGs. 

Impact Levels 4/5/6:  STIGs are applicable if the CSP utilizes the product a STIG addresses.  SRGs are applicable in lieu of STIGs if a product specific STIG is not available.  However, the SP 800-53 control applies whether or not a STIG or SRG is available.  While the DoD Level 4/5/6 value for CM-6 is to utilize DoD SRGs and STIGs as applicable, DISA will evaluate the CSP’s usage of commercial equivalencies (e.g., CIS benchmarks) on a case by case basis.  

For dedicated infrastructure that only serves DoD tenants, CSPs must utilize all applicable DoD STIGs and/or SRGs to secure all DoD contracted cloud computing services.  This applies at levels 4 and above for IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS offerings.

Corresponding Security Controls: CM-6



 

5.6 Physical Facilities and Personnel Requirements


The following sections discuss facility and personnel requirements as they align to the impact levels.

5.6.1 Facilities Requirements


Impact Level 2: CSP data processing facilities supporting Level 2 information will meet the physical security requirements defined in the FedRAMP Moderate baseline.

Impact Levels 4 and 5: CSP data processing facilities supporting Level 4 and 5 CSOs/information will meet the physical security requirements defined in the FedRAMP Moderate baseline as well as any FedRAMP+ C/CEs related to physical security. 

Impact Level 6: DoD data on-premises processing facilities that support cloud services infrastructure and classified service offerings will be housed in facilities (designated as a secure room) designed, built, and approved for open storage commensurate with the highest classification level of the information stored, processed, or transmitted as defined in DoDM 5200.01 Volume 3, DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information[65]



 

5.6.2 CSP Personnel Requirements


The concept of cloud operations, given the shared responsibilities between multiple organizations along with the advanced technology being applied within this space, can impact personnel security requirements.  The ability for a CSP’s personnel to alter the security controls/environment of a provisioned offering and the security of the system/application/data processing within the offering may vary based on the processes/controls used by the CSP.  The components of the underlying infrastructure (e.g., hypervisor, storage subsystems, network devices) and the type of service (e.g., IaaS, PaaS, SaaS) provided by the CSP will further define the access and resulting risk that CSP’s employees can pose to DoD mission or data.  While CSP personnel are typically not approved for access to customer data/information for need-to-know reasons (except for information approved for public release), they are considered to be able to gain access to the information through their duties.

Access to DoD information at the various levels above Level 2 is limited by national affiliation. For other than US Citizens or Non-Citizen US Nationals as defined in 8 U.S. Code § 1408[66], national affiliation is defined in 22 CFR 120.15[67] – US person and 120.16 – Foreign person. 

The limitations by Information Impact Level are as follows:

Impact Level 2: CSP personnel having access to the systems processing/storing DoD public information may be US Citizens, US Nationals, US persons, or Foreign persons. i.e., there is no restriction.

Impact Level 4/5: CSP personnel having access to the systems processing/storing DoD CUI information or to the information itself at Impact Level 4/5 must be US Citizens, US Nationals, or US Persons. No Foreign persons may have such access.

Impact Level 6: CSP personnel having access to systems processing/storing classified information or to the information itself must be US Citizens.

Corresponding Security Controls: PS-2, PS-3



 

5.6.2.1 CSP Personnel Requirements – PS-2: Position Categorization


The FedRAMP Moderate baseline includes the personnel security controls PS-2, PS-3, and enhancement PS-3(3).  Under PS-2, the CSP is required to “assign a risk designation to all organizational positions” and “Establish screening criteria for individuals filling those positions”.  Supplemental guidance states “Position risk designations reflect Office of Personnel Management (OPM) policy and guidance.”  The OPM position designation process takes into account the duties, level of supervision, and the scope over which misconduct might have an effect (i.e., worldwide/government-wide, multi-agency, or agency).  For IT system and information access it also takes into account the sensitivity level of the information accessed (i.e., non-CUI, CUI, and classified). 

The OPM Position Designation System October 2010 document[68] and OPM Position Designation Tool[69] are provided to enable Federal Agencies a methodical and consistent means to determine position sensitivity for National Security Positions (e.g., positions concerned with the protection of the Nation from foreign aggression or espionage or positions that require regular access to classified information) and Public Trust Positions (e.g., positions at the high or moderate risk levels, which includes responsibility for protection of information security systems).  Position risk levels are determined using the Position Designation Tool.  A position may have both National Security and Public Trust considerations that will jointly impact the sensitivity level and ultimately the type of security investigation required.  The Position Sensitivity Tool will be used to determine position sensitivity, position risk levels and investigation requirements for key CSP personnel.

DoD’s primary concern is CSP personnel with direct access to or the ability to gain access to DoD information, or that have responsibilities that can affect the security of the information technology processing, storing, or transmitting that information.  Under OPM policy, such a person with access to CUI or classified information is designated as filling a position designated as “critical-sensitive” or “high risk”.  However, if the person’s “work is carried out under technical review of a higher authority” (i.e., a person holding a “critical-sensitive” or “high risk” position), then the position may be designated as “noncritical-sensitive” or “moderate risk”.  Positions only having access to non-CUI and publicly released information could have a designation of “non-sensitive” or “low risk”.  All positions are considered to have some level of “public trust”.

From a DoD policy perspective under PS-2 and IAW DoD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program[70] Category I automated data processing (ADP) (ADP-1 or IT-1), positions include those in which an individual is responsible for the planning, direction, and implementation of a computer security program; has major responsibility for the direction, planning and design of a computer system, including the hardware and software; or can access a system during the operation or maintenance in such a way and with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage or realize a significant personal gain.  These positions are designated “critical-sensitive”.  Category II automated data processing (ADP) (ADP-2 or IT-2) positions include those in which an individual may have the same responsibilities listed for ADP-1 but whose work is technically reviewed by a higher authority of the ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.  These positions are designated “noncritical-sensitive”.  These designations are consistent with the OPM Position Designation System document and automated tool.

To receive a DoD PA, the CSP must demonstrate that their personnel position categorization and compliance with PS-2 is equivalent to the OPM position designations for the similar CSP positions to the “critical-sensitive” (e.g., DoD’s ADP-1) or “high risk”; “noncritical-sensitive” (e.g., DoD’s ADP-2) or “moderate risk”; and/or “non-sensitive” or “low risk” (i.e., access to only non-CUI and public information) position designations.  These designations drive the level of screening to be established IAW the second half of PS-2 and for PS-3.



 

5.6.2.2 CSP Personnel Requirements – PS-3: Background Investigations


Under PS-3 and PS-3(3), the CSP is required to “Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system”, and re-screen IAW an organizational defined frequency.  PS-3(3) addresses “additional personnel screening criteria” for information “requiring special protection” such as CUI. 

Per the FedRAMP supplemental guidance for PS-3, found in the FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2, June 6, 2014 document[71], an agency must stipulate, “IAW OPM and OMB requirements”, the type of background investigation required for CSP personnel having access to or who can gain access to information.  For DoD, the minimum designations are defined by level as follows:

Impact Level 2: CSP personnel supporting Level 2 cloud service offerings will meet the personnel security requirements and undergo background checks as defined in OPM policy IAW the FedRAMP Moderate baseline.  As such the minimum background investigation required for CSP personnel having access to Level 2 information based on a “non-sensitive” or “low risk” position designation (i.e., position only has access to public and non-CUI non-critical mission information), is a National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI).  The position sensitivity or risk level and resulting investigation may be elevated beyond the minimum requirement as determined by the Mission Owner / AO, based on additional risk considerations.  For instance if the Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability (CIA) of information is determined to be based on a “noncritical-sensitive” or “moderate risk” position using the tool, a National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) (for “noncritical-sensitive” contractors), or a Moderate Risk Background Investigation (MBI) (for “moderate risk” positions) may be required.

Impact Levels 4/5: CSP personnel supporting Level 4 and 5 cloud service offerings will meet the personnel security requirements and undergo background checks as defined in OPM policy IAW the FedRAMP Moderate baseline, the FedRAMP+ CEs related to personnel security, and DoD personnel security policies.  As such the minimum background investigation required for CSP personnel having access to Level 4 and 5 information based on a “critical-sensitive” (e.g., DoD’s ADP-1) position designation, is a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) or a Background Investigation (BI) for a “high risk” position designation.  The minimum background investigation required for CSP personnel having access to Level 4 and 5 information based on a “noncritical-sensitive” (e.g., DoD’s ADP-2) is a National Agency Check with Law and Credit (NACLC) (for “noncritical-sensitive” contractors), or a Moderate Risk Background Investigation (MBI) for a “moderate risk” position designation.

To receive a DoD PA for Level 2, 4, or 5, the CSP must comply with the investigation requirements as listed for personnel requiring access to systems and data (e.g., above the hypervisor).  Personnel who have access to the CSP infrastructure (e.g. at the hypervisor or below) must comply with OPM investigation requirements or the CSP must demonstrate that their personnel background investigations and compliance with PS-3 and PS-3(3) are consistent with OPM investigation requirements for each position designation. 

NOTE: DoD suggests that the CSP request equivalent investigations to those noted above from an investigation contractor listed on the GSA Federal Acquisition Service Contractor Listing for Category 595 27 HR Support: Pre-Employment Background Investigations web site.[72] In using such a contractor and requesting equivalent investigations the CSP can demonstrate equivalency toward receiving a DoD PA, and preparing for the needed investigations following contract award. 

Impact Level 6: In accordance with PS-3(1), invoked by the CNSSI 1253 Classified Information Overlay, personnel having access to a secure room, the infrastructure supporting classified processing, or handling classified information, in addition to meeting the public trust position suitability/investigation requirements (e.g., a favorably adjudicated SSBI for a system administrator in a DoD ADP-1 position) must have a security clearance at the appropriate level.  Systems and network administrators (i.e., privileged users), while typically not approved to handle classified information for need-to-know reasons, are considered to have access to classified information through their duties.  Therefore these individuals require a clearance at the appropriate level for the classified information stored, processed, or transmitted.

DoD personnel clearances are granted through DoD processes as defined in DoDI 5200.02[73] and the DoD 5200.2-R[74], both entitled DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP).  Commercial CSPs’ personnel clearances are granted through the Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Process[75]

Contracts for both on-premises and off-premises Level 6 CSOs will include language related to the contractor requiring access to classified information IAW 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subpart 4.4 - Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry[76] and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) section 52.204-2 - Security Requirements[77].  Such contractors are required to comply with NISP policies as discussed as cited above WRT organizational facilities clearances and cleared personnel.

To receive a DoD PA for Level 6, the CSP must either have a facility clearance and cleared personnel who will manage the CSO (including top level corporate management), or demonstrate the ability to meet the requirements for such, as defined in Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Process. 

For on-premises Level 6 CSOs facilities and personnel clearances will be handled as with any other DoD contract where the contractor needs access to classified information or as required for other purposes.

For off-premises Level 6 CSO facilities and personnel clearances, will be handled through the contracting process as with any other Defense Industrial Base (DIB) contractor. This process is the purview of OUSD(I) and DSS. 



[71] FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2, June 6, 2014; http://cloud.cio.gov/document/control-specific-contract-clauses

[75] Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Process: http://www.dss.mil/psmo-i/indus_psmo-i_process_applicant.html

 

5.6.2.3 Mission Owner Responsibilities Regarding CSP Personnel Requirements


In addition to the above requirements, the FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2[78], also states the following: “Agencies leveraging FedRAMP Provisional Authorizations will be responsible for conducting their own Background Investigations and or accepting reciprocity from other agencies that have implemented Cloud Service Provider systems.”  It also states Agencies are responsible for the screening process, and may want to stipulate additional screening requirements.  As part of the FedRAMP+ assessment, the processes used by the CSP will be evaluated and discussed in the PA as appropriate.  Additionally, Mission Owners may require that some CSP personnel have clearances in the event classified information sharing may be needed at some point in time. This may be based on the criticality of the CSO’s use case and the criticality or type of information. DoD Components and/or Mission Owners must review the investigation type required for all position designations and address investigation requirements and any clearance requirements as well as funding in their contracts with the CSP.



[78] FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2, June 6, 2014; https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/

 

5.6.2.4 Training Requirements


DoD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program, Change 3, January 24, 2012[79] describes the DoD IA Workforce Improvement Program.  This manual requires DoD IA personnel to be categorized and sets experience, training, and certification standards.  DoD CSPs and Mission Owners must comply with DoD 8570.01-M. 

CSPs operating at impact level 6 are also required to meet the requirements of DoD 8570.01-M for their personnel.  However, non-DoD CSPs at impact levels 2-5 are not subject to these requirements.  CSPs at all impact levels are however, required to train security personnel as described in security control AT-3.  The determination to not levy DoD 8570.01-M on commercial CSPs is based on the complexities of attempting to change how a commercial CSP that serves customers outside of DoD hires and trains personnel.  Commercial CSP security personnel training will be assessed for compliance with security control AT-3 as part of the FedRAMP and DoD PA assessments. 



 

5.7 Data Spill


Per CNSSI 4009, CNSS Glossary[80], a data spill or “spillage” is an unauthorized transfer of classified information or Controlled Unclassified Information to an information system that is not accredited for the applicable security level of the data or information.

A data spill is a cyber-incident that requires immediate reporting and response from both the Mission Owner and CSP in order to minimize the scope of the spill and the risk to DoD data.  Mission owners will report the incident via their normal channels; the CSP must report the spill to the mission/information owner as well as follow the requirements in section 6.5 Cyber Incident Reporting and Response.  While the Mission Owner will most likely detect a spillage within their own dataset, the CSP might also detect a spillage.  CSP detection may depend on a particular service offering where the CSP might have intentional access to the content of a Mission Owner information system. 

Cloud environments present a unique challenge for data spill response.  Data spills in traditional IT are typically remediated or “cleaned” by sanitizing affected hardware to ensure that reconstruction of spilled data is impossible or impractical.  This process requires access to physical storage media and frequently involves storage resources being taken offline until the cleanup is complete.  Such loss of availability is not acceptable in a cloud environment with multiple tenants sharing the same infrastructure.  CSP use of storage virtualization can generate numerous, dynamic instantiations of data and makes physical data locations difficult to ascertain.  This makes physical sanitization methods non-viable for data spill remediation in cloud services. These challenges require a method for mitigating data spill cyber incidents that occur in the cloud. 

Where the Mission Owner has control over the cloud environment and/or how their data is stored as in IaaS and some PaaS CSOs, cryptographic erase described in Section 5.11.1, Cryptographic Erase, provides such a method.  Cryptographic erase is a high-assurance way of ensuring data at rest can no longer be read.  Additionally, file deletion will most likely ensure the file’s location will be overwritten with new data.  This will typically happen quickly in a high use cloud environment.  CE coupled with file deletion is faster and more practical than physical sanitization methods in large-scale virtualized environments used by cloud services.  Further, DoD control of encryption keys permits mission owners to address data spill incidents without alerting the CSP to the presence of unauthorized data. 

However, CE is only an option for data that is encrypted.  Mission owners should ensure all data is encrypted at rest consistent with Section 5.11, Encryption of Data-at-Rest in Commercial Cloud Storage.

Upon discovery of a data spill, mission owners should cryptographically erase unauthorized data by deleting the associated decryption key(s), consistent with NIST SP 800-88 Rev 1.  Mission owners must also take any necessary steps to remove unauthorized data that may exist in an unencrypted state, such as in memory of a running VM.

Due to data backup and disaster recovery methods used by Mission Owners and CSPs, data spills could affect associated storage.  Data spills remediation must extend to storage media where the spilled data might migrate.  All backups and mirrored storage affected by the spill must be remediated.  Mission owners are responsible for ensuring that all copies of spilled data are cryptographically erased.  Timely detection, reporting, and response are key to limiting the migration of spilled data under these circumstances. 

Data spills that involve unauthorized data being stored in an unencrypted state in a CSO must be mitigated by the Mission Owner utilizing any available option to make such data unrecoverable.  The response to such an event will likely be limited to methods that provide less assurance than cryptographic erase.  Mission Owners that do not or cannot utilize encryption at rest must create data spill response procedures that enumerate all data erasure options in a given CSO.  Upon discovery of such an incident, a risk analysis should be performed to determine the best course of action to mitigate the risk of reconstruction of unauthorized data.  This may or may not include alerting the CSP to the presence of unauthorized data in order to gain cooperation in mitigating the incident.

Where the Mission Owner does not have control over the cloud environment and/or how their data is stored as in most SaaS and some PaaS CSOs, the CSP must provide capabilities within the CSO that can be activated when a spillage is detected.  These capabilities should be under the control of the Mission Owner.  Granular DAR encryption and data deletion capabilities at the file or database record/field level along with Crypto Erase should be part of such capabilities. 

CSPs must provide a spillage remediation plan addressing the above and Mission Owner control of capabilities for all CSOs as part of their provisional authorization package.

Alternate innovative methods for cloud data spill protection/remediation will be assessed for equivalency to standard methods and approved if found sufficient. 

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-9, MP-6



 

5.8 Data Retrieval and Destruction for Off-boarding from a CSO


Off-boarding is the set of activities that take place when a Mission Owner terminates use of a CSO.  An off-boarding process is required when a Mission Owner migrates to a new cloud service, a mission reaches end of life, a contract ends, or a CSP ceases operations.  The off-boarding process is split into two stages: 1- data retrieval/migration and 2- data sanitization or destruction.   Mission owners must prepare for an eventual CSO off-boarding, and CSPs must support the capability in a timely manner. 

Upon request by the Mission Owner, the CSP will make all Mission Owner data stored in a CSO available for electronic transfer out of the CSP environment in a standard, non-proprietary format.  CSPs must also make available all audit logs relevant to the Mission Owner’s use of the CSO.  This includes all audit content specified by the AU-2 security control for the time period specified by AU-11.  See Section 5.2.3, DoD Data Ownership and CSP Use of DoD Data for additional information.  CSOs that enable Mission Owners to download their data on demand and delete or request destruction of data may not require specific CSP action to fulfill this requirement. Each Mission Owner may also request different means of data transfer (for example, as called out in the SLA), at its discretion. 

Cryptographic Erase, described in Section 5.11.1, Cryptographic Erase, provides a high-assurance way of ensuring data at rest can no longer be read.  Upon successful transfer of data out of a CSO, mission owners with data that is encrypted at rest must cryptographically erase all such mission data and take action to ensure that no data remains in the CSO in an unencrypted state.  All backups maintained in the CSO’s infrastructure, from which the Mission owner is departing, must also be cryptographically erased.  Mission owners should also request that all mission data be deleted or made logically inaccessible as per normal CSP procedure for departing customers.  Upon verification of successful Mission Owner transfer of data, CSPs must immediately delete or otherwise make all Mission Owner data irretrievable.  CSPs remain responsible for sanitizing or destroying all storage devices that held DoD data at the hardware’s end-of-life, even after off-boarding is complete IAW Section 5.9, Reuse and Disposal of Storage Media and Hardware.

DoD Mission Owners using non-DoD service offerings must be capable of migrating their data at any time.  This means that mission owners must have the ability to receive their data from a cloud service on short notice.  This capability can be supported in the form of available local storage infrastructure, or a cloud service offered by a different CSP capable of accepting data in a short time frame.  This is to ensure that mission owners can quickly retrieve their data in case of a sudden shutdown of a CSO.  (e.g., A CSP declares bankruptcy and plans to shut down services). This concern is also mitigated by the mission owner’s use of effective backup procedures as described in Section 5.12, Backup.  

Corresponding Security Controls: DM-2, MP-6

5.9 Reuse and Disposal of Storage Media and Hardware


CSPs will ensure that no residual DoD data exists on all storage devices decommissioned and disposed of, reused in an environment not governed by an agreement between the CSP and DoD, or transferred to a third party; as required by the FedRAMP selected security control MP-6. 

Impact Levels 4/5: CSPs may not reuse or dispose of storage hardware until all DoD data has been successfully removed.  The CSP will minimally ensure this by “Purging” all data on devices prior to decommissioning, disposal, reuse, or transfer, in accordance with NIST SP 800-88, Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitization[81].  Devices that are unable to be cleared or purged must be physically destroyed, as defined in NIST SP 800-88 Rev 1.  When there is any doubt to the success of the cleared or purged process, the storage device must be destroyed in accordance with NIST SP 800-88 Rev 1.

Impact Level 6: On-premises CSP’s may not dispose of or reuse storage hardware at a lower sensitivity or classification level but will ensure classified data is irretrievable from decommissioned devices by sanitizing them in accordance with NSA/CSS Storage Device Declassification Manual 9-12[82].

Corresponding Security Controls: DM-2, MP-6



 

5.10 Architecture


This section of the CC SRG provides guidance on the various architectural considerations related to DoD’s use of DoD and commercial cloud services in the following areas:

  • The connection between the CSP’s infrastructure/network and the  DISN
  • CSP service protections and integration into required DoDIN Cyberspace Defense and access control services
  • Mission system/application protections and integration into required DoDIN Cyberspace Defense and access control services

DoD’s usage of commercial cloud services means that the DoD joins an ecosystem of Internet connected CSPs/CSOs.  While DoD leverages Internet connected CSOs for the dissemination or processing of public information (Level 2), DoD also leverages private connectivity to the same CSOs for the protection of sensitive DoD information i.e., CUI at Levels 4 and 5. Additionally, DoD mission partners that are not native to NIPRNet will need to leverage Internet connected CSOs for their Level 4/5 processing (possibly under waiver) or will need to implement their own private connectivity.

Figure 10 – NIPRNet/Commercial/Federal Cloud Ecosystem shows the overall architecture of the cloud ecosystem into which NIPRNet is connected that consists of Off-Premises, Non-DoD-Private Commercial and Federal CSPs/CSOs. Any of the CSP/CSO clouds in the diagram may be a Commercial CSO or a CSO operated/offered by a Non-DoD Federal Agency. The point of this diagram is to make it blatantly clear that every Non-DoD-Private Commercial and/or Federal CSP/CSO is accessible from the  Internet even if the CSO has a Level 4/5 PA and is connected to NIPRNet via private connections. It also demonstrates that these CSPs/CSOs support non-DoD customers.  This figure focuses on NIPRNet connectivity to Commercial/Federal CSOs for the majority of mission use cases. It does not show all possible situations or use cases. Additional drawings may be provided in future releases of the CC SRG.

Figure 10 – NIPRNet/Commercial/Federal Cloud Ecosystem

5.10.1 Cloud Access Point (CAP)


The concept of and requirement for a Cloud Access Point (CAP) is derived from NSA and DoD Cybersecurity team guidance as presented in the DoD CIO’s DoD Cloud Way Forward, v1, 23 July 2014[83] document which provides for a Security Stack/CAP for both off-premises and on-premises commercially owned and operated CSOs.  This concept was made policy by the 15 December 2014 DoD CIO memo regarding Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services, which states “Commercial cloud services used for Sensitive Data must be connected to customers through a Cloud Access Point (CAP).”  This CC SRG expands upon the concept and adjusts the requirement for on-premises vs off-premises CSOs.

For the purpose of this SRG, Sensitive Data as referenced in the DoD CIO memo means CUI as handled at Levels 4/5 or classified information up to SECRET as handled at Level 6. 

In general, a CAP is required to mitigate risks to the DISN (or other DoD network) posed by connecting commercial CSOs to it except under certain restrictions. A CAP is a system of network boundary protection and monitoring devices (e.g., firewall, IPS, IDS, proxy, etc.), otherwise known as a Cybersecurity or IA stack, through which CSP infrastructure and networks will connect to the network the CAP protects.  This CC SRG addresses the DISN as the protected network which includes NIPRNet, SIPRNet, or other DISN based mission partner/Community of Interest (COI) networks.  

The primary purpose of a CAP is the protection of the DISN (or other network) from, and detection of, unauthorized network access from the CSP’s infrastructure, CSO management plane, CSP’s corporate networks, CSP’s connections to the Internet, and unauthorized traffic generated from compromised Mission Owner systems/applications and virtual networks.  The secondary purpose is the protection of the DoDIN (i.e., DoD information) in general by facilitating protected connections for network users to access Level 4/5 or 6 Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated on IaaS/PaaS, or using SaaS, and the information stored and processed therein, without exposing such traffic to the Internet.  These purposes also apply to any CAP on any Mission Partner or COI network for the protection of those networks and the sensitive information they contain.

NOTICE: a CAP does not protect the application or the network enclave (physical or virtual) in which it resides.  Each Mission Owner having control over what is built in the application’s virtual environment in I/PaaS, must provide for the protection of their application and virtual network enclave.  CSOs such as P/SaaS where the Mission Owner does not have control over what is built in the P/IaaS application’s environment, the CSP is responsible for the protection of the application and the network enclave (physical or virtual) in which the application resides.

CAP architecture will change depending on whether the CSO infrastructure is on-premises or off-premises and the services transiting it.  The concepts of Internal CAPs (ICAPs) for on-premises CSOs and  Boundary CAPs (BCAPs) for off-premises CSOs are detailed below with a focus on how these are implemented to protect the DISN.  Some CAPs will leverage existing infrastructure and some will be a new capability.  CAP architecture may also change depending on the DoDIN network, or COI network it is protecting.

The basic capabilities that any CAP must provide in support of DoDIN Cyber Defenses are as follows:

  • A Firewall capability that will only permit inbound (to DISN) responses to outbound (from DISN) requests to the CSO (all permitted) while denying all traffic originating in the CSO or its management plane except for specifically authorized traffic from the CSO to specific DoD endpoints on the DISN (permit by exception, deny by default). This will address the potential for unauthorized DoDIN/DISN access from the CSO management plane or from a compromised CSO.
  • An Intrusion Detection (IDS) capability to detect firewall failure, unauthorized traffic, and malware or other malicious traffic conveyed in unencrypted traffic.
  • In the event Voice and/or Video over IP (VVoIP) traffic consisting of the SIP-TLS and SRTP protocols (or their unsecure versions which is not permitted) traverse the CAP, a Session Border Controller (SBC) capability must be implemented. The SBC capability must be implemented in a back-to-back-SIP user agent / proxy mode so a TCP/UDP port is not statically opened inbound signaling. The SBC capability must also dynamically manage the randomly selected ephemeral UDP ports for media (SRTP) such that these IP ports are only opened for the duration of the communications session. Additionally the SBC capability must act as a SIP/SRTP IDS to detect and report unauthorized activities, malformed/dropped packets, etc.

NOTE: All of the above capabilities must provide feeds to the DoDIN boundary Cyber Defense capabilities such that anomalies can be detected and correlated with other anomalies on the network and ISs.

The remainder of this section will define the CAP requirements for DISN connected CSOs. These concepts can also be applied to other networks that do not use DISN Transport and are not behind the DISN IAPs.  

Corresponding Security Controls: SC-7, SC-7(3), SC-7(4)



[83] DoD Cloud Way Forward: http://iase.disa.mil/Documents/dodciomemo_w-attachment_cloudwayforwardreport-20141106.pdf

 

5.10.1.1 Boundary CAP (BCAP)


A Boundary CAP (BCAP) is required to connect off-premises commercially owned and operated CSOs to the DISN (or other network).  A BCAP will interconnect the network it protects with multiple CSP networks that offer private connectivity services.  A BCAP does not provide direct Internet access to or from CSP CSOs, the mission applications built upon them, or network users

In general, a BCAP will provide the following protections:

  • Provides DISN perimeter defenses and Cyber Defense sensing for traffic to and from applications hosted in the CSO.
  • Protects the DoDIN (i.e., DoD missions and information within the DISN) along with the DISN and its network services from incidents that affect a particular CSP's infrastructure or supported missions.
  • Protects DoD systems/applications instantiated in one CSP's infrastructure from incidents that affect a different CSP's infrastructure or supported missions.

A DISN BCAP is a DISN boundary intended to protect the enclave and information system which is the DISN and its other interconnected enclaves. The DISN is on the inside or protected side of the boundary.  Likewise Mission Owner systems/applications implemented in I/PaaS or using P/SaaS are considered enclaves which require enclave boundary and DMZ protections. These are on the outside or unprotected side of the boundary.  As such Mission Owner systems/applications implemented in I/PaaS as well as P/SaaS applications must protect themselves. This must be accomplished as close to the application enclave boundary as possible. Multiple Mission Owner systems/applications implemented in IaaS and PaaS where the Mission Owner has control over the VMs and environment can be protected by a Virtual Datacenter Security Stack (VDSS) and managed through a Virtual Datacenter Management Suite (VDMS) as described in the Secure Cloud Computing Architecture (SCCA) Functional Requirements Document (FRD)[84] (currently in Draft). Mission Owner use of PaaS or SaaS where the Mission Owner does not have control over the VMs and environment, must rely on the protections afforded by the CSP for their CSO or leverage an alternative solution (e.g., a third party CSO such as a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) service having minimally a FedRAMP  Moderate PA).



 

5.10.1.1.1 NIPRNet BCAP


The implementation of the DISN BCAP capability for NIPRNet is ultimately a DISA responsibility as part of its mission to protect the DoDIN and DoD information.  Per the 15 December 2014 DoD CIO memo, initial capability may temporarily be provided by DoD Components other than DISA, as approved by the DoD CIO, while the intent is for DISA to implement DISN BCAPs as an enterprise wide DISN service.  This requirement is applicable to Boundary CAPs to the NIPRNet, not ICAPs.  Specific CAP architectural requirements are beyond the scope of this SRG and will be published separately in the SCCA FR document.

The NIPRNet BCAP must be implemented as a system of hyper redundant, dual homed, geographically disbursed, high availability, high capacity cybersecurity stacks and meet-me points so that the BCAP system can handle the throughput required to handle all the applications expected to migrate to commercial Cloud.  It provides connectivity between DISN users and multiple off-premises Level 4/5 CSOs. It also facilitates user connections to these CSOs from the Internet through the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs) for Internet Facing Applications (IFA).  

Impact Level 2: The NIPRNet BCAP is not used since off-premises CSP infrastructure having a Level 2 PA is directly connected to the Internet, all traffic to and from a Level 2 CSO serving Level 2 missions and their mission virtual networks will connect via the Internet.    NIPRNet users access these CSOs and applications via the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs) while Internet based users access them directly.  Mission Owner applications implemented in I/PaaS CSOs must provide their own enclave boundary and DMZ application protections or leveraging an enterprise level application protection service (i.e., the Virtual Datacenter Security Stack (VDSS) / Virtual Datacenter Management Suite (VDMS) portion of the SCCA) instantiated within the same CSO.  VDSS/VDMS may be provided by DISA, a DoD Component, or the Mission Owner.  SaaS CSOs must provide their own enclave boundary and DMZ application protections to which a Mission Owner may layer on additional protection services (e.g., CASB).  See sections 5.10.2.2, User/Data Plane Connectivity and 5.10.2.3, Management Plane Connectivity for additional details.  Alternately a Level 2 IFAs may be implemented in a Level 4/5 CSO thus will connect through the NIPRNet BCAP.  See Impact Levels 4/5 below.

NOTE: All IFAs providing access to publicly released information along with some IFAs providing access to low confidentiality private information should migrate to a Level 2 CSO rather than a Level 4 or 5 CSO. This will not only reduce the load and required capacity on the BCAP infrastructure but will also permit the DoD Components and Department to realize the greatest cost savings and support other mandated cost saving initiatives.

Impact Levels 4/5: All DoD traffic from NIPRNet (or other COI network) to and from off-premises CSP infrastructure serving Level 4 and level 5 missions and the mission virtual networks must traverse one or more NIPRNet BCAPs.  No direct traffic is permitted to/from the Internet except via the NIPRNet IAPs and DoD DMZ capabilities provided by the Mission Owner, a DoD Component, or DISA.  The BCAP or an attached meet-me point provides for direct physical or logical connectivity between the DISN and CSP’s network through which the CSO is accessed. Physical connectivity is established using a direct fiber optic connection between the DISN meet-me point router and a nearby CSP network router.  Logical connectivity is established using dedicated long haul circuits, Private IP VPN services, a FedRAMP authorized multi-CSP/customer interconnection service, or a point to point IPsec VPN.  These connections can also support the transport of IPsec VPNs connections originating within the CSP’s network infrastructure and/or Mission Owner’s virtual networks.  This includes the production plane for non-privileged user access and the management plane for privileged user access and deployed IA/Cybersecurity Defense tool connectivity to internal DISN native Cybersecurity Defense monitoring systems.  See Sections 5.10.2.2, User/Data Plane Connectivity  and 5.10.2.3, Management Plane Connectivity for additional details.  High availability Mission Owner systems and their supporting CSP network infrastructure must connect through two or more NIPRNet BCAPs. 

The NIPRNet BCAP will also provide the following functions:

  • Serves as an authorized DoD demilitarized zone (DMZ) for IFAs and mission systems in Level 4/5 CSOs providing the DISN facing DoD IP addresses used by the mission system/application are authorized DoD DMZ IP addresses.  Mission Owner applications must provide their own DMZ application protections or leveraging an enterprise level application protection service (i.e., the Virtual Datacenter Security Stack (VDSS) / Virtual Datacenter Management Suite (VDMS) portion of the SCCA) provided by DISA or a DoD Component in the cloud.  A BCAP does not support/provide direct internet access to a Level 4/5 CSO. Such access must be via the NIPRNet IAPs.
  • May terminate physical or logical connections from the internal side of a DoD Component’s DMZ extension such that the DoD Component’s existing DMZ/DMZ-extension protections may be leveraged for their IFAs.

NOTICE: Level 5 CSP/CSO infrastructure/applications and DoD Mission Owner applications must be designed such that there is no dependence on Internet based resources such that traffic must traverse the IAPs to/from the Internet to make the CSO function. As such the CSO and DoD Mission Owner applications connected through a BCAP must be able to fully function; serving NIPRNet connected users in the event DoD decides to cut off NIPRNet access to the Internet.  Of course in this situation, Internet connected users will not be able to utilize the Level 5 service/resource.  Mission Owners that need this restriction for Level 4 CSOs must add the requirement to their SLA/contract.

5.10.1.1.2 NIPRNet BCAP Meet-Me Points


A NIPRNet BCAP Meet-Me Point is a DISN Point-of-Presence (PoP) located in a carrier agnostic commercial network interconnection facility or commercial carrier’s collocation facility.  This PoP minimally consists of a high capacity router, but may include DISN boundary protection capabilities that constitute all or part of the BCAP Cybersecurity stack.

The purpose of the BCAP Meet-Me Point is to facilitate the interconnection of the DISN BCAP with multiple CSP networks.  Multiple BCAP Meet-Me Points will be implemented to facilitate redundant and reliable interconnection with CSP networks.  BCAP Meet-Me Points will be geographically disbursed in US jurisdiction to facilitate connection availability and to reduce latency between the users and CSO.   The BCAP and/or Meet-Me Points may also support interconnection with commercial carrier grade services that provide cloud customer network access/connection to multiple CSP networks (e.g., Equinix Cloud Exchange, AT&T NetBond, and Verizon Secure Cloud Interconnect).

Since the Meet-Me Point is a DISN PoP located in a commercial facility, the following requirements apply.  A BCAP Meet-Me Point / DISN PoP located in a commercial facility:

  • Must be located in a physically separate protected space within the commercial facility such as in a locked cage or minimally in a locked cabinet. The physically separate space is minimally protected as follows:
    • Physical access to the commercial facility is compliant with all required physical environment and maintenance personnel access security controls in the FedRAMP moderate or high baseline (PE and MA families) as appropriate to include but not limited to role based access control, access auditing, visitor access logging and escorting as needed, etc.
    • Physical access to the DoD space is compliant with all required physical and maintenance personnel access security controls in the FedRAMP moderate baseline or high baseline as appropriate and/or appropriate CNSSI 1253 baselines to include but not limited to role based access control, access auditing, visitor access logging and escorting as needed, etc.
    • Personnel access to the DoD space is controlled by an automated Entry Access Control System (AECS) that is token and/or biometric based.  This system may be under DoD control or under the control of the facility owner, but must limit access to only authorized individuals, must log/audit all accesses to include the identities of the personnel accessing and departing, and must provide and log alerts for unauthorized accesses and failed attempts.
    • Access to the physical space is externally monitored by the facility owner using video cameras and physical intrusion detection system (IDS) alarm systems.
    • It is highly recommended that the internal space be monitored by an automated motion IDS system and video cameras operated by DoD. In this manner DoD can monitor all physical activities within the space, authorized or unauthorized.
  • Must be compliant with DoD SRGs and STIGs.
  • Must follow a change management and connection approval process that documents all aspects of approved connections and system modification
  • All connections are assigned a Command Communications Service Designator (CCSD) for tracking and authorization purposes

Must be assessed and authorized under DoD RMF as part of the BCAP and DISN accreditation due to its role as an extension of the DISN authorization boundary.

5.10.1.1.3 CSP Support for BCAP Connectivity


To support BCAP connections between DoD and an off-premises Level 4/5 CSP, the CSP must offer a private connection service to the CSO that does not traverse the Internet. The CSP’s network must include a PoP in a carrier agnostic commercial network interconnection facility or commercial carrier’s collocation facility where an existing DISN PoP / BCAP Meet-Me-Point is located. A physical connection within the facility will be installed between the two PoPs providing a direct private connection between the DISN BCAP and the CSP’s network over which the CSO will be accessed along with supporting services. In the event reliability is a requirement for access to the CSO the interconnections must be implemented minimally in two geographically disbursed network interconnection/ collocation facilities.

As a condition for a DoD Level 4 or Level 5 PA the CSP must offer the private connection service for access to the CSO. DoD recognizes that the CSP may not have one or more PoPs collocated with a DISN BCAP Meet-Me-Point. As such the existence of such a CSP network PoP will not be required for obtaining the PA but a willingness to install such a PoP or to negotiate a mutually agreeable location for collocating the DISN and CSP PoPs, or use an approved intermediary cloud interconnection service (having its own DoD PA). Associated costs will be negotiated between the Mission Owner and CSP. If a new DISN Meet-Me PoP is required; DISA must be included in such negotiations. Notice of this potential situation must be provided during the PA assessment phase.  Such negotiations will occur in the planning stage for the BCAP connection based on a contract between the CSP and their first Mission Owner. Mission Owners may also stipulate that the CSP must have/install a PoP collocated with one or more DISN meet-me-points.

5.10.1.1.4 CSP/CSO Network Connectivity to Internet and BCAP


Section 5.10, Architecture and Figure 10 – NIPRNet/Commercial/Federal Cloud Ecosystem provides a depiction of the reality that CSPs/CSOs having a Level 4/5 PA that are connected to the NIPRNet via a NIPRNet BCAP are also connected to the Internet.

As a condition for a DoD Level 4 or Level 5 PA the CSP, when the CSP’s network which supports a DoD contracted CSO is privately connected to the NIPRNet via a NIPRNet BCAP (or other DoD network via their BCAP) and the Internet, the CSP must provide evidence that the CSP’s network or the CSO cannot provide a path from the Internet to the NIPRNet (or other network), thus creating a back door to a Dod network. An additional or associated consideration is the robustness of the CSP’s required boundary protection (defense-in-depth security / protective measures) implemented between the Internet and the CSO for its protection from Internet based threats. This protection is expected to be different depending on whether the CSO is I/PaaS or P/SaaS and whether the Mission Owner has control over their portion of the CSO.  See section 5.10.3, CSP Service Architecture, and section 5.10.6, Mission Owner System/Application Requirements using IaaS/PaaS for details.

5.10.1.2 Internal CAP (ICAP)


An ICAP is a DISN boundary consisting of a Cybersecurity stack which protects the DISN (or other network) or the datacenter network to which the CSO is connected (inside / protected side of the boundary) from, and provides detection of, unauthorized network access from the CSP’s infrastructure (outside / unprotected side of the boundary), externally connected CSO management plane, CSP corporate networks, CSP connections to the Internet, and from compromised Mission Owner systems/applications and virtual networks.  Typically one ICAP is required for each physical CSO infrastructure instance.

Impact Levels 2/4/5: Internal CAPs (ICAPs) will be implemented for on-premises commercially owned and operated CSO connectivity to the DISN, if the CSO management plane has connectivity to external networks that bypasses native NIPRNet enclave and external boundary protections. As such all NIPRNet (or other unclassified COI network) production traffic to and from on-premises commercially owned and operated CSP infrastructure serving Level 2, 4, and 5 missions and the mission virtual networks must traverse an ICAP.

An ICAP is required to mitigate vulnerabilities and risks associated with implementing a commercial CSP’s CSO infrastructure on-premises (i.e., located inside the B/C/P/S physical or virtual “fence-line.”) when, as expected, that infrastructure is managed by the CSP from their off-premises corporate CSO management centers using non-DoD controlled workstations and infrastructure which will most likely have some connectivity to the CSP's corporate network and/or the Internet.  The connection between the CSO management centers and the on-premises CSO’s management plane is expected to traverse an IPSEC tunnel across NIPRNet, its IAPs, and Internet OR traverse a dedicated “side-door” connection using a dedicated circuit, a commercial carrier's Private IP VPN service, or restricted Internet Service Provider (ISP) connection.  ISP connections, across which the CSP must VPN, must not provide inbound or outbound access to/from CSO management plane to/from the open Internet.  This requirement also applies if the CSO management plane is locally dedicated to the CSO and managed on-premises, but with an external connection to the CSP’s corporate network, or similar.  

The ICAP will be configured to pass authorized production traffic (i.e., required Protocols and Services on their approved IP Ports) for those mission applications using the CSO while blocking all access to DISN or the datacenter network to which the CSO is connected from the CSO management plane. 

The architecture of ICAPs may vary and will be developed based upon the location of the CSO infrastructure on the BCPS, existing infrastructure, and other factors.  An ICAP minimally consists of firewall and IDS functions but may leverage existing capabilities such as the Cybersecurity Stack protecting a DoD Data center (today) (e.g., DECC), JIE Core Data Center (CDC) (future), or may be part of a Joint Regional Security Stack (JRSS).  On the other hand, an ICAP may have special capabilities to support specific missions, CSP types (commercial or DoD), or specific cloud services.  Since the CSP infrastructure and ICAP are both on-premises directly connected to the NIPRNet or indirectly via a DoD data center network, the full suite of BCAP boundary protections are not needed.    

When using the Cybersecurity Stack protecting a DoD Data center today (e.g., DECC) or JIE Core Data Center (CDC) in the future as an ICAP, the CSO must be connected in such a manner that both the DISN and datacenter network are protected from the CSO management plane. 

ICAP implementation and the connection of on-premises CSP infrastructure to the NIPRNet will follow normal NIPRNet connection approval guidance and requirements as is the case with any NIPRNet enclave or application infrastructure in a DoD data center.

An ICAP is not required in the event the CSO is managed under the following conditions:

  • The CSO management plane is a closed network directly part of the CSO infrastructure having no side-door or back-door connections to non-DISN networks.

OR

  • The CSO management plane is a NIPRNet enclave or part of one which only has connectivity to external networks such as the Internet or CSP corporate network via, and visible to,  the native NIPRNet boundary protections and IAPs.  While CSP personnel may VPN to their corporate network from their workstation, a point-to-point VPN may not be established between the CSP’s network and the CSO management plane.  The latter will require the establishment of an ICAP.  

Additionally:

  • CSP personnel manage the CSO from a location on a DoD installation / BCPS.
  • The CSP personnel are issued GFE from which they perform their CSO management duties if these workstations can access the NIPRNet.
  • CSP personnel may not use the same GFE to manage the CSO as is used to perform general business functions such as email or those that might require surfing the Internet.
  • The CSP personnel are issued CAC cards for installation / BCPS access and access to their GFE and NIPRNet.

5.10.1.3 SIPRNet BCAP/ICAP


In accordance with CNSS architectural recommendations for the National Secret Fabric, DoD SECRET enclaves and virtual networks instantiated in DoD on-premises Impact level 6 CSOs will be considered as an enclave within the DoD provider network, (i.e., the SIPRNet).

Since DoD on/off-premises Impact level 6 CSOs and their supporting infrastructure, to include management network(s) are required to be one or more closed SIPRNet enclaves, they can be considered to be on-premises for the purposes of this CC SRG due to the concept of extending the virtual “fence-line” or SIPRNet boundary around such DoD enclaves.  As such these enclaves must comply with all SIPRNet connection approval requirements which include the appropriate enclave boundary protections and Cyberspace Defense requirements.  The DoD Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated in these Impact Level 6 CSO enclaves will be assessed and authorized the same way any other DoD SIPRNet enclave connection

As such no SIPRNet BCAP is required for the connection of these DoD enclaves (physical or virtual) to the SIPRNet.

Furthermore SIPRNet (or other classified COI network) traffic to and from on-premises commercially owned and operated CSP infrastructure serving Level 6 missions and the mission virtual networks must traverse an ICAP only if the CSO is managed off-premises (not typical). The ICAP will be configured to pass authorized production traffic for those mission applications using the CSO while blocking all access to DISN or the datacenter network to which the CSO is connected from the CSO management plane.  This not the case when the on-premises CSO is managed from an on-premises location(s) since the CSO and management locations would be considered one or more SIPRNet enclaves and protected as such.

5.10.1.4 Mission Partner Environments or Communities of Interest Network Cloud Access Points


For the purpose of this CC SRG, mission partner refers to DoD Components, Federal agencies, and potentially their contractors operating networks that include DoD and other entities. This section does not include or refer to war fighting coalition partners or the networks they use or are implemented for them.  Coalition networks may be addressed in a future release of the CC SRG, however the use of cloud computing on these networks should be implemented in the same manner as this CC SRG provides for NIPRNet or SIPRNet to include BCAPs and ICAPs depending on the classification level of the network.   

Mission Partner Environments (MPEs) include mission partners that utilize networks other than NIPRNet or SIPRNet (e.g., DREN) and mission partner Communities of Interest (COI) that utilize network overlays and extensions that leverage (e.g., ride on or overlay) the NIPRNet or SIPRNet (e.g., MilCOI).  Additionally, DoD Component mission partners (e.g., commissaries; exchanges; Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) organizations; Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) organizations; educational entities (e.g., National Defense University (NDU)) typically operate networks that may not be part of the DISN (i.e., do not use DISN transport or NIPRNet services such as Internet access via the NIPRNet IAPs) or .mil domain.  These mission partners and their networks may be in the .gov/.org/.com/.edu domains and may be directly accessed from the Internet through a boundary similar to a DoD IAP which they operate and authorize or a contracted third party DHS/GSA Trusted Internet Connection (TIC).  Such other networks and COI may interconnect with NIPRNet or SIPRNet and may interconnect with other DoD and Non-DoD mission partner/Agency networks. 

While the CAP concepts presented here are applicable to non-native DISN networks operated by other DoD Components (e.g., the .edu community which supports a diverse non-DoD user base) there may be other methods of protecting these networks from risks associated with the use of commercial Cloud.  The use of a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) service having minimally a FedRAMP Moderate PA might be one such alternative for non-DISN networks.

MPEs that utilize network(s) other than NIPRNet or SIPRNet (e.g., DRSN), will need to implement BCAPs or ICAPs for those network(s) that provide equivalent protections to those defined in the SCCA Functional Requirements Document (FRD)[85] when connecting CSP infrastructure to their networks.  MPEs implemented as a COI overlay on NIPRNet or SIPRNet can utilize the DISA-provided CAPs to fulfill the CAP requirement or may provide their own CAP capability IAW the SCCA.  Mission Partners that are external to NIPRNet or SIPRNet, however, are responsible for providing an equivalent capability to protect DoD data and MPEs from vulnerabilities associated with a connection to an external service provider. 

All MPE CAP instantiations must be approved by the DoD CIO.

NOTE: MPE network connectivity/access to off-premises commercial DoD Level 4/5 CSOs will not traverse a NIPRNet BCAP or a NIPRNet Federated Gateway (NFG) when connecting to/accessing MPE applications instantiated in such a CSO.  



[85] SCCA FRD: Link to be added when published

 

5.10.1.5 Mission Partner Environment Access to NIPRNet Services Hosted in the Cloud


Mission Partner Environments that require access to NIPRNet services are required to connect to NIPRNet via the Internet, IAPs, and DoD DMZ or via a NIPRNet Federated Gateway (NFG) IAW JFHQ-DODIN TASKORD 16-0103 Establishment of the NIPRNET Federated Gateway (NFG).  NIPRNet services are applications operated by DoD Components for the purpose of serving NIPRNet users.  Some of these NIPRNet focused applications might be implemented in a CSO.  Such a CSO might be commercial off-premises CSO, a DoD private off-premises CSO, or a DoD private on-premises CSO.  Mission Partners that desire or require access to such applications must coordinate with the Mission Owner of the application for permission to access it and to determine the best access method.  There are three approved methods of accessing such an application as follows:

  • The MPE user must establish a VPN connection to NIPRNet or the application itself.
  • The mission owner must expose the application to the Internet through the DoD DMZ such that the MPE user can access the application from the Internet via the IAPs.
  • The mission owner must expose the application to the MPE network and MPE users through the NFG.

5.10.1.6 Mission System Connection Approval through DISN BCAPs


Impact Levels 4/5: Connection of a mission system to the DISN via an ICAP or BCAP will be approved and recorded by the DISA Connection Approval Office in accordance with normal connection approval procedures.  This requires all Mission Owners to register all Cloud based applications, their CSP/CSO, and connection method in the DISA Systems/Network Approval Process (SNAP)[86] database Cloud Module. Initial connections (physical or virtual) to a CSP’s network will occur during onboarding of the CSP’s first Mission Owner customer.  Additional connections will be made or capacity will be scaled as more Mission Owners use the given CSP.  Specific processes and procedures regarding connection approval and Mission Owner connections via a BCAP are addressed in the DISA Cloud Connection Process Guide (CCPG)[87] which will ultimately be merged with the overall DISN Connection Process Guide (CPG)[88]

Impact Level 6: The DoD Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated in these Impact Level 6 CSO enclaves will be assessed and authorized the same way any other DoD SIPRNet enclave connection IAW the DISA CPG.  Approval for connection to the SIPRNet will be processed through the DISA classified connection approval process like any other SIPRNet enclave. 



[87] CCPG: http://disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/Services/DISN-Connect/References/CCPG.pdf

[88] CPG: http://disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/Services/DISN-Connect/References/DISN_CPG.pdf

 

5.10.2 Network Planes


A plane, in a networking context, is one of three integral components of network architectures.  These three elements – the data synchronization/control or network plane, the user/data or production plane, and the management plane – can be thought of as different areas of operations.  Each plane carries a different type of traffic and is conceptually an overlay network on top of the network plane.

5.10.2.1 Network Plane Connectivity


The network or data sync/control plane carries signaling traffic and data replication between servers/data centers.  Network control packets originate from or are destined for a network transport device (virtual or physical).  The network plane in general is subject to network related DoD SRGs and STIGs.  This CC SRG does not contain additional requirements related to network plane connections to the cloud computing infrastructure.

5.10.2.2 User/Data Plane Connectivity


The user/data plane (also known as the forwarding plane, carrier plane, or bearer plane) carries the network user traffic.  Table 5 details the DoD user/data plane connectivity by impact level for DoD on-premises and off-premises CSOs. 

NOTE: While this table does apply to non-DoD Federal Government tenants using a DoD on-premises CSO, it does not apply to non-DoD Federal Government tenants using an off-premises CSO that is a Federal Government community cloud having DoD tenants.

Table 5 - User/Data Plane Connectivity

Impact Level

Off-Premises

Non-DoD CSP Service Offering Infrastructure

On-Premises

DoD and Non-DoD CSP Service Offering Infrastructure

Level 2

  • User connectivity will leverage commercial infrastructure (i.e., Internet). 
  • Users connecting from the Internet will connect directly while users connecting from inside the DISN (i.e., NIPRNet) will connect to the Internet via the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs) then to the CSP infrastructure. 
  • CSO connections will be assessed and authorized using the same external connection requirements as any other Internet-facing connection.
  • User connectivity will use existing infrastructure (Government owned) for its user/data plane when the user is within the B/P/C/S fence-line (on-premises) and directly connected to the local Base Area Network (BAN) and NIPRNet. 
  • User traffic to/from the NIPRNet to/from the CSO infrastructure will traverse an ICAP.  When the user is outside the B/P/C/S fence-line (off-premises) connected to the Internet, user traffic must enter/leave the NIPRNet via the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs) then an ICAP via DoD DMZ extension. 
  • CSO connections will be assessed and authorized the same as any other internal connection.

Level 4

And 5

  • DoD and external user connectivity will leverage a DISN extension to the commercial facility using government network infrastructure within government boundaries (i.e.  NIPRNet) and commercial infrastructure beyond government boundaries (i.e.  commercial carrier infrastructure / connectivity service offerings). 
  • The DISN extension will traverse a BCAP. 
  • Users connecting from inside the DISN (i.e., NIPRNet) will connect via a BCAP while users connecting from the Internet will traverse the IAPs then a BCAP via a DoD DMZ extension. 
  • CSO connections will be assessed and authorized through the Connection Approval Process the same as any other internal connection using the same requirements as any other DoD-facing or Internet-facing connection.  Internet-facing connections are assessed and authorized IAW the DMZ STIG[89].

Level 6

  • User connectivity will leverage a DISN extension to the commercial facility using government SECRET network infrastructure within government boundaries (i.e.  SIPRNet) and commercial infrastructure beyond government boundaries (i.e.  commercial carrier infrastructure / connectivity service offerings). 
  • The DISN extension to a commercial facility can be accomplished with a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) router and optical switch (referred to as a Service Delivery Node). 
  • The DISN extension to a commercial facility will use NSA Type 1 encryption or commercial equivalent (Commercial Solutions for Classified Programs (CSfC)[90] Suite B). 
  • User traffic to/from the Internet (e.g., executive travel kits users) will use NSA Type 1 encryption or commercial equivalent (CSfC Suite B) and must enter/leave the SIPRNet via the approved gateways.
  • User connectivity will use existing SECRET network infrastructure (Government owned) for its user/data plane (i.e., SIPRNet).  User traffic to/from the SIPRNet will traverse an ICAP. 
  • User traffic to/from the Internet (e.g., executive travel kits users) will use NSA Type 1 encryption or commercial equivalent (CSfC Suite B) and must enter/leave the SIPRNet via the approved gateways.
  • CSO connections will be assessed and authorized the same as any other internal connection using the same requirements as any other SIPRNet -facing connection (i.e., IAW the DMZ STIG).


[90] Commercial Solutions for Classified Programs: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/csfc_program/index.shtml

 

5.10.2.3 Management Plane Connectivity


The management plane carries network/server/system privileged user (administrator) traffic along with maintenance and monitoring traffic. 

Table 6 details the management plane connectivity by impact level for Mission Owner’s systems/applications and CSP’s CSOs.  The Mission Owner management plane includes connectivity for DoD personnel or DoD contractors managing Mission Owner systems (i.e., virtual machines and networks) instantiated on IaaS/PaaS as well as for DoD personnel or DoD contractors access to / use of CSP service ordering/management portals for all service offering types (IaaS/PaaS/SaaS).  The CSP management plane includes connectivity for CSP personnel managing the CSP’s service offering infrastructure.

All encryption identified, except as stated otherwise, must be accomplished using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography modules operated in FIPS mode.

IAW standard practice and security requirements, management interfaces on VMs and protective appliances (virtual or physical) located in a Mission Owner’s virtual network, must not be exposed to direct access from the production network (e.g., Internet or NIPRNet/SIPRNet).  To the extent possible, CSP service ordering/management portals through which VMs and virtual networks are instantiated and configured must also be protected from direct access from the production network to prevent compromise of mission systems and DoD information.

All management transactions must be audited.

Table 6 - Management Plane Connectivity

Impact Level

Mission Owner

Management Plane

CSP

Management Plane

Level 2

  • Management connectivity from outside the NIPRNet (e.g., for off-premises contractor personnel) requires an encrypted, tunneled connection via the Internet to the mission system/application and virtual network.  Management traffic to CSP service ordering / service management portals must be encrypted if not in an encrypted VPN.  Monitoring traffic must traverse a VPN connection.  All traffic entering/leaving the NIPRNet must be via the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs).
  • Management connectivity from inside the NIPRNet (e.g., for on-premises DoD or contractor personnel) must be restricted to a defined set of IP addresses and requires an encrypted, tunneled connection through the NIPRNet to the Internet via the IAPs to manage the mission system/application and virtual network.  Management traffic to CSP service ordering / service management portals must be encrypted if outside an encrypted VPN.  Monitoring traffic must traverse a VPN connection.  All traffic must enter/leave the NIPRNet via the DISN Internet Access Points (IAPs).

 

 

  • Non-DoD CSP off-premises service offering infrastructure and off-premises management: CSP management connectivity leverages CSP service offering and management plane infrastructure which should be logically or physically separate from production.  NOTE: DoD cannot dictate how a CSP architects their commercial service offerings that are not dedicated to DoD.  DoD recommends logical or physical separation of service offering production and management plane infrastructure as a well-known industry best practice.  Such separation will be assessed as a bullet point for DoD risk acceptance.  Non-DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and management:  The CSP may directly connect their management infrastructure to their service offering infrastructure if collocated.  An encrypted, tunneled connection from the CSP’s on-premises management infrastructure to the service provider’s on-premises service offering infrastructure is also permitted locally but must be used to access remote service offering infrastructure. 
  • Non-DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and off-premises management: CSP management connectivity must leverage an encrypted, tunneled connection from the CSP’s off-premises management infrastructure to the service provider’s on-premises service offering infrastructure.
  • DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and management: CSP management connectivity will utilize existing infrastructure such as the Enterprise Services Directorate (ESD) Out of Band (OOB) management network.  No service provider security stack is required. 

 

Level 4

And 5

  • Management connectivity from inside the NIPRNet must be restricted to a defined set of IP addresses and requires an encrypted, tunneled connection through the NIPRNet and an ICAP or BCAP to manage the mission system/application and virtual network.  Management traffic to CSP service ordering / service management portals must be encrypted if not in an encrypted VPN.  Monitoring traffic must traverse a VPN connection.  All traffic must enter/leave the NIPRNet via a BCAP. 
  • Management connectivity by DoD personnel or DoD contractors from outside the NIPRNet must be restricted to a defined set of IP addresses and requires an encrypted, tunneled connection from the Internet via an IAP and an ICAP or BCAP to the mission system/application and virtual network.  Per remote administration policy, the remote management terminal must be Government Furnished Equipment (GFE).   Management traffic to CSP service ordering / service management portals must be encrypted if outside an encrypted VPN.  Monitoring traffic must traverse a VPN connection via a BCAP and NIPRNet. 

 

Level 6

  • All management and monitoring connectivity is via the SIPRNet.  Management and monitoring traffic will be encrypted using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography[91] to accommodate separation for Need-to know reasons.
  • DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and management: CSP management connectivity will utilize existing SECRET network infrastructure such as the SECRET Out of Band (OOB) management network.  No service provider security stack is required.
  • Non-DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and management: The CSP may directly connect their management infrastructure to their service offering infrastructure if personnel are collocated using their SECRET LAN.  An encrypted, tunneled connection using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography over SIPRNet from the CSP’s on-premises management infrastructure to the service provider’s on-premises service offering infrastructure is also permitted and will be used to access remote service offering infrastructure. 
  • Non-DoD CSP on-premises service offering infrastructure and off-premises management: CSP management connectivity must leverage a SIPRNet extension or a DoD approved encrypted, tunneled connection from the CSP’s dedicated SECRET off-premises management infrastructure to the service provider’s on-premises service offering infrastructure. 
  • Non-DoD CSP off-premises service offering infrastructure and off-premises management: CSP management connectivity leverages CSP’s dedicated SECRET service offering and management plane infrastructure which must be logically or physically separate.

 



[91] FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html

 

5.10.3 CSP Service Architecture


DoD uses the concept of defense-in-depth when protecting its networks and data/information.  This includes, but is not limited to, hardening host OSs and applications, implementing host firewalls and intrusion detection, strong access control, robust auditing of events, while protecting the networks with application layer firewalls, proxies, web content filters, email gateways, intrusion detection / prevention, and a DMZ /gateway  architecture, along with robust network traffic monitoring. The concept must not be lost when moving Mission Owners systems/applications and their data/information to the commercial cloud.  As such, if virtualization is used, the above measures must also be used to protect the virtual environment along with the use of hypervisor based firewall/filtering/routing mechanisms or virtual security appliances.

This section details the defense-in-depth security concepts and requirements that both CSPs and Mission Owners must implement to protect DoD data/information and mission systems/applications.  DoD recognizes that there are innovative approaches that can be implemented in the virtual environment that may replace some of the defense-in-depth mitigations that have been developed over the years for physical networks and servers.  DoD looks forward to evaluating equivalent alternative measures which will be assessed by DISA on a case by case basis.

5.10.3.1 CSP Service Architecture - SaaS


Mission Owner use of CSP’s SaaS offerings are reliant on the defense-in-depth measures implemented by the CSP for the protection of the service application and the infrastructure that supports it.  This includes the protection of all sensitive information stored and processed in the CSP infrastructure.  In other words, the Mission Owner relies on the CSP and the security posture of its SaaS offering for the protection of DoD information.  During the ATO assessment process for SaaS offerings, defense-in-depth security / protective measures must be assessed for adequacy and potential risk acceptance by DoD.  This may be in addition to assessing security controls.  The following guidance is reflected in the DoD DMZ STIG and Application Security and Development STIG along with other operating system (OS) and application specific STIGs, but is highlighted here to emphasize instances where an authoritative reference (e.g., product specific STIG) is not available. 

The defense-in-depth security / protective measures to be established by the CSP for SaaS are, but are not limited, to the following:

  • Application Layer Firewall (properly configured) and  intrusion detection and/or prevention protection of the CSP’s infrastructure supporting the SaaS application offering, as well as segmentation (logical or physical) from the CSP’s other offerings and corporate networks.
  • Application / network architecture which provides unrestricted/restricted DMZ zones with appropriate protections IAW the DoD DMZ STIG for internet/externally facing servers and private / “back end” zones with appropriate protections for application/database servers and other supporting systems/servers.  This includes but is not limited to Web Application Firewalls, Reverse Web Proxies, FTP Proxies, etc. as necessary for the protection of the application and the customer’s data/information stored/processed within.
  • Customer data-at-rest encryption protections using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules operated in FIPS mode where only the Mission Owner has control of the keys.  This requirement addresses the persistent storage of customer data on various media and in databases, not customer data that requires real time processing without retention.  If such data is retained then the retained data storage is persistent. 
  • Customer data-in-transit encryption protections using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules operated in FIPS mode.  This requirement addresses customer data transiting public and private Wide Area Networks (WAN) (i.e., Internet, NIPRNet, CSP’s WAN) and Local Area Networks (LANs) from the customer terminal to the CSP’s service offering enclave LAN.  Encryption may be native at the protocol level or be at the VPN/tunnel level.  This requirement is also applicable to CSP replication of customer data and systems between primary locations and backup Continuity of Operations (COOP) / Disaster Recovery (DR) locations.
  • Hardening / patching / maintenance of OSs and applications IAW industry standards. DoD SRGs and STIGS or DoD-accepted equivalents must be used if the service is private or community cloud used by DoD.  For Information Assurance (IA) Vulnerability Management (IAVM) message compliance, the CSP will be expected to comply with industry best practice by applying patches identified in the CVE that would be referenced in the DoD IAVM message.  Innovative alternatives such as implementing a behavioral based or software integrity protection model for all systems may be viable and will be assessed on a case by case basis.
  • Implement PIV/DoD CAC / PKI authentication for all customer user access on all SaaS offerings that process information at impact Levels 4 and 5 in accordance with IA-2 (12).  This includes regular non-privileged users accessing the service and privileged customer users accessing service ordering / management interfaces/portals.  SaaS offerings that process information at impact Level 6 must use the CNSS SIPRNet Token.  Alternate authentication measures for those user communities that cannot use the required PKI token will be assessed on a case by case basis and may require a waiver.

NOTE: Equivalencies to the vulnerability mitigations provided in DoD SRGs and STIGS may be viable and acceptable but must be approved by the DISA AO.

NOTE: IAVM messages include IA Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA), IA Vulnerability Bulletins (IAVB), and Technical Advisories (TA).  For the remainder of this SRG, the term IAVMs will be used to refer to all IAVM message types.

5.10.3.2 CSP Service Architecture - IaaS/PaaS


Mission Owners build systems and applications on virtualized infrastructure provided by the CSO under IaaS/PaaS.  There must be a clear delineation of responsibility for security between the CSP and the Mission Owner, which depends on how the CSP presents the security features it supports in the CSO.  Under IaaS the Mission Owner is fully responsible for securing the guest operating systems and applications that they build; the CSP will be responsible for securing the virtualization OS (i.e., hypervisor) and supporting infrastructure.  Under PaaS, the Mission Owner is fully responsible for securing the guest operating systems and the platform applications and applications that they build.  Depending upon how the CSP CSO presents the security features it supports in the CSO, the delineation of responsibility may partially shift from the Mission Owner to the CSP with respect to the guest operating systems and the platform applications.  The CSP might take responsibility for securing these areas of a PaaS CSO as part of the core service or as an add-on component. 

For the purpose of the remainder of Section 5 of this SRG, IaaS and PaaS offerings are generally treated the same with the responsibility of securing the OS and platform applications being that of the Mission Owner.  Mission Owners must assess inherited mitigations that the CSP provides to determine that defense-in-depth security / protective requirements are fully met.

CSP IaaS and PaaS offerings must support the defense-in-depth security / protective measures that the Mission Owner must implement to secure the systems and applications that they build on the service offering. These measures are defined in Section 5.10.6, Mission Owner System/Application Requirements using IaaS/PaaS.

5.10.3.3 CSP Disaster Recovery (DR) - Continuity of Operations (COOP)


As a best business practice, CSPs plan for Disaster Recovery (DR) and Continuity of Operations (COOP) and implement their infrastructures to support it. This typically includes geographically separate facilities/data centers. Furthermore, FedRAMP assess several C/CE related to Contingency Planning (i.e., DR and COOP).

Data replication between CSP geographically separate facilities/data centers is typically required for Disaster Recovery (DR) and/or Continuity of Operations (COOP) which includes backup. 

All Data replication must traverse a CSP’s private internal network (physical or virtual) from CSP offering site/location to the DR/COOP facility and protect the data in transit.  If this network traverses the Internet, the network connection must be encrypted end-to-end in an IPsec tunnel implemented using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography.  Separation requirements implemented in the CSO between DoD data and non-DoD data at the CSP offering site/location must be replicated at the DR/COOP facility.  Such separation is not specifically required in transit unless its implementation is required to support separation at the endpoint facilities. 

NOTE: For Level 4/5 CSOs such transfers do not route through the DISN BCAP unless the DR/COOP facility is on-premises or is another CSP’s CSO.

Related Controls: CP-6, CP-7, CP-9

5.10.4 Internet Protocol (IP) Addressing and Domain Name Services (DNS)


DoDI 8410.01, Internet Domain Name Use and Approval, 4 December, 2015[92] provides DoD policy on the use of Top Level Domain (TLD) names by DoD organizations, their ISs and networks.

DoDI 8410.01 requires DoD to conduct DoD public and private Internet-based communications (e.g., electronic mail and Web operations) under the TLD established for the DoD—the .mil TLD”.  Exceptions are provided for some DoD organizations which may use the .gov, .edu, and .com domains if necessary and approved by the Mission Owner’s CIO.  This means that the end user accessing a DoD web site or other resource using a URL will see “.mil” at the end of the URL (e.g., name.mil is required vs name.com).

DoDI 8410.01 additionally requires DoD to only use the .mil domain to provide names for IP addresses allocated or assigned to the DoD by the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) and specifically states that these IPs are to be assigned in accordance with the DoD NIC Registry Protocol 9802.  DoD NIC Registry Protocol 9802 then goes on to state that

a. ... IP address space is assigned by the DoD NIC for use on a DoD common user data network and may not be used to obtain access to the Internet via a commercial Internet Service Provider.

And

b. IP address space will only be used on the common user network to which it is registered. IP address space or subnets of IP address space will not be shared amongst different common user networks. For example, IP address space assigned for SIPRNET use must be used only on the SIPRNET while IP address space assigned for NIPRNET use must be used only on the NIPRNET.

Interpret this to mean that DoD IP addresses are to only be used on DoD systems located on registered DoD networks.

Furthermore it requires that a .mil URL not redirect to non-.mil domain named hosts (e.g., name.mil will not redirect to name.com) with the only exception being for an approved and accredited service that provides redirection not readily apparent to the end user (e.g., use of a content delivery service or cloud service).  This exception permits the use of a Canonical Name (CNAME) in the system’s DNS record within the DoD DNS servers that redirects the URL to the CSP assigned URL associated with the commercial IP address.  As such the end user must not be made readily aware of the redirection.

NOTE: The example of electronic mail (email) in DoDI 8410.01 paragraph 3.a and previously in this section does not negate the use of an external commercial cloud email service by DoD Components providing the URL to access the service ends in “.mil” and the redirection is not readily apparent to the user.

NOTE: IP addresses assigned by ARIN to the DoD NIC which are then assigned to DoD Components for their networks and information systems (e.g., NIPRNet addresses) are unique publicly routable addresses. Only within DoD network enclaves are “private” (non-publicly routable) RFC 1918 addresses permitted/used.



 

5.10.4.1 IP Addressing


Off-Premises Impact Level 2 IaaS/PaaS/SaaS:

Due to off-premises Impact Level 2 IaaS/PaaS/SaaS CSOs being directly accessed from the Internet, DoD Mission Owner systems/applications using the .mil domain that are implemented in an Impact Level 2  IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS CSO will be addressed using public IP addresses assigned and managed by the CSP.  This also applies to DoD Mission Owner systems/applications approved to use non-.mil domain names. In this case the DoD DNS server will use a CNAME for a .mil URL to point to the commercial URL and its IP address.

NOTE: The use of “private” RFC 1918 IP addresses internal to the virtual network enclave with commercial addresses on the Internet facing interfaces is acceptable and is recommended minimally for topology hiding. 

Off-Premises Impact Level 4/5:

DoD IP addresses are assigned/managed by the DoD Network Information Center (NIC) and may be further managed and assigned to networks and ISs by DoD component NICs. In accordance with DoD policy NIPRNet, subtended Component enclave networks, and their internally connected endpoints are addressed using DoD NIPRNet IP addresses. 

NOTE: The following is NOT applicable to DoD systems that are not connected to, or not part of, the NIPRNet and are already approved to use Non-DoD, Non-NIPRNet, IP addresses.  There is no intent to force such DoD systems to become part of the NIPRNet.

Since, by default, Mission Owners systems/applications instantiated in IaaS and in some PaaS CSOs have full control over the IP addressing of their systems/applications instantiated in the CSO, and since they are connected to NIPRNet through a NIPRNet BCAP, DoD NIPRNet IP addresses will be used. This also applies to SaaS where the Mission Owner has control over the IP addressing used in their portion of the CSO.  As such these systems/applications are within a network enclave that is considered an extension of the NIPRNet.  The DoD NIC has set aside a range of NIPRNet IP addresses for CSOs connected to the NIPRNet BCAP.  This requirement applies similarly to networks other than NIPRNet where a BCAP is required. In such cases IP addresses used on that network will be used.

NOTE:  As with any DoD enclave, the use of “private” RFC 1918 IP addresses internal to the virtual network enclave with NIPRNet addresses on the NIPRNet/Internet facing interfaces connected via the BCAP is acceptable. 

DoD’s objective requirement for all off-premises Level 4/5 CSP’s CSOs serving the DoD is for the CSO to offer a “bring your own” IP address capability for all customer facing interfaces so that DoD NIPRNet IP addresses may be used via the private connection and BCAP.  In this case, customer facing interfaces includes general user interfaces and customer management interfaces including CSO customer service management/ordering portals.  DoD does not want to be required to access such portals via the Internet except during initial setup of the CSO. 

This IP addressing requirement does not include CSP systems instantiated within the CSO infrastructure that are not customer facing or directly accessible from the NIPRNet (or other mission partner network). Such internal systems and infrastructure may use CSP assigned and managed IP addresses.

Level 4/5 Commercial IP Addressing and Routing:

DoD recognizes that with some off-premises commercial SaaS and PaaS CSOs today, the Mission Owner may not have control over the IP addressing of the CSO as would be the case with a “bring your own” IP address capability and therefore, CSP managed commercial IP addresses must be used and interfaced with the NIPRNet via the BCAP.   DoD’s  preferred solution is for the CSP to provide a NAT or proxy between the CSO and NIPRNet BCAP so that NIPRNet need only route DoD IP addresses. 

Waiver: Alternate solutions that require a CSO’s commercial IP addresses to be routed on the NIPRNet must be assessed and approved through a Non-DoD addressing risk assessment and waiver process which may affect the ability of the CSO to be awarded a DoD PA or may result in a PA with conditions.  The CSP must work and coordinate with DISA to achieve such an alternate solution to minimize the operational and cybersecurity effects on the DISN/NIPRNet. 

The following is a set of minimum constraints and requirements that will be considered for the Non-DoD addressing waiver/PA conditions and must be adhered to for ongoing operations:

  • Vendors shall provide a complete list of their commercial IP subnets that need to be routed on NIPRNet in order to effect such routing.
    • These route advertisements must be aggregated to /24 or larger blocks in support of current DISN capabilities.  Although changes are to be expected over time, the frequency of changes to the list must be minimal to lessen the management burden on DISA Operators, and to reduce network service disruptions.
  • Commercial IP subnets advertised to NIPRNet via the BCAP used to access DoD services and applications in off-premises CSOs must not also be advertised to the Internet from the CSP's infrastructure, or if so, they must not be reachable from the Internet. I.e. L4/5 DoD accounts, services, and applications which, per DoD policy, are only to be accessible from the NIPRNet must not be accessible directly from the Internet.    
  • DoD expects the CSO’s commercial IP addresses used to access L4/5 DoD accounts, services, and applications in the CSO via the BCAP and private connection to be dedicated for DoD access.  However, in the event the CSO must use the same IP addresses for access by all CSP/CSO customers, whether DoD or Non-DoD, (this assumes the Non-DoD customers access is via the Internet) then the CSP must take extra precautions to prevent the CSO’s Internet connection or a compromised system from becoming a back door to the NIPRNet. 
  • DISA will NOT advertise any CSP's commercial IP subnets to the Internet via the NIPRNet IAPs. Doing so could cause unauthorized traffic to the CSO from the Internet to attempt to traverse the NIPRNet.  DISA cannot support such traffic for both operational and cybersecurity reasons.  Only DoD IP addresses associated with .mil URLs may be advertised to the Internet via the IAPs.
  • In the event a Mission Owner implements a “Cloud” VPN between the BCAP and their Intranet gateway/boundary for a CSO that is also used by other Mission Owners, the same commercial IP addresses may be visible and reachable from the NIPRNet, Internet, and Mission Owner's Intranet.  In this case, it is the responsibility of the Mission Owner to control their own routing policies.  The Mission Owner shall implement routing and security policies within their network to enforce service access control, during both normal and failure scenarios.

Off-premises Impact Level 6:

All off-premises CSP’s Level 6 CSOs will be treated, designed, and addressed as an extension of the SIPRNet (i.e., a SIPRNet network enclave) or other SECRET mission partner network. 

All Mission Owner systems/applications instantiated in IaaS/PaaS (i.e., VMs and virtual network device interfaces) and connected to SIPRNet will be addressed using SIPRNet IP addresses.  This includes management plane systems and interfaces. 

All off-premises CSP Level 6 SaaS and some PaaS service offerings connected to SIPRNet must utilize DoD assigned and managed SIPRNet IP addresses throughout.  Alternate addressing will require a waiver. 

On-premises Impact Level 2/4/5:

All on-premises Level 2/4/5 IaaS/PaaS/SaaS CSOs and Mission Owner systems/applications will be addressed using DoD NIPRNet IP addresses.

On-premises Impact Level 6:

All on-premises Level 6 IaaS/PaaS/SaaS CSOs and Mission Owner systems/applications will be addressed using DoD SIPRNet IP addresses.

5.10.4.2 Domain Name Services (DNS)


DoD .mil DNS servers on NIPRNet (and .smil.mil DNS servers on SIPRNet) are authoritative for DoD IP addresses provided through the DoD NIC and subtended Component NICs. This means that the DoD .mil DNS servers resolve .mil URLs to their destination IP address. DoD .mil DNS servers on NIPRNet must also be used to host .mil URLs which cannot have a specific IP address associated with it. In this case, a CNAME is used in the DoD .mil DNS servers on NIPRNet to point to a commercial URL used by the CSO.

DoD .mil DNS servers on NIPRNet are protected using various security measures such as the DoD DNS proxies, the Enterprise Recursive service, and DNSSec. As such DoD DNS is protected from many DNS threats and DoD DNS and associated protective services must be used for DoD .mil URLs and address resolution as appropriate. 

General Rule, All On-Premises and Off-Premises Impact Levels 2/4/5:

In general and IAW DoDI 8410.01 Mission Owner systems/applications using the .mil domain instantiated in an IaaS/PaaS/SaaS CSO where the Mission Owner has control over the IP addressing and is using DoD NIPRNet IP addresses, must host their .mil DNS records in the DoD .mil NIPRNet authoritative DNS servers, not public or commercial DNS servers.  Therefore, such Mission Owners are not authorized to utilize DNS services offered by the CSP or any other non-DoD DNS provider unless otherwise approved to use another domain.   

NOTE: Mission Owners using non-.mil URLs may utilize CSP managed or other commercial/public DNS servers (not the DoD DNS servers) for the domains in which they are authorized to operate.

The following exceptions to the general rule noted above apply:

Exception for Off-Premises Impact Level 2:

DoD Mission Owners using an off-Premises Impact Level 2 CSO which by default uses CSP managed commercial IP addresses and URLs must host their .mil DNS records in the DoD .mil NIPRNet DNS servers and use a CNAME to point to the commercial URL or IP address as appropriate. CSP DNS servers will be authoritative for commercial IP address resolution.

Exception for Off-Premises Impact Levels 4/5 SaaS and some PaaS:

DoD Mission Owners using an off-premises Impact Level 4/5 CSO (IaaS and some PaaS) where the Mission Owner does not have control over the IP addressing and therefore is dependent upon CSP managed commercial IP addresses and URLs must host their .mil DNS records in the DoD .mil NIPRNet DNS servers and use a CNAME to point to the commercial URL for IP address resolution as appropriate. CSP DNS servers will be authoritative for their commercial IP address resolution.

In the event their use is required CSP DNS services including URL redirection and dynamic DNS solutions along with implemented DNS protections will be assessed and approved as appropriate for the CSO’s DoD PA. CSP DNS services must be protected using a DNS proxy and must support DNSSec. The DoD PA will also include a risk assessment of the CSP’s DNS management architecture or outsourced services.

All On-Premises and Off-Premises Impact Level 6:

DoD Mission Owners using an on-premises or off-premises Impact Level 6 CSO will use smil.mil URLs whose DNS records will be hosted on the DoD authoritative DNS servers on the SIPRNet (or other SECRET mission partner network).  SIPRNet addresses are assigned by the DoD NIC. 

Corresponding Security Controls: SC-20, SC-21, SC-22

5.10.5 Mission Owner Requirements using SaaS (All Levels)


While protecting/securing/defending the SaaS architecture is the responsibility of the CSP, Mission Owners contracting for and using CSP’s SaaS offerings must minimally address the following to meet DoD policy:

  • Register the Protocols and Services along with their related UDP/TCP IP Ports used by the SaaS service that will traverse the DISN in the DoD PPSM registry. This includes all user and management plane traffic for Levels 4, 5, and 6 as well as management plane traffic for Level 2 if managed/monitored from within a DoD network.  See section 5.15, Ports, Protocols, Services, Management and Cloud for additional information.
  • Register the service/application with the DoD DMZ Whitelist for both inbound and outbound traffic if traffic will cross the IAPs. See section 5.17.2 DoD DMZ Whitelist for more information.

Register the CSP’s CSO in the DISA SNAP database for the connection approval which also includes the designation of a certified CSSP for the performance of Mission Cyberspace Defense (MCD) Actions as defined in Section 6 Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response.

This step is required at all levels for SaaS, including level 2 (even though there is no production connection to the DISN) so that the DoD CSSP community is aware and informed such that they can perform their Cyberspace Defense duties described in Section 5.18, Supply Chain Risk Management Assessment.

As discussed in Section 5.10.3, CSP Service Architecture, the Mission Owner is reliant on the security posture of the CSP and their SaaS offering for the protection of DoD data/information.

5.10.6 Mission Owner System/Application Requirements using IaaS/PaaS


Mission Owners must address defense-in-depth security / protective measures across all information impact levels when implementing systems/applications on IaaS / PaaS which include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Implement Virtual Machines (VMs) in one or more virtual networks in which data-flows between VMs and between VMs and external networks (both physical and virtual) may be controlled. 

NOTE: Virtual networks are typically a feature of the virtualization hypervisor which supports the VMs. 

  • Implement virtual network(s) in accordance with the approved architecture for the type of application as defined in the DoD DMZ STIG and the Application Security and Development STIG, along with other operating system and application specific STIGs.   For example, a web service or application is typically required to have a tiered architecture with unrestricted/restricted DMZ zones with appropriate protections for internet/externally facing servers and private / “back end” zones with appropriate protections for application/database servers and other supporting systems/servers. 
  • In the event the mission system/application is internet facing, implement (in addition to a zoned architecture described above) DMZ protections IAW the DMZ STIG. For example the DMZ STIG requires the following (adapted for Cloud):
    • Web server in a  public virtual network zone
    • Application and database servers in a private virtual network zone
    • Two Routers (virtual for cloud):
      • Outer – public zone to Internet
      • Inner public zone to private zone
    • Reverse Web Proxy (RWP)
    • FTP proxy if FTP is used
    • Web Application Firewall (WAF)
    • Security Information Manager (SIM)
    • Syslog server
    • Two Active directory servers
      • Public zone
      • Private zone

Impact Level 2: DMZ boundary protection requirements (i.e., proxies and firewalls) must be implemented by the mission owner for their application(s) or leverage a common boundary service provided by a larger entity like DoD Component or the DoD enterprise.  This will most likely occur on a CSP by CSP basis.  Other common services may also be available.

Impact Level 4: DMZ boundary protection requirements (i.e., proxies, firewalls, etc.) will be provided by the Mission Owner in their system/application environment until such time as these protections are provided by the Mission Owner’s agency or DISA as an enterprise service. 

  • When infrastructure has direct Internet access, implement virtual application level firewall and virtual intrusion detection and/or prevention capabilities IAW the applicable DoD SRGs and STIGs to protect the virtual network(s) and interconnected VMs.  The Mission Owner and/or their CSSP must be able to control firewall rules and monitor the virtual network boundary, reporting same to the Tier 1.  For dedicated infrastructure with a DISN connection (Levels 4-5): implement firewall, IPS, and/or routing methods that restrict traffic flow inbound and outbound to/from the virtual network to the DISN connection IAW DoDI 8551.  Block all traffic from all other sources such as the CSP’s network which is most likely connected to the Internet. 
  • Implement a secure (encrypted) connection or path (i.e., encrypted VPN) between the virtual firewall, the virtual IDS capabilities and the CSSP responsible for the mission system/application.  See Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response for more specific information. 
  • IaaS: Securely configure (harden / STIG) / patch / maintain each VM’s OS and IAW DoD policy and CYBERCOM direction.  The use of DoD STIGs and SRGs is required for secure configuration as is compliance with IAVMs.
  • PaaS: For those VM OSs and applications under direct management of the Mission Owner (not the CSP per contract), securely configure (harden /STIG) / patch / maintain each VM’s OS and application provided by the CSP IAW DoD policy and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) direction.  The use of DoD STIGs and SRGs is required for secure configuration as is compliance with IAVMs.
  • IaaS/PaaS: Securely configure (harden / STIG) / patch / maintain each application provided/installed by the Mission Owner IAW DoD policy and USCYBERCOM direction.  The use of DoD STIGs and SRGs is required for secure configuration as is compliance with IAVMs.
  • Implement data-at-rest encryption on all DoD files housed in CSP IaaS storage service offerings.  A CSP may offer one or more services or methods to accomplish this.  Data-at-rest encryption may help mitigate issues with data/information spillage.  See Section 5.11, Encryption of Data-at-Rest for more information
  • If the DoD information is sensitive government information (e.g., FOUO or CUI), FIPS 140-2 validated software cryptography modules operated in FIPS mode must be used.
  • All encryption services for data-at-rest must be implemented such that the Mission Owner has sole control over key management and use.
  • Implement Host Based Security System (HBSS) IAW DoD policy.
    • Implement HBSS agents on all VMs with a supported general purpose OS.
    • Utilize an HBSS agent control server (EPO) within NIPRNet or an associated common virtual services environment in the same CSO (e.g., VDMS).
    • Implement a secure (encrypted) connection or path between the HBSS agents and their control server. 
    • Provide visibility by the Mission Owner’s CSSP entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response.
  • Implement scanning using an Assured Compliance Assessment Solution (ACAS) server IAW USCYBERCOM TASKORD 13-670.
    • Utilize an ACAS Security Center server within NIPRNet or within an associated common virtual services environment in the same CSO (e.g., VDMS).
    • Implement a secure (encrypted) connection or path between the ACAS server and its assigned ACAS Security Center.
  • Provide visibility by the Mission Owner’s CSSP entities as defined in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response.
    • Implement DoD PKI server certificates for establishing secure connections. 
  • Implement all required data-in-transit encryption protections using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography modules operated in FIPS mode.
  • Implement DoD CAC / PKI authentication as follows:
    • For all privileged user access to VM operating systems and applications for Levels 2, 4, and 5 IAW DoD policy.  Level 6 must use the CNSS SIPRNet Token.
    • For all general DoD users of the implemented systems/applications for Levels 4 and 5 IAW DoD policy.  Level 6 must use the CNSS SIPRNet Token.
    • Implement a secure (encrypted) connection or path (i.e., encrypted VPN) between the implemented systems/applications and the DoD OCSP responders on NIPRNet or SIPRNet as applicable
  • Secure Active Directory (AD) (if used) and any associated trusts IAW the DoD Windows OS STIGs and/or other applicable DoD STIGs.  This includes trusts between DoD AD forests and CSP CSO AD forests.  If such trusts are required, the implementation must be approved by the AO responsible for the DoD AD forest.  See Section 5.10.7, Active Directory Integration for Cloud for more information.
  • Register the Protocols and Services along with their related UDP/TCP IP Ports used by the Mission Owner’s system/service/application that will traverse the DISN.  This includes all traffic for Levels 4, 5, and 6 as well as management/monitoring plane traffic for Level 2.  See section 5.15, Ports, Protocols, Services, Management and Cloud for additional information.
  • Register the Mission Owner’s system/service/application with the DoD whitelist for both inbound and outbound traffic if traffic will cross the IAPs.  . See section 5.17.2 DoD DMZ Whitelist for more information.
  • Register the Mission Owner’s system/service/application and CSP’s CSO in the DISA SNAP database for the connection approval which also includes designating a certified CSSP to perform MCD Actions.  This step is required at all levels for IaaS/PaaS, including level 2 (even though there is no production connection to the DISN) so that the DoD CSSP community is aware and informed such that they can perform their Cyberspace Defense duties described in Section 6, Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response.
  • Implement Cyberspace Defense and Incident Response for monitoring issues across all CSPs used by DoD.

NOTE: Under PaaS (and potentially IaaS) where CSPs may be under contract to securely configure (harden / STIG) / patch / maintain Mission Owner’s VMs, OSs, applications, or maintain STIGed and patched VM images for their use, such services must be validated to DoD standards IAW all applicable policies (e.g., privileged access).  If the CSP is contracted by the Mission Owner to securely configure OSs and applications, then the CSP is expected to comply with all applicable DoD STIGs.  For IAVA compliance, the CSP will be expected to comply with industry best practice by applying patches identified in the CVE that would be referenced in the DoD IAVA.   Equivalencies will be assessed and approved on a case by case basis.

5.10.7 Active Directory Integration for Cloud


Active Directory (AD) implementations (if needed) will be configured IAW the Active Directory Domain and Forest STIGs[93] along with the following guidance related to Cloud services:

  • DoD/Commercial CSP CSO on premises private/community (e.g., milCloud) managed AD:
    • AD servers and forests may establish trust relationships with other DoD managed AD servers and forests IAW established DoD guidelines.
  • DoD Mission Owner managed AD instantiated in DoD/Commercial CSP CSO on premises private/community IaaS/PaaS (e.g., milCloud):
    • AD servers and forests may establish trust relationships with other DoD managed AD servers and forests IAW established DoD guidelines.
  • DoD Mission Owner managed AD instantiated in Commercial off-premises IaaS/PaaS:
    • DoD AD forests will not trust Mission Owner managed AD servers or forests instantiated in Commercial IaaS/PaaS.
    • AD servers and forests may trust other DoD managed AD servers and forests IAW established DoD guidelines.  This trust must be one way.  Alternate methods than a direct trust such as those described in the following subsections should be used.

NOTE: this mitigates the potential for a compromised Mission Owner’s AD in the commercial CSO being able to compromise a DoD AD on the DISN

  • Non-DoD CSP CSO managed AD:
    • A Non-DoD CSP’s AD may be used to provide access control services to the CSO if it is an integral part of the CSO.  (e.g., for SaaS)
    • DoD AD forests will not trust a Non-DoD CSP’s AD servers or forest.
    • Only if absolutely required, a Non-DoD CSP’s AD forest may trust a DoD AD forest.  This trust must be one way.  Alternate methods than a direct trust such as those described in the following subsections should be used.

NOTE: this mitigates the potential for a compromised CSP’s AD being able to compromise a DoD AD on the DISN.

NOTE: Established DoD guidelines for AD implementation are found in the AD Domain and Forrest STIGs noted above.



 

5.10.7.1 Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS)


Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) is used to extend on-premises Active Directory access control credential use and single sign-on (SSO) capabilities to web servers located in another organization such as a CSP’s SaaS CSO.  This capability will enable access control to multiple web applications over the life of a single browser session.  This is also applicable to providing SSO capabilities to a mission owner’s own web application instantiated in IaaS/PaaS CSO without placing an AD server in the virtual environment.  Since ADFS in essence allows the CSP’s CSO or external web application to trust the DoD identity claim asserted on behalf of the DoD AD, the use of ADFS meets the intent of the AD requirements stated above.

5.10.7.2 Active Directory DirSync (Directory Synchronization)


Active Directory DirSync is a Microsoft Azure tool which is specific to a specific Microsoft SaaS CSO.  DirSync is installed on a domain-joined server (on-premises or on a Microsoft Azure VM) to “synchronize your on-premises Active Directory users to Office 365 for professionals and small businesses”[94].  Since this tool provides user information to the Office 365 AD as a push, then the Office 365 AD is used to provide access control to the CSO for those users, this tool meets the intent of the Non-DoD CSP managed AD requirements stated above. 



 

5.11 Encryption of Data-at-Rest in Commercial Cloud Storage


Mission systems at all impact levels must have the capability for DoD data to be encrypted at rest with exclusive DoD control of encryption keys and key management.  Some CSOs may facilitate this by providing a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or offering customer dedicated HSM devices as a service.  CSOs that do not provide such a capability may require Mission Owners to utilize encryption hardware/software on the DISN or a cloud encryption service that provides DoD control of keys and key management. 

Data-at-rest (DAR) encryption with customer controlled keys and key management protects the DoD data stored in CSOs with the following benefits:

  • Maintains the integrity of publicly released information and web sites at Level 2 where confidentiality is not an issue.
  • Maintains the confidentiality and integrity of CUI at levels 4 and 5 with the following benefits:
  • Limits the insider threat vector of unauthorized access by CSP personnel through increasing the work necessary to compromise/access unencrypted DoD data.
  • Limits the external threat vector of unauthorized access by hackers trough increasing the work necessary to compromise/access unencrypted DoD data.
  • Enables high-assurance data destruction for CSP off-boarding through cryptographic erasure and file deletion without the involvement or cooperation of a CSP. 
  • Enables high-assurance data spill remediation through cryptographic erasure and file deletion without the involvement or cooperation of a CSP. 
  • See Section 5.11.1, Cryptographic Erase for additional information. 

NOTE: Mission Owners and their AOs should consider the benefits of DAR encryption for data destruction and/or spill remediation at Level 2 in addition to the benefit of maintaining integrity of the information. 

For all Information Impact levels:

  • Encrypt all Data at Rest (DAR):
    • Stored in virtual machine virtual hard drives or
    • Stored in mass storage facilities/services whether at the block or file level
    • Stored in database records (whether PaaS, SaaS where the MO does not have sole control over the DB and DBMS)
  • Using FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography modules[95] (minimally Level 1) operated in FIPS Mode in accordance with Federal government policy / standards for the protection of all CUI.
    • Cryptography modules include cryptographic algorithm, RNG, KMI, HASH, etc. (all approved functions)
  • CSP Customer / Mission Owner (MO) maintains control of the keys, from creation through storage and use to destruction
    • Implement Hardware Security Modules (HSM) or Key Management Servers as needed to store, generate, and manage keys within the DISN
    • OR Order a CSP service that provides a dedicated HSM that is managed solely by the customer/MO

For cloud applications where encrypting DAR with DoD key control is not possible, Mission Owners must perform a risk analysis with relevant data owners before transferring data into a CSO.  This analysis must take into account that there may be no high-assurance method available to remediate data spills or ensure destruction of data at the application’s end of life and CSO off-boarding.  Mission Owner AOs are responsible for accepting these risks.

NOTE: CSPs CSOs DAR encryption capabilities and ability to support Mission Owner’s DAR encryption requirements will be assessed and documented toward the award of their DoD PA.

Corresponding Security Controls: SC-28, SC-28(1)



 

5.11.1 Cryptographic Erase


Cryptographic erase is described in NIST SP 800-88 Rev 1[96]:

“Cryptographic Erase is an emerging sanitization technique that can be used in some situations when data is encrypted as it is stored on media. With CE, media sanitization is performed by sanitizing the cryptographic keys used to encrypt the data, as opposed to sanitizing the storage locations on media containing the encrypted data itself. CE techniques are typically capable of sanitizing media very quickly and could support partial sanitization, a technique where a subset of storage media is sanitization. Partial sanitization, sometimes referred to as selective sanitization, has potential applications in cloud computing.”

While much of the CE guidance in SP 800-88 is related to self-encrypting devices, this section expands on NIST’s acknowledgement that CE has applicability in cloud computing.

DAR encryption, coupled with exclusive customer control of cryptographic key management, provides DoD the ability to cryptographically erase data at rest without CSP assistance or cooperation.  This capability coupled with standard CSP provided data deletion provides the following benefits described for DAR encryption in Section 5.11 above.

Data deletion refers to normal file or data record deletion methods used in file systems and data bases.  Deletion before or after cryptographic erase will restore resources to the CSP and will permit for the eventual overwriting of the data under normal operations.

To support cryptographic erase and the various benefits it provides DAR encryption must be performed at an appropriate level of granularity.  This means that one key should not be used to encrypt all or large chunks of mission owner data. 

Related Security Controls: MP-6(3), MP-6(8)



 

5.11.2 Backup


CSPs are responsible for providing backups of data in a CSO consistent with the CP-9 security control.  Mission Owners are also responsible for assuring their data is backed up consistent with the CP-9.  However, mission owners must also consider the risk of entrusting their data to a single non-DoD CSP.  Section 5.8, Data Retrieval and Destruction for Off-boarding from a CSO discusses the importance of Mission Owners being ready to recover and/or migrate their data on short notice in case of CSO shutdown.  This readiness, along with CSP backup requirements, may be sufficient for DoD data of low to moderate impact value.  However, Mission Owners with higher impact value data should consider conducting regular backups of their data and storing them in DoD-owned infrastructure/media or a cloud storage service offered by a different CSP.

Backups stored with a different provider reduce the risk of data loss/corruption in the case of a CSO ceasing operations or catastrophic event that affects a CSP’s entire infrastructure.  Maintenance of such backups may also mitigate the risk of data loss sustained from of a data spillage response.  Mission Owners should determine the potential need for such risk mitigation as part of the contingency planning required by the CP-2 security control.

NOTE: In the case of IaaS/PaaS backups, “data” as used in this section includes VM snapshots or images of the fully configured VMs including their virtual hard drives so that restoration of the computational base is as easy as the restoration of the information processed. 

NOTE: This section is provided for consideration by Mission Owners.  It does not affect CSPs or DoD PA assessments.

Corresponding Security Controls: CP-2, CP-9

5.12 DoD Contractor / DoD Component Mission Partner Use of CSOs


This section focuses specifically on Non-CSP DoD contractors or mission partners (e.g., Defense Industrial Base (DIB) contractors) and DoD Component mission partners (e.g., commissaries, exchanges, educational entities) whose networks that are not part of the DoDIN .mil domain.  These mission partners and their networks are typically in the .gov, .org, .com, .edu domains. 

When using cloud services, mission partners and contractors are responsible for following all guidance in this CC SRG related to the Mission Owner that is not specific to a DISN-provided capability (e.g. CAP) or an enterprise service.  The appropriate impact level must be selected based on the DoD data being processed.  A trusted means of communication that encrypts all DoD data transferred between mission partners and contractor internal networks and CSPs must be utilized.  Mission partners and contractors are also responsible for working with the appropriate DoD data owner or designated agency (e.g. DSS) to create incident response procedures for incidents that occur in a CSO. 

NOTE: the term “Non-CSP DoD Contractors” as used below does not include DoD Contractors that are not a CSP but aggregate CSOs (i.e., integrators) in the fulfilment of a contract for cloud services. As such, and as noted elsewhere in this CC SRG, the CSOs these non-CSP integrators are providing via subcontracts must follow all guidance related to CSOs and DoD’s usage of them.

5.12.1 DoD Component Mission Partners


DoD Component mission partners in the .gov, .org, .com, .edu domains must only use CSPs or CSOs that have a DoD PA for the Information Impact Level that best matches the CNSSI 1253 categorization of the information to be processed/stored/transmitted by the CSP/CSO.  If the information is public, then a Level 2 CSO will be used with direct Internet access. Otherwise, accessing Level 4/5 services depends on how their organizational network/enclave is connected today. This may be as follows:

The organizational network/enclave:

  • Is part of NIPRNet; connectivity to the CSO will be via the NIPRNet BCAP
  • Is part of a Mission partner or COI network with a BCAP; connectivity to the CSO will be via that BCAP
  • Is directly connected to the Internet via one or more approved organizational IAPs; connectivity to the CSO will be via the Internet or a private direct connection.  Such connections will be appropriately secured for the protection of the organization’s network and information/applications in the cloud.  The organization's network boundary with the CSP's network will be considered a BCAP and will provide boundary protections and monitoring as required for the protection of the specific organization's network and information it contains.  DoD Component mission partners are responsible for implementing appropriate boundary protections for their networks.

5.12.2 Non-CSP DoD Contractors and DIB Partners Use of CSOs for the Protection of Sensitive DoD Information


Non-CSP DoD contractors and DIB partners may store, process, and use or create sensitive DoD data/information outside of the DoDIN in conjunction with a DoD contract not associated with providing cloud services. Such contractors are required to protect unclassified sensitive DoD data/information while it is in their environment (i.e., contractor owned/operated IT systems used by the contractor to support contractor functions that store DoD CUI) IAW DoDI 8582.01, Security of Unclassified DoD Information on Non-DoD Information Systems[97] and NIST SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations[98]which mainly focuses primarily on confidentiality.

Non-CSP DoD contractors and DIB partners may wish to utilize Cloud Services in the fulfilment of their contract or for the protection/processing of DoD data they possess (i.e., CUI or Covered Defense Information (CDI)).  Thus, for the protection of sensitive CUI/CDI, it is highly recommended that Non-CSP DoD contractors utilize CSOs that have been granted a DoD Level 4 PA..  Such CSOs must not be dedicated to DoD which would mean the CSO is only connected to the NIPRNet.  That said, access to the CSP/CSO will be via the Internet or a private direct connection. The NIPRNet will not be used as a connection path.  DoD contractors are responsible for implementing appropriate boundary protections for their networks and the protection of information placed in the cloud.

Non-CSP DoD contractors and DIB partners may NOT utilize CSOs that have been granted a DoD Level 5 PA as such contractors are outside the supported community of Federal agencies until such time as DoD changes this Level 5 limitation.

NOTE: Non-CSP DoD Contractors and DIB Partners are required to comply with NIST SP 800-171 for the protection of CDI. The DoD Level 4 and Level 5 baselines cover all of the C/CE referenced in the SP 800-171 except CM-3(2), CM-7(4), and IR-2(1).



 

5.12.3 Non-CSP DoD Contractors Use of CSOs as a Portion of a Non-CSO Product or Service


A Non-CSP DoD Contractor might choose to integrate a third party CSO as a component of a contracted Non-CSO product or service (e.g., a weapons system or major application).  Such contractors may only utilize third party CSPs or CSOs that have a DoD PA for the Information Impact Level that best matches the CNSSI 1253 categorization of the information to be processed/stored/transmitted by the CSP/CSO.  Furthermore, the CSO and its use must follow the CC SRG guidance related to the Mission Owner that is not specific to a DISN-provided capability (e.g. CAP) or an enterprise service to the greatest extent possible. Connectivity to the CSO will be determined by where the contracted product or service will be used and related guidance in this CC SRG. For example if the user base for the product or service is NIPRNet based and the Information Impact Level is 4 or 5, then the NIPRNet BCAP must be used. If the Information Impact Level is 2, then the Internet may be used. All CC SRG requirements apply to the product and flow down to the sub-contracted CSO IAW various DFARS clauses.

In the event the Non-CSP DoD contractor chooses to provide/host the CSO themselves, the CC SRG requirements for the Information Impact Level that best matches the CNSSI 1253 categorization of the information to be processed/stored/transmitted by the CSO applies. If the CSO is dedicated to the product, A&A will handled IAW normal DoD contract A&A requirements.  Consideration for awarding a DoD PA in this case will depend on the results of the A&A processes, compliance with the CC SRG, and the potential for other DoD Component’s Mission Owners to use the CSO.

5.13 Mission Owner DoD Test and Development in the Cloud


Cloud environments are a good place Mission Owners to do application development and testing as well as research.  Furthermore, test and development activities associated with application lifecycle management for cloud based applications are best performed in the same environment as the production application.  This section addresses DoD Test and Development (T&D) activities in IaaS and PaaS CSOs where the Mission Owner has control of the environment.

Security requirements for DoD T&D and laboratory environments are defined in the suite of Enclave T&D STIGs[99].  Refer to these STIGs on IASE for the latest guidance.  This section of the CC SRG does not change the security requirements associated for each zone but it adds nuance when operating in the cloud.  All T&D Zones instantiated in the Cloud must comply with these STIGs except for the nuanced remote access guidance added here.

The Enclave T&D STIG Overview document defines four (4) T&D Zones.  These zones are briefly described as follows:

  • Zone A: Instrumental in application lifecycle management for final end stage testing prior to implementation into a production environment.  This environment is connected to the production network to replicate the final production environment supporting the application.  The use of VPNs for remote access for developers and administrators may be implemented, but must be terminated in the T&D DMZ for inspection.  The assets in the environment are secured the same as the production environment to include STIG and IAVM compliance.  Minimal development is permitted for final revisions and minor updates in the final testing phase.

NOTE: Zone A supports or is representative of the environments in which the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) performs DoD’s Test and Evaluation (T&E) on DoD applications and systems.

  • Zone B: Instrumental in application lifecycle management for application development activities such as coding, compliance, and testing. This environment provides connectivity to the production network with access controls in place to protect the production network for application testing.    Provides an isolated network segment for the use of tools and capabilities to facilitate application development that would not be permitted in the production environment.  Implements remote access to the testing segment of the environment for developers and administrators.  Is secured WRT STIG and IAVA compliance at the discretion of the IAM.  
  • Zone C: Closed test environment not connected to DoD production networks but interconnects multiple testing environments through the use of direct connections or tunneling mechanisms.  This environment can be used for testing systems, devices, applications, tools, and/or protocols where their security posture or potential to threaten DoD production networks is unknown or known to be risky while needing long-haul network connectivity. 
  • Zone D: A fully closed and physically separate network from any DoD live operational network for the purpose of extensive testing using prohibited tools, working with malicious code, virus samples, working with Ports, Protocols, and Services (PPS) that are otherwise restricted via DoD policy.  Development within this environment is generally not an encouraged practice.

All DoD test and development performed in cloud infrastructure must be categorized IAW the T&D Zone descriptions in the Enclave T&D STIG Overview document and comply with the security requirements in the associated Enclave T&D STIG.

Since Zones A and B are instrumental in application lifecycle management and able to be connected to the production network, it is reasonable that these zones can and should be implemented in the same IaaS/PaaS cloud infrastructure as the production applications they support.  Due to the robust routing and filtering capabilities inherent in today’s virtual networks, the segmentation of these zones can easily be implemented IAW the related Zone A and B STIG requirements using VLANs or distinct virtual networks. 

Application lifecycle management typically involves an application development Zone B, an application test Zone A, and a production zone. Each zone has its own cyber security requirements that must be implemented to protect the zone itself and the DoDIN.  As with DoD production applications, T&D zones A and B may be instantiated in DoD private I/PaaS CSOs connected to the NIPRNet.  T&D zones A and B must also be protected and monitored by the same CSSP as the production zone when implemented in the same CSO.

DoD application test Zone A instantiated in cloud infrastructure must be implemented in the same CSP/CSO with the same information impact level and having the same connectivity model as the production application zone to support lifecycle management of the application.  The sensitivity of the information processed by the production application determines the information impact level of the CSO and its PA IAW this SRG.  While there may be some exceptions based on where the application developers reside, this also applies to DoD application development Zone B when used for the lifecycle management of a production application.  Placing all three zones in the same CSO using the same connectivity model and CSSP as the production application zone helps to realize the efficiencies of the cloud and ultimately better protect the application, the information being processed/stored and the DoDIN

DoD application development Zone B instantiated in cloud infrastructure must minimally be implemented in a CSP’s CSO that has a Level 2 PA to support pre-production application development with developers accessing the zone via the Internet.  Consideration for implementing Zone B in a Level 4/5 CSO for this purpose, will depend on the sensitivity of the application itself and its code.  This is at the discretion of the program’s IAM or responsible AO. Again, once pre-production development is complete and if the Zone B is to be used for the lifecycle management of a production application, then it should be implemented in the same CSP/CSO as the production application.  While the systems within the Zone B are not required to be STIG compliant and may not be subject to the same HBSS and ACAS requirements as a Zone A or the production zone, the network infrastructure and network transport must be STIG compliant. This includes a properly hardened zone boundary stack to protect the less than secure inside of the zone. This boundary must be monitored and protected by a CSSP.

While Zones C and D are typically implemented in physical facilities and while various aspects may use virtualization, these zones may only be implemented in cloud services providing the required lack of connectivity to DoD production networks.  This generally precludes on-premises CSOs connected to NIPRNet which are intended for wide usage by multiple DoD tenants such as milCloud as designed today.  Alternately Zones C and/or D might be implemented in an off-premises commercial or an on-premises DoD cloud environment where there is no direct connectivity to DoD networks, providing the testing activities do not threaten the CSP’s CSO and/or network, other CSP tenants’ systems/applications or the Internet.  Additional exceptions and requirements for these use cases may be provided in a future release of this or another SRG. Zones C and D which might be categorized at Levels 4/5/6 and implemented in off-premises CSOs are not permitted to connect to the DISN; i.e., these zones will not connect via a BCAP.  Zones C and D may or may not be monitored and protected by a CSSP, however a CSSP must be aligned to receive incident reports and perform incident response.

Corresponding Security Controls: CM-4, CM-4 (1)



 

5.13.1 Workstation Connectivity to Cloud Based T&D Zones


Workstation connectivity to all T&D zones instantiated in the Cloud will use remote connectivity methods as a result of the nature of Cloud. The different zones require different types of workstations and remote connectivity models. The options are as follows:

  • Application test zone A is accessed in the same manner as the production application.
    • Workstations are NIPRNet connected. As with the production application, STIGed Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) must be used to manage the environment and test the application.
  • Application development Zone B connectivity:
    • Zone B is in the same CSO as the associated Zone A and production zone (commercial off-premises or DoD private on-premises) supporting lifecycle management of the production application:
      • If the development workstations are NIPRNet connected, as with the production application, STIGed Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) must be used to manage the environment and test the application. A remote terminal solution may be used (e.g., Citrix, Terminal Services (bastion host)).  A VPN is only required for tunneling sensitive data.
    • Zone B is in a separate CSO from the associated Zone A and production zone supporting pre-production application development:
      • Commercial off-premises CSO with off-premises contracted developers: Non-GFE may be used across the Internet using a VPN or encrypted protocols. 
      • Commercial off-premises CSO with on-premises DoD or contracted developers: Zone B must be configured behind its own firewall. A VPN must be used to access the Zone. STIGed GFE must be used due to NIPRNet connectivity. A remote terminal solution is also required after the VPN has been established into the Zone B environment (e.g., Citrix, Terminal Services (bastion host)) where the local WS cannot be compromised from the windowed view of the systems in the zone. The path may be via the IAPs/Internet or BCAP/private connection
  • T&D/Research Zones C and D:
    • Typically, workstations accessing a zone D must do so from within the zone, or from the coupled zone D in a Zone C construct. Cloud presents several different scenarios as follows:
      • Zone D or all portions of a Zone C are instantiated in an Internet connected CSO: workstations connect via the Internet. NIPRNet connectivity is generally precluded except for dedicated hardware connecting via a dedicated network or segmented NIPRNet path using VLANs, VRFs, and/or VPNs.
      • One or more Zone D enclaves of a Zone C construct are physical zone D enclaves on DoD premises: All portions of the Zone C including those portions implemented in an off-premises CSO must be accessed from workstations within the Zone C (i.e., the physical zone D enclaves).  In this scenario there should be no need for remote access from outside the Zone D or C.

5.14 Ports, Protocols, Services, Management and Cloud Based Systems/Applications


Mission Owners using CSOs of any service type (I/P/SaaS) must comply with DoDI 8551.01: Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM)[100] when implementing and operating their systems/applications in an IaaS/PaaS CSO or when using a SaaS offering.  DoDI 8551.01 is the DoD policy that provides policy guidance for DoD Mission Owner compliance with CM-7, CM-7 (1), and SA-9 (2).  While CSPs must comply with these C/CE for their internal networks and service offerings, DoDI 8551.01 does not apply to CSPs as the policy applies to Protocols and Services (PS) traversing the DISN.

The DISA PPSM office[101] [102], along with the PPSM Change Control Board (CCB) and Technical Advisory Group (TAG) publish a Category Assignment List (CAL) which lists the PS permitted to cross certain DISN boundaries and Vulnerability Assessments (VAs) for each PS listed.   Compliance with VAs is the key to the secure usage of the PS listed in the CAL. In other words, PS used on the DISN must comply with the associated VA.  Mission Owners must utilize the mitigations presented in the PPS VAs when building their systems.  Additionally all Mission Owners must register their cloud CSO based systems/applications in the DoD PPSM Registry (only available on SIPRNet) to include systems/applications in an I/PaaS CSO or when using a SaaS offering.  Registration includes all PS along with their related UDP/TCP IP Ports used by the application that will traverse the DISN.  This includes all user and management plane traffic for Levels 4, 5, and 6 as well as management plane traffic for Level 2 if managed/monitored from within a DoD network. 

The remainder of this section of the CC SRG provides guidance to mission owners when registering their applications in the PPSM database.

Level 2 Off-premises CSO: A Level 2 Mission Owner virtual network, virtual machines, and applications in IaaS/PaaS CSOs constitute a DoD enclave within and accessed via an external network.  Similarly a SaaS CSO is an enclave within and accessed via an external network.  This external network is the Internet.  So for Level 2 the Mission Owner should leverage PPSM guidance for PPSM boundaries 1-5.  This is only applicable to Mission Owner’s management traffic for their virtual networks and systems/applications in IaaS/PaaS and CSO management traffic for I/P/SaaS.  When registering the application in the PPSM database the Mission Owner should register on boundaries 1-5.  Since non-privileged user traffic will be via the Internet, registration is not required even if a portion of this traffic is to/from non-privileged users within the DoDIN.  Such traffic will traverse the DISN IAPs as any other web based traffic.

NOTE: This guidance may change with regard to user plane traffic pending a decision of the PPSM CCB.  Since firewalls and sensors are required at the boundary of a Mission Owner’s virtual enclave and since the sensors will be monitored by the MCD protecting the Mission Owner’s system/application, the same or similar guidance as is provided for Level 4/5/6 below may be applicable.

Level 2/4/5/6 On-premises CSO: On-premises CSOs at any level will be treated as normal DoD enclaves.  PPSM Registrations will utilize boundary designations 7-11 if directly connected or 10-12 and 15 if connected via an IPSEC tunnel.

Levels 4/5/6 Off-premises CSO: IAW the CC SRG, Levels 4/5/6 Off-premises CSOs will be treated as normal DoD enclaves since they are architected as extensions of the DoDIN/DISN even though the CSO is in an external network (the CSP’s network) and are connected via a BCAP.   As such, PPSM Registrations will utilize boundary designations 7-11 if directly connected or 10-12 and 15 if connected via an IPSEC tunnel.

NOTE: PS designated as local services may be used within the Mission Owner’s system/application virtual enclave in IaaS/PaaS CSOs as with any other enclave providing they do not traverse the virtual enclave’s boundary.



 

5.15 Mobile Code


Mobile code is defined as software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed on a local information system without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.  Some examples of software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the production and use of mobile code include Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript, etc.

Mobile Code presents a great number of attack vectors to both CSPs and DoD Mission Owners.   CSP organizational IT systems as well as the infrastructure that supports CSOs are vulnerable to malicious mobile code, and if compromised, the security of DoD Mission Owner’s systems/applications/information/data can be negatively affected.  Additionally compromised CSOs and DoD Mission Owner’s systems/applications can negatively affect a customer’s endpoint and network if malicious mobile code is served by (downloaded from) these systems.  

While DoD mobile code policies are under revision, CNSS and DoD has identified mobile code in categories as follows:

“Category 1: Mobile code technologies that exhibit a broad functionality, allowing unmediated access to the workstation, server, and remote system services and resources. Category 1 mobile code technologies have and pose known security vulnerabilities with few or no countermeasures once executing.

Category 2: Mobile code technologies that have full functionality, allowing mediated access to the workstation, server, and remote system services and resources. Category 2 mobile code technologies have and pose known security vulnerabilities, however, known fine grained, periodic, or continuous countermeasures/safeguards exist.

Category 3: Mobile code technologies that have limited functionality, with no capability for unmediated access to the workstation, server, and remote system services and resources. Category 3 mobile code technologies may have a history of having and posing known security vulnerabilities, but also support known fine grained, periodic, or continuous countermeasures/safeguards.

Emerging Mobile Code Technologies: All mobile code technologies, systems, platforms, or languages whose capabilities and threat level have not yet undergone a risk assessment and been categorized as described above.”

While most of the compliance with DoD Mobile Code policy is the responsibility of the Mission Owner, SC-18 (2) states “The organization ensures that the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code to be deployed in information systems meets organization-defined mobile code requirements”. The following applies to DoD IS:

“(a) Emerging mobile code technologies that have not undergone a risk assessment and been assigned to a Risk Category by the CIO are not used.

(b) Category 1 mobile code is signed with a code signing certificate; use of unsigned Category 1 mobile code is prohibited; use of Category 1 mobile code technologies that cannot block or disable unsigned mobile code (e.g., Windows Scripting Host) is prohibited.

(c) Category 2 mobile code which executes in a constrained environment without access to system resources (e.g., Windows registry, file system, system parameters, and network connections to other than the originating host) may be used.

(d) Category 2 mobile code that does not execute in a constrained environment may be used when obtained from a trusted source over an assured channel (e.g., SIPRNet, SSL connection, S/MIME, code is signed with an approved code signing certificate).

(e) Category 3 (mobile code having limited functionality, with no capability for unmediated access to the services and resources of a computing platform) mobile code may be used."

DoD expects the CSP to enact similar Mobile Code Policies for SC-18 (2) for their organizational IT systems and the infrastructure supporting their CSO(s) for the protection of the CSO(s), Mission Owners’ systems/applications/information/data in the CSO. Furthermore DoD expects that the CSP’s CSO will not enable or permit the download of unapproved/risky mobile code, for the protection of the CSO’s end users as well as Mission Owner’s and their end user’s systems and networks. SC-18 (2) is under consideration for addition to the FedRAMP+ baseline for all impact levels.

Similarly SC-18 (3) and SC-18 (4) have been assigned values in Table 9. These are currently in the set of SLA controls to be considered by Mission Owners for inclusion in the SLA/Contract. These too, are under consideration for addition to the FedRAMP+ baseline for all impact levels.

Mission Owners systems/applications must not download and execute mobile code except as permitted above, and must not enable or permit the download of unapproved/risky mobile code, for the protection of the system’s/application’s end users as well as their end user’s systems and networks.

5.16 Registration and Connection Approval for Cloud Based Systems/Applications


This section provides information on the various registrations required for cloud based systems/applications in addition to PPSM registration discussed in Section 5.15, Ports, Protocols, Services, Management and Cloud Based Systems/Applications.

5.16.1 DISA Systems/Network Approval Process (SNAP)


All Mission Owners are required to register all Cloud based systems/applications; their CSP/CSO, MCD, and connection method in the DISA Systems/Network Approval Process (SNAP)[103] database Cloud Module.  This registration will enable these systems/applications to be connected to the DISN and is crucial for the situational awareness of the Cybersecurity Defense community tasked with protecting the DoDIN, DoD information, and the Mission Owners Cloud based systems/applications.



 

5.16.2 DoD DMZ Whitelist


The DoD DMZ Whitelist implementation supports USCYBERCOM’s TASKORD 12-0371 and subsequent FRAGOs which support the operation of the DoD DMZ program. In the event the Mission Owners Cloud based systems/applications requires traffic to traverse the DISN IAPs, the systems/applications URLs/IP addresses must be registered with the DoD DMZ Whitelist.  Traffic that will typically traverse the IAP is management traffic for Level 2 off-premises systems/applications and for user plane traffic to/from Level 4/5 systems/applications that are internet facing (i.e., accessed from the Internet via the DoD DMZ extension connected to a BCAP). Such traffic and IP addresses may be blocked if not registered in the Whitelist.  The Whitelist can be found on SIPRNet at https://niprdmzwhitelist.csd.disa.smil.mil/home.aspx. There is a Whitelist Users Guide available via the “Help” link.  Mission Owners may need to contact their DoD Component’s point of contact to have their entry added to the Whitelist.

5.16.3 Select and Native Programming Data Input System- Information Technology (SNaP-IT)


In compliance with the DoD Memo, "Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services," 15 Dec 2014, DoD Components will report all appropriate information within the Select and Native Programming Data Input System- Information Technology (SNaP-IT)[104] as directed in DoD CIO annual IT budget guidance for each utilized cloud computing service.  SNaP-IT is the authoritative DoD database used for publishing the DoD IT Budget estimates to Congress and the OMB Circular A-11 Section 53 and Section 300 exhibits to OMB for Information Technology.  To comply, Components MUST respond to the SNaP-IT Profile questions for the Exhibit 53 into two submissions; the Exhibit 53A, 'Agency IT Investment Portfolio Summary', and the Exhibit 53C, the 'Agency Cloud Computing Spending Summary'.  Components must identify whether a cloud computing option was evaluated for each investment, and provide detail as instructed.  Components fulfill their requirement for all Exhibits 53s by completing their SNaP-IT Profile, Resource, and Budget Support Data for each component investment. 



[104] SNaP-IT U: https://snap.pae.osd.mil/snapit/loginauth.aspx for Levels 2/4/5 systems/applications

    SNaP-IT S: https://snap.cape.osd.smil.mil/snapit for Level 6 systems/applications

 

5.17 Supply Chain Risk Management Assessment


The DoD selected FedRAMP+ control SA-12 addresses Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) while SA-19 deals with component authenticity. The acquisition of system components and software that are counterfeit, unreliable, or contain malicious logic or code is of great concern to DoD for all products supporting the processing, storage, and transmission of CUI and classified information. This concern extends to Cloud Computing.

As part of the CSO’s DoD PA assessment package, the CSP will provide a SCRM plan outlining their supply chain assessment/management and component authenticity process and measures taken such that they are not acquiring system components and software that are counterfeit, unreliable, or contain malicious logic or code and incorporating them into the CSO infrastructure or its management plane.

The CSP’s SCRM plan for how the CSP implements SA-12 and SA-19 will be assessed and approved during the DoD PA assessment process for all Impact Level 4, 5, and 6 CSOs.

5.18 Electronic Mail Protections IAW TASKORD 12-0920


US CYBERCOM Task Order (TASKORD) 12-0920 requires the use of the Enterprise E-Mail Security Gateway (EEMSG) for all email inbound from, or outbound to, the Internet. It further requires email outbound from one DoD Component’s email servers to another Component’s email servers to pass through the EEMSG. The EEMSG only deals with server to server email traffic, it does not deal with client to server traffic. All DoD Components are required to use the EEMSG unless a waiver is in place. In the event a waiver is in place, the DoD Component must use their own email security gateway.

Therefore IAW the full TASKORD:

  • All email transfers inbound through the IAP from an external email server destined to a L4/5 email server in a Mission Owner’s enclave within a CSO via a BCAP must pass through the EEMSG inbound protections.
  • All email transfers sent from a L4/5 email server in a Mission Owner’s enclave within a CSO via a BCAP and through the IAP to an external email server must pass through the EEMSG outbound protections
  • All email transfers sent from a L4/5 email server in a Mission Owner’s enclave within a CSO via a BCAP to email servers in a DoD Component’s data center enclave must pass through the EEMSG outbound protections.
  • All Email transfers sent from email servers in DoD Component's data center enclave to a L4/5 email server in a Mission Owner’s enclave within a CSO via a BCAP must pass through the EEMSG outbound protections.

This requirement and interpretation of the TASKORD is based on the fact that the Mission Owner’s environment in any CSO is considered a DoD enclave that may include an email server either as the primary service SaaS offering or as an adjunct service to a PaaS/SaaS, or may be instantiated by the Mission Owner in IaaS. 

In the event two Mission Owners utilize the same email SaaS and email servers, there is no need for EEMSG protections for email between the different Mission Owners’ users. However, in the event the CSO implements different servers/enclaves for different Mission Owners, the CSO must include an email hygiene/protective service through which email transfers between these servers/enclaves will route. In this case the server-to-server email traffic will remain within the CSP’s infrastructure and not traverse the CAP or EEMSG. Similarly, Mission Owners that implement email servers in IaaS or leverage a PaaS feature within their CSO based enclaves will follow the same rules as above for SaaS and must provide for email hygiene/protective service within the CSO for enclave to Mission Owner enclave to Mission Owner enclave traffic or route such traffic through the BCAP and EEMSG.

All BCAPs must support Mission Owner’s and implement the appropriate routing of server-to-server email traffic to/from the EEMSG capability at the CAP end of the connection for all CSOs that contain an email server. This includes routing to/from such servers and the IAP for email servers that are external and Internet connected. This is a CSO connection approval requirement. However it is ultimately a Mission Owner responsibility for TASKORD compliance when they use a CSO or implement a system/application in IaaS/PaaS. 

NOTE: As of this release of the CC SRG, EEMSG does not currently inspect intra-enclave email. Therefore the above requirements do not apply to email traffic that remains within the DISN and Mission Owner enclaves in a CSO, until EEMSG does inspect intra-enclave email. That said, the requirement for EEMSG to inspect all email traffic to/from the Internet based email servers still applies.

6 CYBERSPACE DEFENSE AND INCIDENT RESPONSE


NOTICE: This release of the CC SRG has been coordinated with the new Cyberspace Defense lexicon defined in DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), "Cyberspace Operations" and DoDI 8530.01, “Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations”.  Additionally, due to publication of the DoDI 8530.01 and the replacement of the DRAFT Cloud CND CONOPS (rescinded) with DRAFT DoDM 8530.01, “Cyberspace Activity Support to DoDIN Operations & Defensive Cyber Operations – Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM)” all releasable content from DoDM 8530.01 applicable to CSPs will be included in a subsequent release.  Mission Owners and others will refer to the DoDM 8530.01 when published.

Cyberspace Defense addresses the defense and protection of networks and Information Systems (ISs), detection of threats, and response to incidents. Cyber situational awareness improves the quality and timeliness of collaborative decision-making regarding the employment, protection, and defense of DoD systems and data. DoD cyberspace defense actions provide the means to react to threats and incidents to defend the DoDIN.  This section addresses critical cyberspace defense actions; roles and responsibilities; incident reporting and response; and other cybersecurity processes.

6.1 Overview of Cyberspace Defense


DoD operates a cybersecurity structure as defined in DoDI 8530.01, "Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations”.  The structure consists of United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Joint Forces Headquarters DoDIN (JFHQ-DoDIN) at the top organizational level and a network of Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSPs) that have been accredited by USCYBERCOM IAW DoD policy.  Each DoD information system is operated/managed by a Mission Owner which must be aligned with an accredited CSSP which monitors and protects the information systems and associated assets.  The Mission Owner is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the security posture of their system(s) in accordance with SRGs/STIGs, and DoD policy in coordination with, and/or with the assistance of their aligned CSSP.  CSSPs report information to USCYBERCOM which maintains Cyber situational awareness over all DoD networks and ISs.  USCYBERCOM also provides threat information collected from various sources and threat mitigation orders to the CSSPs and Mission Owners.

NOTE: An example of maintaining the security posture of a Mission Owner’s system is the application of patches/upgrades and IAVM compliance. This is a Mission Owner-level activity or responsibility. While some DoD Components (e.g., Army) relieve their Mission Owners of some, or all, security posture maintenance activities by transferring their performance to the system’s CSSP (e.g., ARCYBER), they remain Mission Owner-level activities and responsibilities. As such, the CSSP is responsible for performing the transferred Mission Owner-level functions along with their CSSP-level functions.

6.2 Concept Changes for Information Impact Levels for Cloud Computing


With the move to commercial cloud computing, the DoD is adopting a risk-based approach in applying network defense capabilities and processes.  As described in Section 3.2, Information Impact Levels. DoD has defined Information Impact Levels commensurate to the risk and type of data, with each higher level warranting greater protections. 

With Impact Level 2 data, the overall value of the data is not mission critical or sensitive in nature, thus it may not warrant the same level of protections as higher impact level data, while still needing protection.  Recognizing that the data at Impact Level 2 has minimal requirements for confidentiality, emphasis must be placed on integrity and availability that achieve a level of security and risk acceptable to the responsible AO.  User connectivity to the information system flows through the CSP’s Internet connection; thus DoD is relying on the network boundary protections and monitoring available through the CSO if any.  If the boundary defense is not implemented by the CSP, then the Mission Owner will be responsible and must coordinate with their DoD CSSP. Protection capabilities supporting the mission system at the system/host/application level will be provided by a combination of the CSSP and the mission system administrators (including the CSP for SaaS). See section 5.10.6, Mission Owner System/Application Requirements using IaaS/PaaS for related boundary requirements. CSPs are expected to protect their SaaS CSOs (and PaaS CSOs where the Mission Owner does not have control) by applying the appropriate boundary protections and CSSP services. See section 5.10.3, CSP Service Architecture and subsections for additional information and CSP requirements for all service models I/P/SaaS.

Level 4 and above data presents greater risk and thus necessitates the need for enterprise defense mechanisms and data collection that enable robust monitoring, event correlation, and analytics.  With level 4 and above data, the DISN boundary is essentially extended through a connection between a DoD CAP and the CSP’s network infrastructure supporting the DoD mission.   Therefore, an event may be detected through a few different entities: the CSP through monitoring of their CSO (especially for SaaS); the mission administrators or owners; or the CSSPs that are supporting the monitoring of the mission and the boundary connection.  All entities must work together to quickly investigate and respond to incidents. The protection of a DoD BCAP is supported by organizations performing Boundary Cyberspace Actions.

6.2.1 Boundary Cyberspace Defense Actions


Boundary Cyberspace Defense (BCD) Actions monitor and defend the connections to/from CSPs via an authorized BCAP.  BCD Actions guard against the risk that each CSP interconnection poses to the DoDIN individually, along with cross-CSP analysis for all connections flowing through an individual BCAP.  While these actions focus on the connections through a particular BCAP, cross-BCAP analysis is warranted to determine if a threat extends beyond a single CSP or BCAP.

6.2.2 Mission Cyberspace Defense Actions


Mission Cyberspace Defense (MCD) Actions provide services to Mission Owners’ cloud-based mission systems/applications and virtual networks. Any given organization performing MCD Actions may service cloud-based mission systems/applications and virtual networks instantiated in multiple CSPs and multiple CSOs. MCD Actions are executed by accredited DoD CSSPs with a focus on elements of cloud computing. MCD Actions will typically be executed by the CSSP used by the Mission Owner’s Component for their non-cloud-based ISs; however, Mission Owners can choose to use and fund any certified CSSP for execution of MCD Actions.

6.3 Cyberspace Defense Actions


The following is a list of cyberspace defense actions and their responsibilities as it relates to cloud operations. 

  • DoDIN Cyberspace Defense (DCD) Actions: The primary objective of the organization that performs DCD Actions is to oversee a coordinated response to DODIN-wide attacks. DCD builds a broad picture of the operating environment across Mission Owners, MCDs, BCDs, CSOs, and CSPs. The DCD identifies patterns of incidents or events, consolidates related incident tickets, directs mitigations, and assigns DODIN Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) to focus efforts on a specific threat or adversary.  Specific cyberspace defense actions include:
    • Protect the DoDIN and DoD mission systems in commercial cloud infrastructure through cross-BCAP correlation and analysis of events/data.
    • Direct or recommend cybersecurity actions regarding DoDIN-wide incident and system health reporting involving a BCAP or CSP.
    • Establish and maintain external communications with the CSP for DoDIN-wide incidents and ensure internal DoD communications are established between all entities, which includes the MCD and BCD.
    • Interface with US-CERT to obtain relevant CSP information; ensure cross-sharing of information across all organizations performing BCD/MCD Actions.
  • Boundary Cyberspace Defense (BCD) Actions: The primary objective of organizations that perform BCD Actions is to protect the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) from events or incidents that utilize Public, Private, Hybrid, or Community Clouds, through approved CSPs that can impact the DISN through a dedicated connection via a Boundary Cloud Access Point (BCAP). BCD Actions support MCDs in their objectives of defending their systems, applications, and data hosted in the Cloud. Specific cyberspace defense actions include:
    • Protect the DISN via the BCAP.
    • Provide timely access to BCD-collected indications and warnings relevant to organizations performing MCD Actions.
    • Support DCD Actions to identify correlations between related events or incidents that impact multiple Mission Owners, CSOs, or CSPs.
  • Mission Cyberspace Defense (MCD) Actions: The primary objective of organizations that perform MCD Actions is to defend Mission Owners’ systems, applications, and data hosted in the Cloud. MCD Actions are performed by Cybersecurity Service Providers (CSSPs) on behalf of their organic organizations and subscribers.  Specific cyberspace defense actions include:
    • Analyze cyber incidents and events for Mission Owners.
    • Monitor, protect, and defend Mission Owners’ cloud-based systems, applications, and virtual networks in the CSP’s IaaS/PaaS infrastructure
    • Monitor, protect, and defend Mission Owners’ cloud-based data in the CSO.
    • Defend all connections to the CSO, whether via BCAP, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Internet Access Point (IAP), direct internet access to public servers, or other.
    • Monitor privileged actions (e.g. Cloud management or Mission Owner application administration) and monitor for events or incidents against the Mission Owner applications (e.g. Structured Query Language (SQL) injection).
    • Support DCD efforts to identify correlations between related events or incidents that impact multiple Mission Owners, CSOs, or CSPs.
    • Ensure internal DoD communications are established between all entities which include the Mission Owner and organizations performing MCD and BCD Actions.

6.4 Cyberspace Defense Roles and Responsibilities


The following is a list of the Cyberspace Defense roles and responsibilities as they relate to cloud operations.

  • JFHQ-DoDIN: JFHQ-DoDIN will perform DCD Actions and has direct tasking authority over DoD Components. JFHQ-DoDIN, as part of USCYBERCOM, has legal authority to collaborate with entities external to DoD, such as the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).
  • DoD Components: Service Cyber Components, Defense Agencies, and DISA may perform MCD Actions in support of their Mission Owners; and BCD Actions when they have the responsibility of operating, monitoring, and maintaining a BCAP.
  • Mission Administrators: Administrators of Mission Owner’s cloud-based systems, applications, and virtual networks; responsible for:
    • Following the directives and orders from the Mission Owner.
    • Maintaining and patching the cloud-based mission systems, applications, and virtual networks.
    • Installing and maintaining protective measures for the cloud-based mission systems, applications, and virtual networks.

NOTE: As noted in Section 6.1, Overview of Cyberspace Defense  some DoD Components might transfer some or all of these responsibilities to organizations performing MCD Actions. 

  • Cloud Service Provider (CSP): CSPs provide for their own Cyberspace Defense services to provide for a secure environment for their customer’s (DoD Mission Owner's) systems, applications, and virtual networks.  In effect, the CSP will function as an extension of the  Mission Owner. At a minimum, CSPs are responsible for:
    • Providing local operational direction and support for Cyberspace Defense within their infrastructure and service offerings.
    • Fully maintaining, patching, monitoring, and protecting the infrastructure, operating systems, and applications supporting all service offerings. 
    • Fully maintaining, patching, monitoring, and protecting the portions of PaaS service offering OSs and applications for which they are responsible (which may vary from none to all) as defined in the service offering SLA/description and/or the Mission Owner’s SLA/contract.
    • Fully maintaining, patching, monitoring, and protecting SaaS service offering OSs and applications including DoD data/information in them.
    • And as contracted:
      • Coordinating with the organizations performing MCD Actions regarding incident response and the mitigation of threats to DoD cloud based mission systems/applications and data.
      • Providing timely incident and system health reports.
    • Maintaining bidirectional cyber situational awareness.
  • Mission Owners: Individuals/organizations responsible for the overall mission environment, ensuring that the functional and Cyberspace Defense requirements of the system are being met. Mission Owners, as the CSO subscribers to the CSPs, have a contractual relationship to the CSPs. Mission Owners can optionally expand Cyberspace Defense relevant reporting to their organizations performing MCD and BCD Actions by including such language in their Service Level Agreements (SLAs). At a minimum, Mission Owners are responsible for:
    • Engaging and funding the services of organizations performing MCD Actions to provide for the defense of the Mission Owner’s systems, applications, and virtual networks in any CSP’s IaaS/PaaS infrastructure (whether DoD operated or operated by a commercial/non-DoD entity).
    • Establishing the terms and requirements in the contract with the CSP for incident reporting, incident response, and communications with the appropriate organizations performing MCD and BCD Actions.

6.5 Cyber Incident Reporting and Response


Two key definitions related to this section as reflected in the CNSSI 4009, IA Glossary, are as follows:

cyber incident

Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information residing therein.  See incident. 

incident

An assessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system; or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits; or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. 

For the purposes of this SRG, we will use incident and cyber incident interchangeably.

FedRAMP, through the selection and implementation of IR-6, requires CSPs to report cyber incidents to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team[105] (US-CERT) and the consuming Federal Agencies.  For CSOs that are multi-tenant or otherwise shared across Federal Agencies outside of the DoD (Impact Levels 2 through 5), incidents will be reported to US-CERT as required by FedRAMP, in parallel with reporting to DoD.  For CSPs providing dedicated infrastructure to the DoD (Impact Levels 4 and above), incidents regarding that infrastructure and CSOs will not be reported to US-CERT, but directly to the DoD.  USCYBERCOM/JFHQ-DoDIN will handle coordination with US-CERT and other entities as appropriate. The DoD incident reporting process is described in Section 6.5.3, Incident Reporting Mechanism.

All CSPs actively supporting DoD missions will be supported by one or more organization performing MCD Actions.  The organizations performing MCD Actions will be the DoD point of contact to which the CSP’s operational entity will coordinate response to incidents affecting the security posture of the CSP and the CSP’s cloud service offerings.  The organizations performing MCD Actions will coordinate with the organizations performing BCD Actions as appropriate. 

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-4, IR-5, IR-6



 

6.5.1 Incident Response Plans and Addendums


CSPs will provide, either as part of their Incident Response Plan or through an Incident Response Plan Addendum, their approach to fulfilling DoD Cyberspace Defense integration requirements.  CSPs will make their plan or addendum available to DISA for review and approval as a condition of its PA and inclusion in the DoD Cloud Service Catalog. CSPs will update and deliver the Incident Response Plan Addendum (if used) in conjunction with updates and deliveries of their Incident Response Plan, as required by the FedRAMP selected security control IR-1.  A CSP must specifically address cyber incidents and data breaches, where a “breach” or cyber incident includes the loss of control, compromise, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where any unauthorized person has access or potential access to government data, whether in electronic or non-electronic form, for any unauthorized purpose.  CSPs must ensure that the plan or addendum addresses all incidents regardless of the time, day, or location of the incident and must provide for notice to the Government of any breach of its data.  The plan or addendum must incorporate any other policies or procedures that the Government may require to be followed in the event of an incident, including, but not limited to:

  • To whom within the Government, the incident will be reported IAW the incident reporting process defined in Section 6.5.3, Incident Reporting Mechanism
  • Specific steps to be taken in order to mitigate or remedy the incident, including time periods for taking such steps (e.g., reporting of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) data breaches within one hour, Negligent Disclosure of Classified Information (NDCIs) which are commonly referred to as spillages)
  • How and under what circumstances any  individuals or entities affected by an incident will be notified and by whom and
  • Any other special instructions for handling computer security incidents affecting, or potentially affecting U.S.  Government data; consistent with guidance and policy directives issued by DoD, NIST, US-CERT and CNSS for incident management, classification, and remediation; or other applicable law, regulation, order, or policy.

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-8

6.5.2 Information Requirements, Categories, Timelines, and Formats


Defending DoD missions and systems is a shared responsibility that requires all entities (CSPs; organizations performing MCD or BCD Actions; Mission Owners and Mission Administrators) to work collectively as a team.  An event may be detected by any of following entities, depending upon the connection architecture (direct Internet or through a CAP):

  • CSP personnel through monitoring of their CSO (especially for PaaS/SaaS);
  • Mission administrators or owners (includes the CSP for PaaS/SaaS);
  • Supporting organizations performing MCD Actions through monitoring;
  • Supporting organizations performing BCD Actions via BCAP monitoring.

All entities must work together to quickly investigate and respond to events and incidents.  In the course of a CSP performing Cyberspace Defense for its environments, CSPs will monitor their information systems and report relevant information to the organization performing MCD Actions, focused on situations where any unauthorized person has access or potential access to government data. 

CSP’s reporting requirements to DoD will align with the reporting lexicon used by US-CERT for the broader Federal Government reporting requirements.  Incident notifications should include a description of the incident and as much of the following information as possible:

  • Contract information to include contract number, USG Contracting Officer(s) contact information, contract clearance level, etc.
  • Contact information for the impacted and reporting organizations as well as the MCD.
  • Details describing any vulnerabilities involved (i.e., Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers)
  • Date/Time of occurrence, including time zone
  • Date/Time of detection and identification, including time zone
  • Related indicators (e.g. hostnames, domain names, network traffic characteristics, registry keys, X.509 certificates, MD5 file signatures)
  • Threat vectors, if known (see Threat Vector Taxonomy and Cause Analysis flowchart within the US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines)
  • Prioritization factors (i.e.  functional impact, information impact, and recoverability as defined flowchart within the US-CERT Federal Incident Notification Guidelines[106])
  • Source and Destination Internet Protocol (IP) address, port, and protocol
  • Operating System(s) affected
  • Mitigating factors (e.g. full disk encryption or two-factor authentication)
  • Mitigation actions taken, if applicable
  • System Function(s) (e.g. web server, domain controller, or workstation)
  • Physical system location(s) (e.g. Washington DC, Los Angeles, CA)
  • Sources, methods, or tools used to identify the incident (e.g. Intrusion Detection System or audit log analysis)
  • Any additional information relevant to the incident and not included above.

Initial incident reports should be submitted within one hour of discovery with follow-on information provided as available.  Initial reports may be incomplete to facilitate communication and teamwork between the CSP and the organizations performing MCD/BCD Actions. CSPs should balance the necessity of timely reporting (incomplete reports with critical information) versus complete reports (those with all blocks completed).  Timely reporting is vital, and complete information should follow as details emerge.

NOTE: These requirements are applicable to all systems at all Information Impact Levels.  The CSP must follow these requirements when integrating with DoD organizations preforming Cyberspace Defense Actions. Mission Owners must include these requirements in the contract, even at Level 2.

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-5, IR-6, IR-8



 

6.5.3 Incident Reporting Mechanism


DoD CSP's (e.g., milCloud’s) Cyberspace Defense providers will report all incidents using the Joint Incident Management System (JIMS) IAW normal DoD processes.

The following requirements are consistent with DFARS Clause 252.204-7012(d) as updated for Cloud Computing when finalized.

Level 2/4/5 Commercial CSPs will report all incidents via the on-line Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Incident Collection Format (ICF)[107].  Use of the on-line format is preferred.  Access to this format requires a DoD-approved medium assurance External Certificate Authority (ECA) certificate.  If you are unable to access this format, please call (877) 838-2174 or email: DCISE@DC3.mil.

The CSP must include, for routing purposes, all points of contact (POCs) of organizations performing MCD Actions for all DoD missions affected by the incident.  This is in addition to any other POCs required by the tool for routing to contract managers, etc.  The organization performing MCD Actions, once the report is received, will initiate the DoD reporting process via JIMS.

When classified incident reporting is appropriate and directed, CSPs will use SIPRNet email or secure phone/fax to report and coordinate incidents as specified.  Level 6 Commercial CSPs will report all incidents to the organization performing MCD Actions using SIPRNet email or secure phone/fax to report and coordinate incidents as specified.

Existing notification mechanisms of a CSP that are already in place to communicate between the CSP and its customers for some or all classes of Cyberspace Defense information may be used, as long as those mechanisms demonstrate a level of assurance, equivalent to the listed encrypted mechanisms, for the confidentiality and integrity of the information. 

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-6, IR-8



[107] DIBNet CS/IA Portal: https://dibnet.dod.mil/

 

6.5.4 Digital Forensics in the Cloud and Support for Law Enforcement/Criminal Investigation


Incidents and compromises will happen.  When they do, they must be reported and then forensically analyzed to gain detailed information regarding how it occurred how to prevent it or protect the system in the future, and potentially who is responsible.  Incident information must be gathered and handled in a manner that will support legal prosecution if needed.  As such it must be protected from alteration from the time it is captured until it is no longer needed.  Support for forensics is shared between the Mission Owner and the CSP to various degrees depending on the service type. 

Digital forensics in the cloud has many challenges as described by NIST in Draft National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency or Internal Report (NISTIR) 8006, Cloud Computing Forensic Science Challenges.[108] This section of the CC SRG provides initial guidance regarding the DoD requirements for enabling and performing Cloud Forensics and supporting Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation (LE/CE) activities.

The following requirements apply to all Information Impact Levels 2 through 6.

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-4, IR-5(1)



 

6.5.4.1 Malicious Software


CSPs or their subcontractors that discover and isolate malicious software in connection with a reported cyber incident shall securely submit the malicious software to the organization performing MCD Actions for analysis in addition to any other analysis organization employed by the CSP.  The means of submission will be coordinated with the organization performing MCD Actions.  The DoD Cyberspace Defense community will use their analysis to develop detection signatures and mitigation measures to be applied to DoD networks and Mission Owner’s systems.  Analysis results will be shared with the CSP if permissible and the appropriate communication channels exist.

Corresponding Security Controls: SI-3 (10)

6.5.4.2 Incident Information Collection, Preservation, and Protection


Under all service types including SaaS, when a CSP discovers a cyber-incident has occurred within infrastructure and/or CSO for which they are responsible, in conjunction with initial incident reporting, the CSP shall capture, preserve, and protect images and state of all known affected systems/servers/workstations supporting the CSO and the customer.  This includes system logs, volatile memory captures, and hard drive (physical or virtual) images.  The CSP shall also preserve and protect all relevant network logs, as well as all available network monitoring/packet capture data.  This information must be collected as soon as possible after the discovery if not immediately.

The CSP will maintain captured incident information for at least 90 days from the submission of the required cyber incident report to allow DoD to request the information or decline interest.  This requirement applies to the underlying infrastructure supporting IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS, the systems and applications managed by the CSP under PaaS, and all systems and applications under SaaS.

Under IaaS, when a Mission Owner discovers a cyber-incident has occurred within their systems/applications/virtual networks, they will work with their organization performing MCD Actions and CSP to capture, preserve, and protect images and state of all known affected virtual machines which they manage as well as any network logs, and network monitoring/packet capture data generated by their virtual network(s).  This includes system logs, volatile memory captures, and virtual hard drive images.  While the virtual hard drive image of a compromised VM is typically easy to preserve as a new image is placed into service, tools run on the compromised VM before it is shut down are typically used to capture and package the system logs and/or volatile memory and detailed procedures are followed.  An example of this is the DISA Incident Response and Recovery Team’s (IRRT) First Responder’s Guide and web page[109] which makes software tools available for Windows and UNIX/Linux based systems to collect the necessary supporting information.  These tools work within the VM and the volatile memory allocated to it.  They will not compromise other customers’ information or VMs running on the same physical hardware which may be a concern for other tools.  Each organization performing MCD Actions is required to have and use similar procedures and tools.  The Mission Owner and/or the organization performing MCD Actions must subsequently coordinate with the CSP to collect relevant infrastructure logs in support of investigating the incident.  Alternately, the CSP may/should also provide similar tools/capabilities that will work in their environment.

Under PaaS and SaaS, a Mission Owner, their organization performing MCD Actions, or the CSP may detect an incident.  Each party must work with the others to collect the necessary forensic information from the areas of the service each manages.  It may be unlikely that the Mission Owner will be able to run the tools discussed under IaaS above, however, the CSP must provide similar tools/capabilities that will work in their environment. 

Under PaaS, if the Mission Owner manages their contracted servers (VMs or otherwise) OS and platform applications, it is their responsibility to perform the capture, preserve, and protect functions in coordination with their organization performing MCD Actions as described under IaaS on their own or using tools provided by the CSP.  If, on the other hand, the CSP manages the CSO servers, OS, and/or platform applications, then the CSP must perform the capture, preserve, and protect functions.  The CSP will then share their results with the Mission Owner’s organization performing MCD Actions.

Under SaaS, the CSP must perform the capture, preserve, and protect functions in conjunction with their CSSP.  The CSP will then share their results with the Mission Owner’s organization performing MCD Actions.

All captured incident information is digital evidence.  All digital evidence, when copied / captured from the system, the original and copied information must be hashed to validate the integrity of the copy initially and in the future.

To be effective, all incident capture should be performed using automation IAW IR-5(1). The CSP must provide an automated capability that supports incident capture and protection, which must support the CSP’s investigation of incidents within their own infrastructure and in customer’s CSO environments. An interface to the capability must be made available to the customer in support of the customer’s incident response activities as needed in their environments within the CSO.   All such automation must capture the information in a manner that segregates captured information by customer such that non-DoD or non-Federal information is not revealed to the incident response team or forensic / LE investigators.  Likewise the information relating to the government environment must be segregated from the information captured from the CSP’s underlying infrastructure. Once the information is captured, the automation must create one or more hashes of the data such that changes to it can be detected.  The automation must then encrypt the data to preserve its confidentiality and integrity. Captured information captured from the CSP’s underlying infrastructure will be encrypted separately from the information captured from the Government’s environment.  Encryption keys will be provided to the forensics analysists and stored in such a manner that only the Government has access to the keys for the information captured from the Government’s environment and the CSP has access to captured data from the CSP’s underlying infrastructure.

NOTE: At this time some of the tools provided on the DISA IRRT website (more specifically Oscar) incorporate licensed software and may not be used by other organizations other than as directed by the DISA IRRT.

Mission Owners must reflect these requirements in their contract /SLA with the CSP delineating specific responsibilities between the CSP and Mission Owner/MCD.

Corresponding Security Controls: IR-4, IR-5(1), IR-8, SI-12



[109] DISA IRRT Web site: https://blogs.intelink.gov/blogs/_disairrt (CAC/PIV PKI required)

 

6.5.4.3 Forensics/Incident Information Chain-of-Custody for LE/CI


According to NISTIR 8006, Chain-of-custody is defined in legal contexts as the chronological documentation of evidence handling, which is required to avoid allegations of evidence tampering or misconduct.  In the event the incident discovered by the CSP or Mission Owner was maliciously caused by an individual, maintaining the chain of custody over the information is critical to being able to legally reprimand or prosecute the responsible individual or organization. 

To support LE/CI investigations, the chain-of-custody of the captured data should be documented from end-to-end, person-to-person starting when the incident investigation begins.  The individual that captures each piece or portion of the information initiates this documentation and each individual that subsequently handles the information or media containing it must continue the documentation.  Chain-of custody-forms are available on the DISA IRRT web site noted above or from law enforcement.  While chain-of-custody documentation is important and recommended; initiating the chain-of-custody forms and procedures may only be required if the incident warrants the notification of law enforcement.  In that case, the chain-of-custody forms will be initiated by law enforcement officers.  If requested or subpoenaed, the CSP will make their employees available to provide attestation either via affidavits or expert testimony on the CSP’s chain-of-custody and forensic data capture/collection methods.

Corresponding Security Controls: SI-12

6.5.4.4 Digital Forensics Support by CSP toward PA Award


CSPs will be evaluated for their ability to support the requirements above that are incumbent upon the CSP and for their ability to support requirements that are incumbent upon the Mission Owner particularly in the area of system image and state preservation.  This includes capabilities and tools to support the capture and preservation of system logs, volatile memory captures, and hard drive (physical or virtual) images by the Mission Owner or CSP.  The CSP must document their capability to support digital forensics in their Security Plan.  CSP Forensics Support capabilities and their acceptability will be documented in the information supporting the PA.

6.6 Warning, Tactical Directives, and Orders


USCYBERCOM or JFHQ-DoDIN disseminates Warnings, Tactical Directives, and Orders to the organizations performing BCD and MCD Actions.  The organizations performing BCD and MCD Actions will analyze them for their applicability to individual CSPs, and then communicate with USCYBERCOM or JFHQ-DoDIN, and the CSPs, as appropriate.  CSPs will coordinate with the organizations performing MCD Actions and Mission Owners to implement directives and countermeasures.

CSPs must be able to receive, act upon, and report compliance with directives and notifications sent by the organization performing MCD Actions on behalf of the Mission Owner, as required by FedRAMP selected security control SI-5.

6.7 Continuous Monitoring / Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms)


Understanding existing vulnerabilities and risks within the enterprise is a key component in performing effective Cyberspace Defense analysis.  The vulnerability reports and POA&Ms developed by the CSPs as part of continuous monitoring requirements supporting both FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ requirements will be made available to DISA’s cloud services support team and subsequently to the organizations performing MCD and BCD Actions for their collective use in providing Cyberspace Defense. 

For both FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ requirements, high and critical risk findings must be mitigated within 30 days.  Moderate findings must be mitigated within 90 days. 

Corresponding Security Controls: CA-5, CA-7

6.8 Notice of Scheduled Outages


Planned outages affecting mission systems are to be coordinated through the Mission Owner; with the goal of minimizing impacts to the operational community.  An approved outage is referred to as an Authorized Services Interruption (ASI).   CSPs must notify all affected organizations performing MCD Actions of ASIs under their control when an outage starts and upon return to service.  Outages or changes that affect more than one mission environment must be reported by the organization performing MCD Actions to the organization performing BCD Actions to enable broader situational awareness.  Mission Owners and administrators are responsible for the same notifications to the organizations performing MCD Actions when the ASI is under their control.

6.9 PKI for Cyberspace Defense Purposes


The DoD PKI program provides assurances of an individual’s identity, which is important in sharing information regarding C2 and Cyberspace Defense actions.  This section outlines requirements for establishing trusted identities for CSP personnel communicating securely with DoD Cyberspace Defense personnel.  Once an incident is reported through the process identified in Section 6.5.3, Incident Reporting Mechanism, and in the event signed or encrypted email is to be used as the subsequent communications method, DoD PKI certificates will be required as follows:

Impact Level 2 through 5: CSPs must preferably have either a DoD PKI certificate or a DoD-approved PKI credential for each person that needs to communicate with DoD via encrypted email.  For more information on DoD-approved credentials, please see the IASE PKI/ECA web page[110] and PKI/PK Enabling (PKE) web page[111]. Equivalent alternative measures will be assessed on a case by case basis.

Impact Level 6: CSPs serving Level 6 systems will already have SIPRNet tokens / NSS PKI certificates for their system administrators by virtue of the connection to SIPRNet.  Incident response and Cyberspace Defense personnel will use SIPRNet tokens/certificates to communicate with DoD via encrypted email.



 

6.10 Vulnerability and Threat Information Sharing


Vulnerability and threat information sharing is a highly effective way for DoD to help CSPs protect and defend DoD information housed or processed in their service offerings.  Government sources such as US-CERT and USCYBERCOM provide detailed vulnerability information.  Several commercial sources also provide supplemental information that can be used by CSPs in further defending their infrastructure.  CSPs are encouraged to leverage such knowledge sources.  However, much of the information that the DoD can provide to CSPs is classified.  An avenue to obtain such information follows:

The Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity / Information Assurance Program[112]  (DIB CS/IA) is a program to enhance and supplement DIB participants’ capabilities to safeguard DoD information that resides on, or transits, DIB unclassified information systems.  Under this voluntary public-private cybersecurity partnership, DoD and participating DIB companies share unclassified and classified cyber threat information, best practices and mitigation strategies.  While cyber incident reporting is an important component to the success of this partnership, the real value of the program is collaboration that is key to making DoD information more secure.  Membership in DIB CS/IA enables DIB participants to acquire access to DIBNet-U and DIBNet-S, the unclassified and classified networks used for data sharing and collaboration.  Access to DIBNet provides CSPs with access to CYBERCOM notifications, classified email, and the DIB web portals. 

Access to DIBNet provides CSPs with access to both classified and unclassified cyber threat information, including mitigation strategies.  DIB CS/IA program membership is voluntary, although cyber incident reporting as described in Section 6.5.3, Incident Reporting Mechanism is mandatory.  Eligible CSPs are encouraged to join the voluntary DIB CS/IA program to facilitate their protection of infrastructure that hosts higher-value DoD data and systems. 

NOTE: DoD CSPs are already integrated into the Cyberspace Defense communications architecture and receive unclassified CYBERCOM notifications via established channels.



[112] DIBNet CS/IA Portal: https://dibnet.dod.mil/

 

Appendix A - References


  1. Public Law 93-579, as codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a, Privacy Act of 1974
    http://www.archives.gov/about/laws/privacy-act-1974.html
  2. Public Law 104-191, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Act of 1996
    http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/content-detail.html
  3. Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
    http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1327/ML13274A489.pdf#page=23
  4. 22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 22 CFR 120.15 – US Persons, 120-16 – Foreign persons,
    https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title22-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title22-vol1-sec120-15.pdf
  5. 22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 22 CFR 120.17 – Export,
    https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2004-title22-vol1/pdf/CFR-2004-title22-vol1-sec120-17.pdf
  6. 22 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 22 CFR 120.-130 International Traffic in Arms Regulations Part 123 - Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar.html
  7. 8 U.S. Code § 1408 - Nationals but not citizens of the United States at birth,
    https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title8/pdf/USCODE-2010-title8-chap12-subchapIII-partI-sec1408.pdf
  8. Executive Order 13526:  Classified National Security Information, dated 29 December 2009.
    http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/cnsi-eo.html
  9. Executive Order 12829 – National Industrial Security Program, January 1993.  http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12829.html
  10. Executive Order 13556 - Controlled Unclassified Information.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/04/executive-order-13556-controlled-unclassified-information
  11. EO 12958, Classified National Security Information (April 17, 1995) as amended by EO 13292.
    http://www.archives.gov/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.html
  12. 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subpart 4.4 - Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry. 
    https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-2011-title48-vol1/CFR-2011-title48-vol1-part4-subpart4-4
  13. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) section 52.204-2 - Security Requirements.  https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2002-title48-vol2/pdf/CFR-2002-title48-vol2-sec52-204-1.pdf
  14. NIST FIPS 199:  Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, dated February 2004.
    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips199/FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf
  15. NIST SP 500-292:  NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, dated September 2011.
    http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=909505
  16. NIST SP 800-53:  Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, Revision 4, dated April 2013.
    http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf

Note:  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html contains additional documents relating to SP 800-53.

  1. NIST SP 800-59:  Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System, dated August 2003.
    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-59/SP800-59.pdf
  2. NIST SP 800-66, Revision 1:  An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, dated October 2008.
    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-66-Rev1/SP-800-66-Revision1.pdf
  3. NIST SP 800-88, Revision 1: Guidelines for Media Sanitization, dated September 2012. 
    http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf
  4. NIST SP 800-122:  Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), dated April 2010.
    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/sp800-122.pdf
  5. NIST SP 800-144:  Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing, dated December 2011.
    http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-144/SP800-144.pdf
  6. NIST SP 800-145: The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, dated September 2011.  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf
  7. NIST SP 800-37, Revision 1: Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems, dated February 2010.  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-rev1/sp800-37-rev1-final.pdf
  8. NIST SP 800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations, dated June 2015. 
    http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-171.pdf   
  9. CNSS Instruction 4009:  National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, dated 30 April 2010.   
    https://www.cnss.gov or www.cnss.gov/cnss/issuances/Instructions.cfm
  10. CNSS Instruction 1253:  Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security
    Systems, dated 27 March 2014.
    https://www.cnss.gov or www.cnss.gov/cnss/issuances/Instructions.cfm
  11. CNSS Instruction No.1253F, Attachment 5: Classified Information Overlay dated 09 May 2014. 
    https://www.cnss.gov  or www.cnss.gov/cnss/issuances/Instructions.cfm
  12. CNSS Instruction No.1253F, Attachment 6: Privacy Overlay dated 20 April 2015. 
    https://www.cnss.gov  or www.cnss.gov/cnss/issuances/Instructions.cfm
  13. DoD Chief Information Officer, Updated Guidance on the Acquisition and Use of Commercial Cloud Computing Services, 15 December 2014.
    http://iase.disa.mil/Documents/commercial_cloud_computing_services.pdf
  14. DoD Instruction 8500.01: Cybersecurity, dated 14 March 2014.  http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf
  15. DoD Instruction 8510.01: Risk Management Framework (RMF) For DoD Information Technology (IT), dated 12 March 2014. 
    http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/851001_2014.pdf
  16. DoD Instruction 8520.03: Identity Authentication for Information Systems, dated 13 May, 2011.
    http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/852003p.pdf
  17. DoD Instruction 8550.01: DoD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities, September 11, 2012.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/855001p.pdf
  18. DoD Instruction 8551.01: Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM), May 28, 2014.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/855101p.pdf
  19. DoD Instruction 8410.01, Internet Domain Name Use and Approval, dated April 14, 2008.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/841001p.pdf
  20. DoD Instruction 8530.01, "Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations”
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/853001p.pdf
  21. DoD Joint Publication 3-12 (R), "Cyberspace Operations"
    http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf
  22. DoD Instruction 8582.01, Security of Unclassified DoD Information on Non-DoD Information Systems, June 6, 2012.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/858201p.pdf
  23. DoD Instruction 8320.07, Implementing the Sharing of Data, Information, and Information Technology (IT) Services in the Department of Defense
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/832007p.pdf
  24. DoD 5220.22-R: Industrial Security Regulation (ISR), dated December 1985.  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022r.pdf
  25. DoD Instruction 5220.22: National Industrial Security Program, dated March 2011.  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022p.pdf
  26. DoD Manual 5220.22 Manual: National Industrial Security Program: Operating Manual (NISPOM), dated march 2013.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022m.pdf
  27. DoD Instruction 5200.01: DoD Information Security Program and Protection of SCI, dated June 2011.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520001p.pdf
  28. DoD Manual 5200.01 Vol 1: DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification and Declassification, dated February 2012.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520001_vol1.pdf
  29. DoD Manual 5200.01 Vol 2: DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information, dated March 2013.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520001_vol2.pdf
  30. DoD Manual 5200.01 Vol 3: DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information, dated March 2013.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520001_vol3.pdf
  31. DoD Instruction 5200.02: DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP), Change 1 dated September 2014.
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520002_2014.pdf
  32. DoD Manual 5200.2-R: Personnel Security Program, dated February 1996. 
    http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/520002r.pdf
  33. CJCSM 6510.01B:  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual: Cyber Incident Handling Program, dated 10 July 2012.  (Current as of 18 December 2014).
    http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m651001.pdf
  34. DSS Facility Clearance Branch.
    http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/fac_clear.html   
  35. DoD ECA PKI Certificate.
    http://iase.disa.mil/pki/eca/Pages/index.aspx  
  36. OPM Position Designation System 2010.
    http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/position-designation-tool/oct2010.pdf  
  37. Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Home Page.
    https://www.fedramp.gov/
  38. FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2, June 6, 2014. http://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents
  39. Defense Information Systems Agency, the Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) Home Page. 
     http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/index.aspx
  40. Defense Information Systems Agency, DoD Cloud Services Support website.
    http://disa.mil/Services/DoD-Cloud-Broker
  41. Guide to Understanding FedRAMP.
    https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/
  42. FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide.
    https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/
  43. FedRAMP Control Specific Contract Clauses v2, June 6, 2014. 
    https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/
  44. OPM Position Designation System document, Oct 2010. 
    http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/position-designation-tool/oct2010.pdf
  45. OPM Position Designation Tool. 
    http://www.opm.gov/investigations/background-investigations/position-designation-tool/
  46. DoD DMZ STIG. 
    https://powhatan.iiie.disa.mil/stigs/downloads/zip/fouo_dod_internet-niprnet_dmz_technology_v3r3_stig.zip (CAC/PKI required)

Appendix B - Glossary


B.1. Cloud Terminology

This section is organized by topic.

Cloud Service Provider (CSP): An organization, commercial or Private, that offers/provides Cloud Services. Unqualified use of the term refers to any or all Cloud Service Providers, DoD or non-DoD.

Commercial CSP: refers to a Non-DoD Non-Federal Government organization offering cloud services to the public and/or government customers as part of a business venture, typically for a fee with the intent to make a profit.

DoD CSP: will refer to a DoD organization offering Cloud Services which may be owned and operated by DoD or a contractor for the benefit of the Department (e.g., milCloud). Such services will typically be offered under a cost recovery model. A DoD CSP may offer cloud services to non-DoD mission partners

Non-DoD CSP: will refer to a commercial or Federal Government owned and operated CSP.

Cloud Service Offering (CSO): refers to a CSP’s product or service offering. In other words, a CSO is the actual Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) or Software as a Service (SaaS) solution available from a CSP. A CSP may provide multiple CSOs (e.g., Microsoft O-365 (SaaS) and Azure (I/PaaS)). CSO also refers granularly to optional services or software available within any of the service types (e.g., one or more specific database applications optionally available for customer usage under PaaS).

  • Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): As defined in NIST SP 800-145, “The capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).”
  • Platform as a Service (PaaS): As defined in NIST SP 800-145, “The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment.”
  • Software as a Service (SaaS): As defined in NIST SP 800-145, “The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure.  The applications are accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface.  The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.”

Community Cloud: A multi-tenant cloud in which services are provided for the exclusive use of a specific group or type of independent customer organizations. 

Federal Government Community Cloud: A community cloud offered for use by multiple Federal Government organizations (which include the DoD).  Resources providing the cloud services must be dedicated to Federal Government use and require physical separation from non-Federal customers. 

Private Cloud: A single or multi-tenant cloud in which services are provided for the exclusive use of a specific customer organization.

DoD Private Cloud/CSO: a DoD Community Cloud or CSO in which services are provided for the exclusive use of one or more DoD customer organizations; supporting multiple DoD tenants or DoD sponsored tenants in the same cloud.  The DoD maintains ultimate authority over the usage of the cloud services, and any non-DoD use of services must be authorized and sponsored through the DoD.  Resources providing the cloud services must be dedicated to DoD use and have physical separation from resources not dedicated to DoD use.

DoD Cloud Service Catalog[113]: The repository of all CSOs that have been awarded a DoD PA and have security packages available for DoD components to leverage.

DoD Component: A DoD Service or Agency including their sub-elements/commands/organizations.

DoD Off-Premises: A facility (building/container) or IT infrastructure is Off-Premises if it is NOT physically or virtually on DoD owned or controlled property (i.e., On-Premises physically or virtually).  See section 5.2.1.1, DoD Off-Premises Vs On-Premises Vs Virtually On-Premises for additional details.

DoD On-Premises: A facility (building/container) or IT infrastructure is On-Premises if it is physically on DoD owned or controlled property. That is, it is within the protected perimeter (walls or “fence line”) of a DoD installation (i.e., Base, Camp, Post, or Station (B/C/P/S) or leased commercial space) which is under the direct control of DoD personnel and DoD security policies. See section 5.2.1.1, DoD Off-Premises Vs On-Premises Vs Virtually On-Premises for details.

DoD Virtually On-Premises: A IT infrastructure located in a physically off-premises location such as a Federal Government or commercial data center (i.e., facilities under the direct control of  non-DoD personnel using non-DoD security policies) may be considered Virtually On-Premises under specific conditions.  These conditions apply certain physical security controls and extend the DISN accreditation boundary.  In essence this construct virtually extends the DoD protected perimeter or “fence line” around the infrastructure.  See section 5.2.1.1, DoD Off-Premises Vs On-Premises Vs Virtually On-Premises for details and requirements.

Mission Owner (MO): Mission Owners are entities such as IT system/application owner/operators or program managers within the DoD Components/Agencies responsible for instantiating and operating one or more information systems and applications who may leverage a CSP’s CSO in fulfilment of their IT missions.  In this context the Mission Owner is not the DoD Enterprise or DoD Component/Agency Enterprise even though these entities may control and have oversite for Component/Agency level policies and Mission Owner’s acquisitions.  The Mission Owner is also responsible to the Information Owner and the information system’s AO.  The information owner, in addition to owning the information and all associated derivatives, is responsible for ensuring the data that is migrated to the cloud is at the appropriate security level having the approval of their Risk Management Executive/AO.

B.2. General Terminology

Authenticity: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator.”

Availability: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “The property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity.”

Classified Information: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “Information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 13526 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.”

C/CE (Control/Control Enhancement): National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Security and Privacy controls and their enhancements which are selected and assembled in various baselines and overlays.

CSM: Cloud Security Model.  The CSM is the document that preceded the CC SRG and has since been deprecated.

CSSP: Cybersecurity Service Provider. Defined in DoDI 8530.01, Cybersecurity Activities Support to DoD Information Network Operations.

Dedicated infrastructure: Refers to the cloud service infrastructure being dedicated to serving a single customer organization or a specific group of customer organizations (e.g., a specific community).

Confidentiality: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “The property that information is not disclosed to system entities (users, processes, devices) unless they have been authorized to access the information.”

Cyber incident:  Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information residing therein.  See incident. 

Incident:  An assessed occurrence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system; or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits; or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies. 

Integrity: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “The property whereby an entity has not been modified in an unauthorized manner.”

JAB: Joint Authorization Board.  The primary governance and decision-making body for the FedRAMP program.

Mission Owner: A DoD Cloud Consumer.  As defined in NIST SP 500-292, “A cloud consumer represents a person or organization that maintains a business relationship with, and uses the service from a cloud provider.”

Non-Repudiation: As defined in CNSSI-4009, “Assurance that the sender of information is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can later deny having processed the information.”

Provisional Authorization (PA):  A pre-acquisition type of Risk Management Framework Information System Authorization used by DoD and FedRAMP to pre-qualify Commercial CSOs to host Federal Government and/or DoD information and information systems. PAs are to be used by Federal and DoD Cloud Mission Owners during source selection and subsequent system authorization under RMF.    See Section 2.6 - DoD Provisional Authorization.

RMF: Risk Management Framework. As described in NIST SP 800-37, RMF is a six step risk based approach to information system security, the purpose of which is compliance with various public laws including FISMA. The RMF replaces the traditional certification and accreditation C&A processes.

Restoration: The return of something to a former, original, normal, or unimpaired condition.

SCA: Security Control Assessor.  As defined in NIST SP 800-37, “The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a security control assessment.”

Spillage or Data Spill: an unauthorized transfer of classified information or Controlled Unclassified Information to an information system that is not accredited for the applicable security level of the data or information.



 

Appendix C - Roles and Responsibilities


Table 7 provides a summary of the major roles and responsibilities in implementation of the CC SRG.

Table 7 - Roles and Responsibilities

Role

Responsibility

DISA

  • Provide security requirements guidelines (SRGs) and Security Technical Implementation Guidance (STIGs) for DoD cloud computing
  • Assess CSP’s Service Offerings and 3PAO results for consideration in awarding a DoD Provisional Authorization
  • Issue DoD Provisional Authorizations
  • Develop and maintain a DoD Boundary Cloud Access Point (BCAP).
  • Provide Boundary Cyberspace Defense (BCD) capabilities.
  • Provide technical support for the DoD CIO's role on the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board
  • Provide a catalog of DoD cloud services
  • Maintain a registry of DoD Components using commercial cloud services.
  • Support the DoDIN Waiver Process
  • Receives CSP's continuous monitoring products and passes them to the appropriate entities within DoD
  • Serve as the DoD CSSP certifier

Cloud Service Provider (CSP)

  • Commercial vendor or Federal organization offering or providing cloud services (Includes DoD CSPs)
  • Provides Cloud Service Offerings for mission use
  • Provides cybersecurity services for their infrastructure and service offerings

Cloud Access Point (CAP)

  • Provided by DISA or other DoD Component
  • Protect DoD missions from vulnerabilities or risk that may affect operations in a CSP environment
  • Provide perimeter defenses and sensing for applications hosted in the commercial cloud service

DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)

  • Official approving authority for all CAPs

FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB)

  • Reviews CSP security assessment packages under the FedRAMP program
  • Grants FedRAMP Provisional Authorizations
  • Ensures that FedRAMP Provisional Authorizations are reviewed and updated regularly
  • Approves accreditation criteria for third party assessment organizations (3PAOs)

Third Party Assessment Organizations (3PAO)

  • Accredited by American Association for Laboratory Accreditation (A2LA) and with final approval by FedRAMP PMO
  • Contracted by CSP
  • Independently performs security assessments of a CSP cloud offering and creates security assessment package artifacts in accordance with FedRAMP requirements
  • May perform continuous monitoring of CSP systems
  • May independently assess a CSP’s compliance to DoD FedRAMP+ security controls and other requirements

DISA Cloud SCA

  • May independently assess a CSP’s compliance to DoD FedRAMP+ security controls and other requirements if not performed by a 3PAO
  • May assess a CSP’s compliance to FedRAMP security controls for DoD CSPs if not done by another DoD SCA
  • May assess a CSP’s compliance to FedRAMP security controls for Commercial CSPs undergoing a DoD assessment outside of FedRAMP if not done by another DoD SCA
  • Advises the DISA AO regarding PA award through the assessment of CSP SARs and the development of a Certification Recommendation
  • Serves as FedRAMP Technical Advisor to the DoD CIO in his/her role as JAB tri-chair

DoD Cloud SCA (Other than  DISA)

  • May assess a CSP’s compliance to FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ security controls for DoD or non-DoD CSPs undergoing a DoD assessment outside of FedRAMP (if not done by DISA) toward awarding an DoD PA and component Agency ATO. 

DISA Authorizing Official (AO)

  • Official approving PA for a CSP’s Service Offerings for DoD use

 

  •  

DoD Component Authorizing Official (AO)

  • Official approving ATOs for Mission Owner’s systems/applications
  • Reviews PA documentation to understand residual risk

Mission Owner

(CSP’s DoD Cloud Customer

DoD Cloud Consumer)

  • DoD entity that acquires cloud services in support of its mission
  • Reviews DoD PA documentation to understand residual risk
  • Performs assessment to issue ATO for their mission systems/applications
  • Ensures Mission Cyberspace Defense (MCD) Service Provider is identified and funded
  • Performs end-point Cyberspace Defense for their mission systems/applications
  • Ensures CSP requirements for Cyberspace Defense and other SRG requirements are included in any cloud contracts
  • Registers ports and protocols with the PPSM Office

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)

  • Receives incident reports from CSP as mandated by FedRAMP. 
  • Responsible for coordination across non-DoD agencies

Computer Network Defense Service Provider (CDSP)

  • Provides Cyber Defense services and Command and Control (C2) direction addressing the protection of the network, detection of threats, and response to incidents. 

Cybersecurity Service Provider (CSSP)

  • Provides cybersecurity services for the protection of the network, detection of threats, and response to incidents. 

Organizations Performing Boundary Cyberspace Defense (BCD) Actions

  • DoD CSSPs
  • Monitor and defend the connections to/from off-premises CSPs at the Boundary Cloud Access Point (BCAP)
  • Provide cross-CSP analysis capabilities or entities
  • Communicate with organizations performing DCD, BCDs, and MCDs Actions.
  • Provide MCDs timely access to BCD-collected indications and warnings relevant to MCD subscribers.

Organizations Performing Mission Cyberspace Defense (MCD) Actions

  • DoD CSSP
  • Provide Cyberspace Defense services to specific Mission Owner’s systems/applications and virtual networks
  • Serve as the DoD Cyberspace Defense point of contact for the Mission Owner
  • Communicate with organizations performing DCD, BCDs, and MCDs Actions, and Mission Owners.

 

Appendix D - CSP Assessment Parameter Values for PA


Table 8 provides a listing of only the FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CEs that require parameter values.  These C/CEs and associated parameter values are published here as a benchmark for CSPs and will be used for CSP assessment toward receiving a PAIt is not a complete list of all FedRAMP moderate and FedRAMP+ C/CEs that a CSP must meet.  The full C/CEs text is included to provide full context for the selection or value being addressed.

Many parameter values are not defined by DoD or FedRAMP since they may change depending on the CSP organization and/or CSO.  This makes it impossible to define all parameter values for all cases in this SRG. For parameter values not defined in Table 8 as indicated by the lack of a reference in the right hand column to the parameter in the left hand column, the CSP must define the parameter values in the Security Plan along with the details on how the C/CE is met for the DoD to assess and the DISA AO to accept/approve for the DoD PA.

NOTE: For some C/CEs none of the required parameter selections/values were defined by DoD or FedRAMP.  As such the right column cell in the table is blank.  The associated parameter values are treated as noted above with the CSP defining the value for assessment.

In many cases, DoD and FedRAMP defined different values for control parameters.  In such cases, and as displayed, the more stringent parameter values will be required for a DoD PA at Impact Levels 4-6.  Impact Level 2 CSOs will be assessed using the FedRAMP values.  Controls with different parameter values for Impact Level 2 as compared to Impact Levels 4-6 are noted in the table.  The CSP may offer alternate values or methods of meeting a control for consideration.   

NOTE: For Level 6, the application of the CNSSI 1253 Classified Information Overlay will modify some of the values presented in the tables below. Overlay values take precidence.

Mission Owners must use, define, and/or tailor the parameter values for the applications they instantiate in IaaS/PaaS cloud services in accordance with the values defined by the DoD RMF TAG. DoD/FedRAMP predefined and CSP defined parameter values assessed for DoD PA award are inherited by the Mission Owners’ systems/applications.  If the Mission Owner needs alternate values for these inherited values, they must be negotiated with the CSP and reflect the change in their SLA/contract.

NOTE: DoD Components / Mission Owners may tailor this set of values by altering existing or defining additional selections/values when publishing RFPs and executing contracts.  Mission owners must either accept the values documented in the CSP’s Security Plan and accepted by the DISA AO as reflected in the PA or negotiate for alrernate values and include them in their contract/SLA. 

Table 9 provides a listing of only the C/CEs listed in Table 3 - Security Controls/Enhancements to be addressed in the Contract/SLA that require parameter values.  These are provided to inform Mission Owners and CSPs of the DoD values associated with the parameters.  For parameter values not defined in Table 9 as indicated by the lack of a reference in the right hand column to the parameter in the left hand column, the Mission Owner must assign the value in their contract/SLA when selecting the C/CE, accept a CSP assigned value, or negotiate the value with the CSP.

NOTICE: These tables do not include C/CE added by the FedRAMPHigh Baseline.

Table 8 – FedRAMP M / FedRMP+ Control / Enhancement Parameter Values for PA Assessment

Control/Enhancement text

Value

AC-1; ACCESS CONTROL; Access Control Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
         [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
         coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and associated access controls; and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Access control policy
         [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Access control procedures
         [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

AC-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
b.1 at least every 3 years

All Impact Levels:
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-2; ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management:

The organization:
a.  Identifies and selects the following types of information system accounts to support organizational missions/business functions:
         [Assignment: organization-defined information system account
           types]
;
b.  Assigns account managers for information system accounts;
c.  Establishes conditions for group and role membership;
d.  Specifies authorized users of the information system, group and role membership, and access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes (as required) for each account;
e.  Requires approvals by
      [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
for requests to create information system accounts;
f.  Creates, enables, modifies, disables, and removes information system accounts in accordance with
         [Assignment: organization-defined procedures or conditions];
g. Monitors the use of, information system accounts;
h.  Notifies account managers:
     1.  When accounts are no longer required;
     2.  When users are terminated or transferred; and
     3.  When individual information system usage or need-to-know changes;
i.  Authorizes access to the information system based on:
     1.  A valid access authorization;
     2.  Intended system usage; and
     3.  Other attributes as required by the organization or associated missions/business functions;
j.  Reviews accounts for compliance with account management requirements
         [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
k.  Establishes a process for reissuing shared/group account credentials (if deployed) when individuals are removed from the group.

References: None.

AC-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
e.  ISSM or ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
j at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-2 (2); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Removal Of Temporary Emergency Accounts

The information system automatically
         [Selection:
            - removes;
            - disables

          ]

temporary and emergency accounts after
         [Assignment: organization-defined time period for each type of
          account]
.

References: None.

AC-2 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:
For temporary user accounts: 72 hours  

For emergency admin accounts: never (see supplemental recommendation)

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


Impact Level 2:
[No more than 30 days for temporary and emergency account types]

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-2 (3); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Disable Inactive Accounts

The information system automatically disables inactive accounts after
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

AC-2 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
35 days

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
90 days for user accounts

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: The service provider defines the time period for non-user accounts (e.g., accounts associated with devices).  The time periods are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official.

AC-2 (4); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Automated Audit Actions

The information system automatically audits account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions, and notifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

AC-2 (4)
Impact Levels 4-6:

System administrator and ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-2 (5); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Inactivity Logout

The organization requires that users log out when
          [Assignment: organization-defined time-period of expected
            inactivity or description of when to log out].


References: None.

AC-2 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
At the end of the users standard work period unless otherwise defined in formal organizational policy.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-2 (7); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Role-Based Schemes

The organization:
(a) Establishes and administers privileged user accounts in accordance with a role-based access scheme that organizes allowed information system access and privileges into roles;
(b) Monitors privileged role assignments; and
(c) Takes
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions]
when privileged role assignments are no longer appropriate.

References: None.

AC-2 (7)

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  Disables (or revokes) privileged user account

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-2 (9); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Restrictions On Use Of Shared Groups / Accounts

The organization only permits the use of shared/group accounts that meet
          [Assignment: organization-defined conditions for establishing
            shared/group accounts].


References: None.

AC-2 (9)

All Impact Levels:

In support of auditing and accountability, shared/group accounts are not permitted unless the requirement to uniquely attribute user activity to the account is implemented; exceptions may be approved on a case-by-case basis. Personal accounts will not be shared.


Source: DoD best practice, SRGs and STIGs, CNSSI 1253 Privacy Overlay.
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Required if shared/group accounts are deployed

AC-2 (12); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Account Monitoring /Atypical Usage

The organization:
(a) Monitors information system accounts for
          [Assignment: organization-defined atypical use];
and
(b) Reports atypical usage of information system accounts to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

AC-2 (12)

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  at a minimum, the ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
AC-2 (12)(a) and AC-2 (12)(b) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.

AC-4; ACCESS CONTROL; Information Flow Enforcement:

The information system enforces approved authorizations for controlling the flow of information within the system and between interconnected systems based on
          [Assignment: organization-defined information flow control
            policies]
.

References: Web: ucdmo.gov

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-4 (21); ACCESS CONTROL; Information Flow Enforcement - Enhancement:
Physical / Logical Separation Of Information Flows

The information system separates information flows logically or physically using
         [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms and/or
            techniques]

to accomplish
          [Assignment: organization-defined required separations by
            types of information]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-5; ACCESS CONTROL; Separation Of Duties:

The organization:
a.  Separates
          [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];
b.  Documents separation of duties of individuals; and
c.  Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-6 (1); ACCESS CONTROL; Least Privilege - Enhancement:
Authorize Access To Security Functions

The organization explicitly authorizes access to
          [Assignment: organization-defined security functions
            (deployed in hardware, software, and firmware) and
            security-relevant information]
.

References: None.

AC-6 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
all functions not publicly accessible and all security-relevant information not publicly available

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-6 (2); ACCESS CONTROL; Least Privilege - Enhancement:
Non-Privileged Access For Non-security Functions

The organization requires that users of information system accounts, or roles, with access to
          [Assignment: organization-defined security functions or
            security-relevant information]
,
use non-privileged accounts, or roles, when accessing non-security functions.

References: None.

AC-6 (2)
All Impact Levels:

all security functions

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
AC-6 (2).  Guidance:  Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.                          

AC-6 (5); ACCESS CONTROL; Least Privilege - Enhancement:
Privileged Accounts

The organization restricts privileged accounts on the information system to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-6 (7); ACCESS CONTROL; Least Privilege - Enhancement:
Review Of User Privileges

The organization:
(a) Reviews
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
the privileges assigned to
          [Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users]
to validate the need for such privileges; and
(b) Reassigns or removes privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission/business needs.

References: None.

AC-6 (7)

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at a minimum, annually

a.  all users

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-6 (8); ACCESS CONTROL; Least Privilege - Enhancement:
Privilege Levels For Code Execution

The information system prevents
          [Assignment: organization-defined software]
from executing at higher privilege levels than users executing the software.

References: None.

AC-6 (8)

Impact Levels 4-6:
any software except software explicitly documented

Source:
DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-7; ACCESS CONTROL; Unsuccessful Login Attempts:

The information system:
a.  Enforces a limit of
          [Assignment: organization-defined number] 
consecutive invalid login attempts by a user during a
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period];
and
b.  Automatically
          [Selection:
            - locks the account/node for an

                 
[Assignment: organization-defined time period];
            - locks the account/node until released by an administrator;
            - delays next login prompt according to

                   [Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm]

          ]
when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

References: None.

AC-7

Impact Level 2:
AC-7a [not more than three]
 [fifteen minutes]

AC-7b [locks the account/node for thirty minutes]

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

Impact Levels 4-6:
a1.  Three  
a2.  15 minutes  
b1.  locks the account/node  
b2.  Until released by an administrator  
b3.  Minimum of 5 seconds

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

AC-8; ACCESS CONTROL; System Use Notification:

The information system:
a.  Displays to users
          [Assignment: organization-defined system use notification
            message or banner]

before granting access to the system that provides privacy and security notices consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance and states that:
     1.  Users are accessing a U.S.  Government information system;
     2.  Information system usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit;
     3.  Unauthorized use of the information system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties; and
     4.  Use of the information system indicates consent to monitoring and recording;   
b.  Retains the notification message or banner on the screen until users acknowledge the usage conditions and take explicit actions to log on to or further access the information system; and
c.  For publicly accessible systems:
     1.  Displays system use information
          [Assignment: organization-defined conditions],
before
        granting further access;
     2.  Displays references, if any, to monitoring, recording, or auditing that are consistent with privacy
         accommodations for such systems that generally prohibit those activities; and
     3.  Includes a description of the authorized uses of the system.

References: None.

AC-8

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  The CSO must have a customer configurable capability to support a logon banner having a minimum of 1300 characters that is displayed and acknowledged before any logon prompt offered to privileged and non-privileged customer users.   
c.  See a.

Mission Owner Guidance: Configure the CSO provided customer logon banner capability and any Mission Owner provided logon capability to mission applications, virtual machines, databases, etc. IAW DoDI 8500.01 Encl. 3, para 9.a.(1)(d) for all privileged and non-privileged customer users that must logon.
Source: DoD RMF TAG adjusted for Cloud
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels :
See Additional Requirements and Guidance.

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control.  The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official (AO).
Requirement: The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check.  The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the AO.
Guidance: If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
Requirement: If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider.  The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the AO.

AC-10; ACCESS CONTROL; Concurrent Session Control:

The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for each
          [Assignment: organization-defined account and/or account
            type]

to
          [Assignment: organization-defined number].

References: None.

AC-10

Impact Levels 4-6:
all account types and/or accounts

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
 three (3) sessions for privileged access and two (2) sessions for non-privileged access

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-11; ACCESS CONTROL; Session Lock:

The information system:
a.  Prevents further access to the system by initiating a session lock after
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of inactivity or upon receiving a request from a user; and
b.  Retains the session lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.

References: OMB Memorandum 06-16.

AC-11

All Impact Levels:
a.  15 minutes

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

 

AC-12; ACCESS CONTROL; Session Termination:

The information system automatically terminates a user session after
          [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events
            requiring session disconnect]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-14; ACCESS CONTROL; Permitted Actions Without Identification Or Authentication:

The organization:
a.  Identifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined user actions]
that can be performed on the information system without identification or authentication consistent with organizational missions/business functions; and    
b.  Documents and provides supporting rationale in the security plan for the information system, user actions not requiring identification or authentication.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-17 (3); ACCESS CONTROL; Remote Access - Enhancement:
Managed Access Control Points

The information system routes all remote accesses through
          [Assignment: organization-defined number]
managed network access control points.

References: None.

AC-17 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Level 4/5: Off-Premises CSP infrastructure must connect to DoD customers via one or more external DoDIN Cloud Access Points (CAPs). 

Level 4/5: On-Premises Commercial CSP infrastructure must connect to DoD customers via one or more Internal DoDIN Cloud Access Points (CAPs).Not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP’s infrastructure or service offerings.  The CSP defines the value and the DISA AO approves and/or accepts

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-17 (4); ACCESS CONTROL; Remote Access - Enhancement:
Privileged Commands / Access

The organization:
(a) Authorizes the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access only for
          [Assignment: organization-defined needs];
and
(b) Documents the rationale for such access in the security plan for the information system.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-17 (9); ACCESS CONTROL; Remote Access - Enhancement:
Disconnect / Disable Access

The organization provides the capability to expeditiously disconnect or disable remote access to the information system within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

AC-17 (9)

Impact Levels 4-6:
immediately

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
no greater than 15 minutes

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-19 (5); ACCESS CONTROL; Access Control For Mobile Devices - Enhancement:
Full Device / Container- Based Encryption

The organization employs
          [Selection:
            - full-device encryption;
            - container encryption

          ]

to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on
          [Assignment: organization-defined mobile devices].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-21; ACCESS CONTROL; User-Based Collaboration And Information Sharing RENAMED:  Information Sharing:

The organization:
a.  Facilitates information sharing by enabling authorized users to determine whether access authorizations assigned to the sharing partner match the access restrictions on the information for
          [Assignment: organization-defined information sharing
            circumstances where user discretion is required]
;
and
b.  Employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms
            or manual processes]

to assist users in making information sharing/collaboration decisions.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-22; ACCESS CONTROL; Publicly Accessible Content:

The organization:
a.  Designates individuals authorized to post information onto a publicly accessible information system;
b.  Trains authorized individuals to ensure that publicly accessible information does not contain nonpublic information;
c.  Reviews the proposed content of information prior to posting onto the publicly accessible information system to ensure that nonpublic information is not included; and
d.  Reviews the content on the publicly accessible information system for nonpublic information
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
and removes such information, if discovered.

References: None.

AC-22

Impact Levels 4-6:
d.  Every 90 days or as new information is posted

Source:
DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
d.  at least quarterly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AC-23; ACCESS CONTROL; Data Mining Protection:

The organization employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined data mining prevention
            and detection techniques]

for
          [Assignment: organization-defined data storage objects]
to adequately detect and protect against data mining.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AT-1; AWARENESS AND TRAINING ; Security Awareness And Training Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
        commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and training policy and associated
         security awareness and training controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Security awareness and training policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Security awareness and training procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-16, 800-50, 800-100.

AT-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

Source:
DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

 

All Impact Levels:

b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AT-2; AWARENESS AND TRAINING; Security Awareness
 RENAMED: Security Awareness Training:

The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors):
a.  As part of initial training for new users;
b.  When required by information system changes; and
c.  [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
thereafter.

References: C.F.R.  Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R 930.301); NIST Special Publication 800-50.

AT-2

All Impact Levels:
c.  annually

Source:
DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

 

AT-3; AWARENESS AND TRAINING ; Security Training RENAMED: Role-based Security Training:

The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities:
a.  Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned duties;
b.  When required by information system changes; and
c.  [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
thereafter.

References: C.F.R.  Part 5 Subpart C (5 C.F.R 930.301); NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.

AT-3

All Impact Levels:
c.  annually

Source:
DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

 

AT-3 (2); AWARENESS AND TRAINING ; Security Training RENAMED: Role-based Security Training - Enhancement:
Physical Security Controls

The organization provides
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
with initial and
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
training in the employment and operation of physical security controls.

References: None.

AT-3 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:

all personnel with the assigned role of routine physical access to the space housing the infrastructure supporting the CSO and/or media containing customer’s information


Annual

Source: DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial CSPs
-------------------

AT-3 (4); AWARENESS AND TRAINING; Role-based Security Training - Enhancement:
Suspicious Communications And Anomalous System Behavior

The organization provides training to its personnel on
          [Assignment: organization-defined indicators of malicious
            code]

to recognize suspicious communications and anomalous behavior in organizational information systems.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AT-4; AWARENESS AND TRAINING ; Security Training Records:

The organization:  
a.  Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities including basic security awareness training and specific information system security training; and
b.  Retains individual training records for
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

AT-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  at least 5 years or 5 years after completion of a specific training program

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

Impact Level 2:

At least one year

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-1; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit And Accountability Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:  
     1.  An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and 
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit
         and accountability controls;
and 
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Audit and accountability policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Audit and accountability procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

AU-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate
 
b.  1.  Annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


Impact Level 2:
b.1 at least every 3 years

Source: FedRAMP v2

 

All Impact Levels:
b.2 at least annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG  and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-2; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Auditable Events:

The organization:
a.  Determines that the information system is capable of auditing the following events:
          [Assignment: organization-defined auditable events];
b.  Coordinates the security audit function with other organizational entities requiring audit-related information to enhance mutual support and to help guide the selection of auditable events;
c.  Provides a rationale for why the auditable events are deemed to be adequate to support after-the-fact investigations of security incidents; and
d.  Determines that the following events are to be audited within the information system:
          [Assignment: organization-defined audited events (the subset
            of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.) along with the
            frequency of (or situation requiring) auditing for each
            identified event]
.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-92; Web: CSRC.NIST.GOV/PCIG/CIG.HTML, IDMANAGEMENT.GOV

AU-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
 a.  Successful and unsuccessful attempts to access, modify, or delete privileges, security objects, security levels, or categories of information (e.g. classification levels).  Successful and unsuccessful logon attempts, Privileged activities or other system level access, Starting and ending time for user access to the system, Concurrent logons from different workstations, Successful and unsuccessful accesses to objects, All program initiations, All direct access to the information system.  All account creations, modifications, disabling, and terminations.  All kernel module load, unload, and restart. 
 
d.  all auditable events defined in AU-2 (a) per occurrence.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

Impact Level 2:
a.  Successful and unsuccessful account logon events, account management events, object access, policy change, privilege functions, process tracking, and system events.  For Web applications: all administrator activity, authentication checks, authorization checks, data deletions, data access, data changes, and permission changes;
 

d.  organization-defined subset of the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.  to be audited continually for each identified event.

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-2 (3); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Auditable Events - Enhancement:
Reviews And Updates

The organization reviews and updates the audited events
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

AU-2 (3)

All Impact Levels:
Annually and based on situational awareness of threats, vulnerabilities

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Guidance: Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the Authorizing Official. 

AU-3 (1); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Content Of Audit Records - Enhancement:
Additional Audit Information

The information system generates audit records containing the following
          [Assignment: organization-defined additional, more detailed
            information]
.

References: None.

AU-3 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
At a minimum, full-text recording of privileged commands or the individual identities of group account users.   

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
Impact Level 2:

session, connection, transaction, or activity duration; for client-server transactions, the number of bytes received and bytes sent; additional informational messages to diagnose or identify the event; characteristics that describe or identify the object or resource being acted upon

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
AU-3 (1).  Requirement: The service provider defines audit record types.  The audit record types are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official.
Guidance: For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry. 

AU-4; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Storage Capacity:

The organization allocates audit record storage capacity in accordance with
          [Assignment: organization-defined audit record storage
            requirements]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AU-4 (1); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Storage Capacity - Enhancement:
Transfer To Alternate Storage

The information system off-loads audit records
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
onto a different system or media than the system being audited.

References: None.

AU-4 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
At a minimum, real-time for interconnected systems and weekly for stand-alone systems

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AU-5; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Response To Audit Processing Failures:

The information system:
a.  Alerts
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
in the event of an audit processing failure; and
b.  Takes the following additional actions:
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken (e.g.,
            shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit records,
            stop generating audit records)]
.

References: None.

AU-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  At a minimum, the SCA and ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

All Impact Levels :
b.  low-impact: overwrite oldest audit records; moderate-impact: shut down

Sourc: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-6; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Review, Analysis, And Reporting:

The organization:
a.  Reviews and analyzes information system audit records
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
for indications of
          [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or unusual
            activity]
;
and
b.  Reports findings to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

AU-6

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  every seven days or more frequently if required by an alarm event or anomaly;

b.  at a minimum, the ISSO and ISSM

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

Impact Level 2:
a.  at least weekly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-7 (1); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Reduction And Report Generation - Enhancement:
Automatic Processing

The information system provides the capability to process audit records for events of interest based on
          [Assignment: organization-defined audit fields within audit
            records]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AU-8; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Time Stamps:

The information system:
a.  Uses internal system clocks to generate time stamps for audit records; and
b.  Records time stamps for audit records that can be mapped to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) or Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and meets
          [Assignment: organization-defined granularity of time
            measurement]
.

References: None.

AU-8

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  one second

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AU-8 (1); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Protection Of Audit Information - Enhancement:
Synchronization With Authoritative Time Source

The information system:
a.  Compares the internal information system clocks
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
with
          [Assignment: organization-defined authoritative time source]
and;
b.  Synchronizes the internal system clocks to the authoritative time source when the time difference is greater than
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

AU-8 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  an authoritative time server  which is synchronized with redundant United States Naval Observatory (USNO) time servers as designated for the appropriate DoD network (NIPRNet / SIPRNet) and/or the Global Positioning System (GPS); 
b.  Greater than the organizationally defined granularity in AU-8

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
All Impact Levels:
a.  At least hourly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
AU-8 (1).  Requirement: The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service.  The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.
Requirement: The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.
Guidance: Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.

AU-9 (2); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Protection Of Audit Information - Enhancement:
Audit Backup On Separate Physical Systems / Components

The information system backs up audit records
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
onto a physically different system or system component than the system or component being audited.

References: None.

AU-9 (2)

All Impact Levels:
at least weekly

Source: DoD RMF TAG&  FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-9 (4); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Protection Of Audit Information - Enhancement:
Access By Subset Of Privileged Users

The organization authorizes access to management of audit functionality to only
          [Assignment: organization-defined subset of privileged users].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AU-11; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Record Retention:

The organization retains audit records for
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent
            with records retention policy]

to provide support for after-the-fact investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory and organizational information retention requirements.

References: None.

AU-11

Impact Levels 4-6:
5 years for SAMI; otherwise for at least 1 year

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
at least ninety days

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
AU-11.  Requirement: The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.  NARA General Records Schedules http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/grs.html

AU-12; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Generation:

The information system:
a.  Provides audit record generation capability for the auditable events defined in AU-2 a.  at
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components];

b.  Allows
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
to select which auditable events are to be audited by specific components of the information system; and
c.  Generates audit records for the events defined in AU-2 d.  with the content defined in AU-3.

References: None.

AU-12

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all information system and network components

b.  ISSM or individuals appointed by the ISSM

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  all information system and network components where audit capability is deployed/available

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

AU-12 (1); AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Audit Generation - Enhancement:
System-Wide / Time-Correlated Audit Trail

The information system compiles audit records from
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components]

into a system-wide (logical or physical) audit trail that is time-correlated to within
          [Assignment: organization-defined level of tolerance for
            relationship between time stamps of individual records
            in the audit trail]
.

References: None.

AU-12 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:

The time tracking tolerance defined in AU-8

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CA-1; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Assessment And Authorization Policies And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
         management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and authorization policy and
         associated security assessment and authorization controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Security assessment and authorization policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Security assessment and authorization procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-37, 800-53A, 800-100.

CA-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
 a.  all personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CA-2; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Assessments:

The organization:
a.  Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including:
     1.  Security controls and control enhancements under assessment;
     2.  Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness; and
     3.  Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities;
b.  Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of operation
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements;
c.  Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment; and 
d.  Provides the results of the security control assessment to
          [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles].

References: Executive Order 12587; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-37, 800-39,  800-53A, 800-115, 800-137

CA-2
All Impact Levels:
b.  at least annually

Source:  FedRAMP v2
-------------------


d.  at a minimum, the CSP’s ISSO and ISSM, FedRAMP PMO (as applicable), the DISA A&A/SCA team, and the customer’s MCD

Source: FedRAMP v2, DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial and DoD private on-premises CSP/CSOs
-------------------
 

CA-2 (1); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Assessments - Enhancement:
Independent Assessors

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with
          [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence]
to conduct security control assessments.

References: None.

CA-2 (1)

All Impact Levels:
Added to NIST Baseline for "Low" FedRAMP baseline.

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
For JAB Authorization, must be an accredited 3PAO

CA-2 (2); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Assessments - Enhancement:
Specialized Assessments

The organization includes as part of security control assessments,
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency],
          [Selection:
             - announced;
             - unannounced

          ]
,
          [Selection (one or more):
             - in-depth monitoring;
             - vulnerability scanning;
             - malicious user testing;
             - insider threat assessment;
             - performance/load testing;

             - [Assignment: organization-defined other forms of security

                 assessment]
          ].

References: None.

CA-2 (2)

All Impact Levels:
at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'

CA-2 (3); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Assessments - Enhancement:
External Organizations

The organization accepts the results of an assessment of
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system]
performed by
          [Assignment: organization-defined external organization]
when the assessment meets
          [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

References: None.

CA-2 (3)

All Impact Levels:
CSP and CSO infrastructure

any FedRAMP Accredited 3PAO

the conditions of a PA in the FedRAMP Repository

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CA-3; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Information System Connections RENAMED: System Interconnections:

The organization:  
a.  Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements;  
b.  Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated; and
c.  Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-47.

CA-3

All Impact Levels:
c.  at least annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  3 Years / Annually and on input from FedRAMP

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CA-3 (1); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Information System Connections RENAMED: System Interconnections - Enhancement:
Unclassified National Security System Connections

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an
          [Assignment: organization-defined unclassified, national
            security system]
to an external network without the use of
          [Assignment: organization-defined boundary protection
            device]
.

References: None.

CA-3 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
all unclassified NSS

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CA-3 (3); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; System Interconnections - Enhancement:
Unclassified Non-National Security System Connections

The organization prohibits the direct connection of an
          [Assignment: organization-defined unclassified, non-national
            security system]

to an external network without the use of
          [Assignment; organization-defined boundary protection
            device]
.

References: None.

CA-3 (3)

All Impact Levels:
Boundary Protections which meet the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) requirements

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CA-3(3) Guidance: Refer to Appendix H – Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document. https://www.fedramp.gov/files/2015/04/TIC_Ref_Arch_v2-0_2013.pdf

CA-3 (5); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; System Interconnections - Enhancement:
Restrictions On External System Connections

The organization employs
          [Selection:
            - allow-all,
            - deny-by-exception;
            - deny-all,
            - permit-by-exception

          ]
policy for allowing
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems] to connect to external information systems.

References: None.

CA-3 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
deny-all, permit by exception

any systems requiring external connectivity

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing

CA-5; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Plan Of Action And Milestones:

The organization: 
a.  Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the organization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system; and
b.  Updates existing plan of action and milestones
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact analyses, and continuous monitoring activities.

References: OMB Memorandum 02-01; NIST Special Publication 800-37.

CA-5

All Impact Levels:

b.  at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CA-5  Guidance: Requirement: POA&Ms  must be provided at least monthly.

CA-6; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Security Authorization:

The organization:
a.  Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the information system;
b.  Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing before commencing operations; and
c.  Updates the security authorization
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: OMB Circular A-130; OMB Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publication 800-37, 800-137.

CA-6

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  at least every three years, whenever there is a significant change to the system, or if there is a change to the environment in which the system operates.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  at least every three years or when a significant change occurs

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CA-6c.  Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.  The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture.  The types of changes are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official.

CA-7; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Continuous Monitoring:

The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a continuous monitoring program that includes:
a.  Establishment of
          [Assignment: organization-defined metrics]
to be monitored;
b.  Establishment of
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies]
for monitoring and
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies]
for assessments supporting such monitoring;
c.  Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;
d.  Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy;  
e.  Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by assessments and monitoring;
f.  Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related information; and
g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: OMG Memorandum 11-33; NIST Special Publications 800-37 800-39, 800-53A, 800-115, 800-137; US-CERT Technical Cyber Security Alerts; DoD Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts.

CA-7
All Impact Levels:
d.  To meet Federal and FedRAMP requirements

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Operating System Scans: at least monthly
Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly
All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually

CA-7 Guidance: CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates

 

NOTE: There is a discrepancy in the listing of ‘d’ in the parameter value, as ‘d’ does not have a parameter.  This is however how the parameter is defined in FedRAMP v2.

CA-7 (1); SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Continuous Monitoring - Enhancement:
Independent Assessment

The organization employs assessors or assessment teams with
          [Assignment: organization-defined level of independence]
to monitor the security controls in the information system on an ongoing basis.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

CA-8; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Penetration Testing:

The organization conducts penetration testing
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
on
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems or
            system components].


References: None.

CA-8

All Impact Levels:
at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CA-9; SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND AUTHORIZATION; Internal System Connections:

The organization:
a.  Authorizes internal connections of
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components or classes of components]

to the information system; and
b.  Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security requirements, and the nature of the information communicated.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

CM-1; BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Configuration Management Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope,  roles, responsibilities, management
         commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management policy and associated
         configuration management controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Configuration management policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Configuration management procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

CM-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all stakeholders in the configuration management process
b.1.  annually


Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
Impact Level 2:
b.1. at least every 3 years
 

All Impact Levels:

b.2. at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CM-2 (1); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Baseline Configuration - Enhancement:
Reviews And Updates

The organization reviews and updates the baseline configuration of the information system:
(a)    [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
(b) When required due to
          [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances];
and
(c) As an integral part of information system component installations and upgrades.

References: None.

CM-2 (1)

All Impact Levels:
a.  at least annually

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  baseline configuration changes or as events dictate such as changes due to USCYBERCOM tactical orders/ directives or cyber-attacks.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

Impact Level 2:
b.  to include when directed by Authorizing Official

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CM-2 (3); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Baseline Configuration - Enhancement:
Retention Of Previous Configurations

The organization retains
          [Assignment: organization-defined previous versions of
            baseline configurations of the information system]

to support rollback.

References: None.

CM-2 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
the previous approved baseline configuration of IS components for a minimum of 3 month

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CM-2 (7); CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT; Baseline Configuration - Enhancement:
Configure Systems, Components,  Or Devices For High-Risk Areas

The organization:                                                                              
a.  Issues
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems,
            system components, or devices]

with
          [Assignment: organization-defined configurations]
to individuals traveling to locations that the organization deems to be of significant risk; and 
b.  Applies
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
to the devices when the individuals return.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

CM-3; BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Configuration Change Control:

The organization:
a.  Determines the type of changes to the information system that are configuration controlled;
b.  Reviews proposed configuration-controlled changes to the information system and approves or disapproves such changes with explicit consideration for security impact analyses;
c.  Documents configuration change decisions associated with the information system;
d.  Implements approved configuration-controlled changes to the information system;
e.  Retains records of configuration-controlled changes to the information system for [Assignment: organization-defined time period];
f.  Audits and reviews activities associated with configuration-controlled changes to the information system; and
g. Coordinates and provides oversight for configuration change control activities through
          [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change
            control element (e.g., committee, board)]

that convenes
          [Selection (one or more):
            - [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
            - [Assignment: organization-defined configuration
                change conditions]
          ].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

CM-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
e.  The time period should be defined at the organization's CCB. 
g. a configuration control board;
g. at a frequency determined by the CCB;
g. configuration change conditions determined by the CCB.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page).  The means of communication are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official.

CM-3e Guidance:  In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.

CM-3 (4); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Configuration Change Control - Enhancement:
Security Representative

The organization requires an information security representative to be a member of the
          [Assignment: organization-defined configuration change
            control element].


References: None.

CM-3 (4)

Impact Levels 4-6:
configuration control board (CCB) (as defined in CM-3, CCI 1586)

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CM-3 (6); CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT; Configuration Change Control - Enhancement:
Cryptography Management

The organization ensures that cryptographic mechanisms used to provide
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
are under configuration management.

References: None.

CM-3 (6)

Impact Levels 4-6:
All security safeguards that rely on cryptography

Source: DoD RMF TAG & CNSSI 1253

CM-5 (3); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Access Restrictions For Change - Enhancement:
Signed Components

The information system prevents the installation of
          [Assignment: organization-defined critical software and
            firmware components]

without verification that the component has been digitally signed using a certificate that is recognized and approved by the organization.

References: None.

CM-5 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Any software or firmware components when the vendor provides digitally signed products

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Guidance: If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable,  alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.

CM-5 (5); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Access Restrictions For Change - Enhancement:
Limit Production / Operational Privileges

The organization:
(a) Limits privileges to change information system components and system-related information within a production or operational environment; and
(b) Reviews and reevaluates privileges
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

CM-5 (5)

All Impact Levels:
b.  at least quarterly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CM-6; BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Configuration Settings:

The organization:
a.  Establishes and documents configuration settings for information technology products employed within the information system using
          [Assignment: organization-defined security configuration
            checklists]

that reflect the most restrictive mode consistent with operational requirements;
b.  Implements the configuration settings;
c.  Identifies, documents, and approves any deviations from established configuration settings for
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components]

based on
          [Assignment: organization-defined operational requirements];
and                                                                     
d.  Monitors and controls changes to the configuration settings in accordance with organizational policies and procedures.

References: OMB Memoranda 07-11, 07-18, 08-22; NIST Special Publications 800-70, 800-128; Web: nvd.nist.gov; checklists.nist.gov; www.nsa.gov.

CM-6

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  DoD security configuration or implementation guidance (e.g. STIGs, SRGs, NSA configuration guides, CTOs, DTMs etc.).;
c.  All configurable information system components;

Source: DoD RMF TAG
NOTE: DISA will evaluate Commercial CSP equivalencies on a case by case basis. A example of such equivalency may be the use of CIS benchmarks.
-------------------

Impact Level 2:
a.  See CM-6(a) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CM-6a.  Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
CM-6a.  Requirement: The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
CM-6a.  Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc .

CM-6 (1); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Configuration Settings - Enhancement:
Automated Central Management / Application / Verification

The organization employs automated mechanisms to centrally manage, apply, and verify configuration settings for
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

CM-7; BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Least Functionality:

The organization:                                                                       
a.  Configures the information system to provide only essential capabilities; and                                                         
b.  Prohibits or restricts the use of the following functions, ports, protocols, and/or services:
          [Assignment: organization-defined prohibited or restricted
            functions, ports, protocols, and/or services]
.

References: DoD Instruction 8551.01

CM-7

Impact Levels 4-6:
IAW DoDI 8551.01

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB)

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
CM-7.  Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc.
(Partially derived from AC-17(8).)

CM-7 (1); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Least Functionality - Enhancement:
Periodic Review

The organization:                                                                          
a.  Reviews the information system
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to identify unnecessary and/or non-secure functions, ports, protocols, and services; and
b.  Disables
          [Assignment: organization-defined functions, ports, protocols,
            and services within the information system deemed to be
            unnecessary and/or non-secure]
.

References: None.

CM-7 (1)

All Impact Levels:
a.  at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  Non-secure functions, ports, protocols and services are defined in DoDI 8551.01.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

CM-7 (2); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Least Functionality - Enhancement:
Prevent Program Execution

The information system prevents program execution in accordance with
          [Selection (one or more):
            -
[Assignment: organization-defined policies regarding
                software program usage and restrictions]
;
            - rules authorizing the terms and conditions of software program usage]
.

References: None.

CM-7 (2)

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CM-7(2) Guidance:   This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e.  white listing).  This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run. 

CM-7 (5); CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT; Least Functionality - Enhancement:
Authorized Software / Whitelisting

The organization:                                                                               
a.  Identifies  
          [Assignment: organization-defined software programs
            authorized to execute on the information system]
;
 b.  Employs a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the information system; and
c.  Reviews and updates the list of authorized software programs  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

CM-7 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  Monthly

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


Impact Level 2:
 c.  at least Annually or when there is a change.

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CM-8; BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Information System Component Inventory:

The organization:                                                                             
a.  Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that:
    1.  Accurately reflects the current information system;
    2.  Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information system;
    3.  Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting;   and
    4.  Includes  
          [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed
            necessary to achieve effective information system
            component accountability]
; and
b.  Reviews and updates the information system component inventory  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-128.

CM-8

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  hardware inventory specifications (manufacturer, type, model, serial number, physical location), software license information, information system/component owner, and for a networked component/device, the machine name.;

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.  at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CM-8 Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.

CM-8 (3); BASELINE CONFIGURATION; Information System Component Inventory - Enhancement:
Automated Unauthorized Component Detection

The organization:
(a) Employs automated mechanisms [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to detect the presence of unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware components within the information system; and
(b) Takes the following actions when unauthorized components are detected:  
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - disables network access by such components; 
            - isolates the components; 
            - notifies
[Assignment: organization-defined personnel
                              or roles]
          ].

References: None.

CM-8 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
 a.  Continuously, using automated mechanisms with a maximum five-minute delay in detection.

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CM-10 (1); CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT; Software Usage Restrictions - Enhancement:
Open Source Software

The organization establishes the following restrictions on the use of open source software:  
          [Assignment: organization-defined restrictions].

References: None.

CM-10 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
IAW DoD Memorandum "Clarifying Guidance Regarding Open Source Software (OSS)" 16 Oct 2009 ( http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/FOSS/2009OSS.pdf).

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CM-11; CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT; User-Installed Software:

The organization:                                                                              
a.  Establishes 
          [Assignment: organization-defined policies]
governing the installation of software by users;                              
b.  Enforces software installation policies through 
          [Assignment: organization-defined methods];
and                        
c.  Monitors policy compliance at 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

CM-11

All Impact Levels:

c.  Continuously (via CM-7 (5))

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CP-1; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Contingency Planning Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
        commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy and associated
         contingency planning controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Contingency planning policy 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Contingency planning procedures  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-34, 800-100.

CP-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CP-2; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Contingency Plan:

The organization:
a.  Develops a contingency plan for the information system that:
     1.  Identifies essential missions and business functions and associated contingency requirements;
     2.  Provides recovery objectives, restoration priorities, and metrics;
     3.  Addresses contingency roles, responsibilities, assigned individuals with contact information;
     4.  Addresses maintaining essential missions and business functions despite an information system
         disruption, compromise, or failure;
     5.  Addresses eventual, full information system restoration without deterioration of the security safeguards
         originally planned and implemented; and
     6.  Is reviewed and approved by 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];
b.  Distributes copies of the contingency plan to  
          [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel
            (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements];

c.  Coordinates contingency planning activities with incident handling activities;
d.  Reviews the contingency plan for the information system  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
e.  Updates the contingency plan to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems encountered during contingency plan implementation, execution, or testing;
f.  Communicates contingency plan changes to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined key contingency personnel
            (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational
            elements]
;
and
g. Protects the contingency plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publication 800-34.

CP-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO

b.  all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan

f:  all stakeholders identified in the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
d.  at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.

CP-2 (3); CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Contingency Plan - Enhancement:
Resume Essential Missions / Business Functions

The organization plans for the resumption of essential missions and business functions within 
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of contingency plan activation.

References: None.

CP-2 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
1 hour (Availability High )
12 hours (Availability Moderate)
as defined in the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

CP-3; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Contingency Training:

The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:
a.  Within 
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of assuming a contingency role or responsibility;
b.  When required by information system changes; and
c.  [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
thereafter.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.

CP-3

All Impact Levels:
a.  10 days

c.  at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CP-4; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Contingency Plan Testing And Exercises
RENAMED: Contingency Plan Testing:

The organization:
a.  Tests the contingency plan for the information system 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
using  
          [Assignment: organization-defined tests]
to determine the effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan;
b.  Reviews the contingency plan test results; and
c.  Initiates corrective actions, if needed.

References: Federal Continuity Directive 1; FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-34, 800-84.

CP-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at least annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  at least annually for moderate impact systems; at least every three years for low impact systems] [functional exercises for moderate impact systems; classroom exercises/table top written tests for low impact systems

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
a.  Requirement: The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the Authorizing Official prior to initiating testing.

CP-7; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Alternate Processing Site:

The organization:
a.  Establishes an alternate processing site including necessary agreements to permit the transfer and resumption of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            operations]

for essential missions/business functions within  
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period consistent
            with recovery time and recovery point objectives]

when the primary processing capabilities are unavailable;
b.  Ensures that equipment and supplies required to transfer and resume operations are available at the alternate processing site or contracts are in place to support delivery to the site within the organization-defined time period for transfer/resumption; and
c.  Ensures that the alternate processing site provides information security safeguards equivalent to that of the primary site.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.

CP-7

Impact Levels 4-6:

a.  1 hour (Availability High ) 12 hours (Availability Moderate) as defined in the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

 

Impact Level 2:

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CP-7a.  Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.

CP-8; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Telecommunications Services:

The organization establishes alternate telecommunications services including necessary agreements to permit the resumption of  
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            operations]
 
for essential missions and business functions within  
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
when the primary telecommunications capabilities are unavailable at either the primary or alternate processing or storage sites.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34; National Communications Directive 3-10; Web: TSP.NCS.GOV.

CP-8

Impact Levels 4-6:

1 hour (Availability High )
12 hours (Availability Moderate) as defined in the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CP-8.  Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the business impact analysis.

CP-9; CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Information System Backup:

The organization:
a.  Conducts backups of user-level information contained in the information system  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with
            recovery time and recovery point objectives]
;
b.  Conducts backups of system-level information contained in the information system  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with
            recovery time and recovery point objectives]
;
c.  Conducts backups of information system documentation including security-related documentation 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency consistent with
            recovery time and recovery point objectives];

and
d.  Protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of backup information at the storage locations.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-34.

CP-9
Impact Levels 4-6:c.  when created or received, when updated, and as required by system baseline configuration changes in accordance with the contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


All Impact Levels:
a.  daily incremental; weekly full
b.  daily incremental; weekly full

 

Impact Level 2:
c.  daily incremental; weekly full

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
CP-9.  Requirement: The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control.
Requirement: The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
CP-9a.  Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
CP-9b.  Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
CP-9c.  Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.

CP-9 (1); CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Information System Backup - Enhancement:
Testing For Reliability / Integrity

The organization tests backup information 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to verify media reliability and information integrity.

References: None.

CP-9 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
at least monthly in accordance with contingency plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:

at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

CP-9 (3); CONTINGENCY PLANNING; Information System Backup - Enhancement:
Separate Storage For Critical Information

The organization stores backup copies of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined critical information system
            software and other security-related information]

in a separate facility or in a fire-rated container that is not collocated with the operational system.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IA-1; IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Identification And Authentication Policy And Procedures:

The organization: a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to  
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
1.  An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and authentication policy and associated identification and authentication controls; and b.  Reviews and updates the  current: 1.  Identification and authentication policy 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
2.  Identification and authentication procedures 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-63, 800-73, 800-76, 800-78, 800-100.

IA-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
the ISSO and ISSM and others as the local organization deems appropriate;
b.  1.  annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
b.1 at least every 3 years

All Impact Levels:
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IA-2 (11); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Identification And Authentication (Organizational Users) - Enhancement:
Remote Access - Separate Device

The information system implements multifactor authentication for remote access to privileged and non-privileged accounts such that one of the factors is provided by a device separate from the system gaining access and the device meets 
          [Assignment: organization-defined strength of mechanism
            requirements].


References: None.

IA-2 (11)

Impact Levels 4-6:
DoD PKI or a technology approved by their Authorizing Official, FIPS 140-2, NIAP Certification, or NSA approval

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IA-3; IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Device Identification And Authentication:

The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates  
          [Assignment: organization-defined list of specific and/or types
            of devices]
before establishing a  
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - local; 
            - remote; 
            - network

          ]

connection.

References: None.

IA-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
all mobile devices and network connected endpoint devices (including but not limited to: workstations, printers, servers (outside a datacenter), VoIP Phones, VTC CODECs). 

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IA-4; IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Identifier Management:

The organization manages information system identifiers by:
a.  Receiving authorization from
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
to assign an individual, group, role, or device identifier;
b.  Selecting an identifier that identifies an individual, group, role, or device;
c.  Assigning the identifier to the intended individual, group, role, or device;
d.  Preventing reuse of identifiers for  
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and
e.  Disabling the identifier after
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity].

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78.

IA-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  ISSM or ISSO

e.  35 days

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
d.  at least two years

Impact Level 2:
e.  ninety days for user identifiers (See additional requirements and guidance.)

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
IA-4e.  Requirement: The service provider defines time period of inactivity for device identifiers.

IA-4 (4); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Identifier Management - Enhancement:
Identify User Status

The organization manages individual identifiers by uniquely identifying each individual as
          [Assignment: organization-defined characteristic identifying
            individual status]
.

References: None.

IA-4 (4)

Impact Levels 4-6:
contractor or government employee and by nationality.  User identifiers will follow the same format as DoD user e-mail addresses (john.smith.ctr@army.mil or john.smith.uk@army.mil);
- DoD user e-mail display names (e.g., John Smith, Contractor <john.smith.ctr@army.mil> or John Smith, United Kingdom <john.smith.uk@army.mil>);  and
- automated signature blocks (e.g., John Smith, Contractor,  J-6K, Joint Staff or John Doe, Australia, LNO, Combatant Command).
Contractors who are also foreign nationals are identified as both, e.g., john.smith.ctr.uk@army.mil

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
contractors; foreign nationals


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IA-5; IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management:

The organization manages information system authenticators by:
a.  Verifying, as part of the initial authenticator distribution, the identity of the individual, group, role, or device receiving the authenticator;
b.  Establishing initial authenticator content for authenticators defined by the organization;
c.  Ensuring that authenticators have sufficient strength of mechanism for their intended use;
d.  Establishing and implementing administrative procedures for initial authenticator distribution, for lost/compromised or damaged authenticators, and for revoking authenticators;
e.  Changing default content of authenticators prior to information system installation;
f.  Establishing minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions and reuse conditions for authenticators;
g. Changing/refreshing authenticators
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period by
            authenticator type]
;
h.  Protecting authenticator content from unauthorized disclosure and modification; and
i.  Requiring individuals to take, and having devices implement, specific security safeguards to protect authenticators; and
j.  Changing authenticators for group/role accounts when membership to those accounts changes.

References: OMB Memorandum 04-04, 11-11; FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-63, 800-76, 800-78; FICAM Roadmap and Implementation Guidance; Web: idmanagement.gov

IA-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
g. CAC - every 3 years, or 1 year from term of contract
Password: 60 days 
Biometrics: re-enroll every 3 years.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
g. to include sixty days for passwords

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IA-5 (1); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management - Enhancement:
Password-Based Authentication

The information system, for password-based authentication:
(a) Enforces minimum password complexity of
          [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for case
            sensitivity, number of characters, mix of upper-case letters,
            lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters, including
            minimum requirements for each type];

(b) Enforces at least the following number of changed characters when new passwords are created:
          [Assignment: organization-defined number];
(c ) Stores and transmits only encrypted representations of passwords;
(d) Enforces password minimum and maximum lifetime restrictions of
          [Assignment: organization-defined numbers for lifetime
            minimum, lifetime maximum]
;
(e) Prohibits password reuse for
          [Assignment: organization-defined number]
generations; and  
(f) Allows the use of a temporary password for system logons with an immediate change to a permanent password.

References: None.

IA-5 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
As supported by the device:
 a.  minimum of 15 Characters, 1 of each of the following character sets:
- Upper-case
- Lower-case
- Numeric
- Special characters (e.g. ~ ! @ # $ % ^ & * ( ) _ + = - ‘ [ ] / ? > <)]; ,

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
Ia.  case sensitive, minimum of twelve characters, and at least one each of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters
 

All Impact Levels:

b.  at least one
d.  one day minimum, sixty day maximum
e.  twenty four

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IA-5 (3); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management - Enhancement:
In-Person Or Trusted Third-Party Registration

The organization requires that the registration process to receive
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of and/or specific
            authenticators]

be conducted
          [Selection:
            - in person;
            - by a trusted third party
           ]

before
          [Assignment: organization-defined registration authority]
with authorization by
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

IA-5 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
The DoD PKI CP defines the role and responsibilities of a DoD PKI Registration Authority (RA).  The NSS PKI CP defines the role and responsibilities of an NSS PKI RA.

The DoD PKI RA–LRA CPS defines the nomination process for DoD PKI RAs.  The NSS PKI DoD RPS defines the nomination process for NSS PKI RAs for DoD.

The DoD PKI CP defines DoD PKI subscribers and the authentication requirements for issuance of credentials to subscribers.  The NSS PKI CP defines NSS PKI subscribers and the authentication requirements for issuance of credentials to subscribers.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
 All hardware/biometric (multifactor authenticators)in person


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IA-5 (4); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management - Enhancement:
Automated Support For Password Strength Determination

The organization employs automated tools to determine if password authenticators are sufficiently strong to satisfy
          [Assignment: organization-defined requirements].

References: None.

IA-5 (4)

Impact Levels 4-6:
complexity as identified in IA-5 (1) Part A

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

All Impact Levels:

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
IA-4e Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: Guidance: If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators

IA-5 (11); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management - Enhancement:
Hardware Token-Based Authentication

The information system, for hardware token-based authentication, employs mechanisms that satisfy
          [Assignment: organization-defined token quality requirements].

References: None.

IA-5 (11)

Impact Levels 4-6:
DoDI 8520.03

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IA-5 (13); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Authenticator Management - Enhancement:
Expiration Of Cached Authenticators

The information system prohibits the use of cached authenticators after
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IA-8 (3); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Identification And Authentication (Non-Organization Users) - Enhancement:
Use Of FICAM-Approved Products

The organization employs only FICAM-approved information system components in
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems]
to accept third-party credentials.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IR-1; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Response Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
        commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and associated incident
         response controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Incident response policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
      and
     2.  Incident response procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-61, 800-83, 800-100.

IR-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel identified as stakeholders in the incident response process, as well as the ISSM and ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IR-2; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Response Training:

The organization provides incident response training to information system users consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities:
a.  Within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of assuming an incident response role or responsibility;
b.  When required by information system changes; and
c.    [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
thereafter.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-16, 800-50.

IR-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  30 working days

Source:
DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
c.  at least annually

Source:
FedRAMP v2
-------------------

IR-3; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Response Testing And Exercises RENAMED: Incident Response Testing:

The organization tests the incident response capability for the information system
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
using
          [Assignment: organization-defined tests]
to determine the incident response effectiveness and documents the results.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-84, 800-115.

IR-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
At least every six months for high availability and at least annually for low/med availability
 
Tests as defined in the incident response plan

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
IR-3.  Requirement: The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended).
Requirement: For JAB Authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the Authorizing Official (AO) annually.

Requirement: Test plans are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official prior to test commencing.

IR-4 (3); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Handling - Enhancement:
Continuity Of Operations

The organization identifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined classes of incidents]
and
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions to take in response
            to classes of incidents]

to ensure continuation of organizational missions and business functions.

References: None.

IR-4 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Classes of incidents defined in CJCSM 6510.01B Appendix A- Enclosure B

Actions defined in CJCSM 6510.01B

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IR-4 (7); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Handling - Enhancement:
Insider Threats - Intra-Organization Coordination

The organization coordinates incident handling capability for insider threats across
          [Assignment: organization-defined components or elements
            of the organization]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IR-4 (8); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Handling - Enhancement:
Correlation With External Organizations

The organization coordinates with
          [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]
to correlate and share
          [Assignment: organization-defined incident information]
to achieve a cross-organization perspective on incident awareness and more effective incident responses.

References: None.

IR-4 (8)

Impact Levels 4-6:
The appropriate CIRT/CERT (such as US-CERT, DoD CERT, IC CERT), the Mission Owner’s MCD, and Law Enforcement

Incident information as defined in section 6.4 - Cyber Incident Reporting and Response

Source: DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial CSPs
-------------------

IR-6; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Reporting:

The organization:
a.  Requires personnel to report suspected security incidents to the organizational incident response capability within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period];
and
b.  Reports security incident information to
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorities].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61: Web: WWW.US-CERT.GOV.

IR-6

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  the timeframes specified by CJCSM 6510.01B (Table C-A-1) unless the data owner provides more restrictive guidance

b.  The appropriate CIRT/CERT (such as US-CERT, DoD CERT, IC CERT), the Mission Owner’s MCD, and Law Enforcement

Source: DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial CSPs
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  US-CERT incident reporting timelines as specified in NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended)

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Requirement: Reports security incident information  according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.

IR-6 (2); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Reporting - Enhancement:
Vulnerabilities Related To Incidents

The organization reports information system vulnerabilities associated with reported security incidents to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

IR-6 (2) )

All Impact Levels:
the AOs who issued the PA and the customer’s ATO, the customer’s MCD, the CIRT/CERT (such as US-CERT, DoD CERT, IC CERT)

Source: CC SRG best practice for community information sharing and mitigation of new vulnerabilities across the community

IR-8; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Incident Response Plan:

The organization:
a.  Develops an incident response plan that:
     1.  Provides the organization with a roadmap for implementing its incident response capability;
     2.  Describes the structure and organization of the incident response capability;
     3.  Provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall organization;
     4.  Meets the unique requirements of the organization, which relate to mission, size, structure, and functions;
     5.  Defines reportable incidents;
     6.  Provides metrics for measuring the incident response capability within the organization;
     7.  Defines the resources and management support needed to effectively maintain and mature an incident
         response capability; and
     8.  Is reviewed and approved by
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];
b.  Distributes copies of the incident response plan to
          [Assignment: organization-defined incident response
            personnel (identified by name
          and/or by role) and organizational elements]
;
c.  Reviews the incident response plan
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
d.  Updates the incident response plan to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing;
e.  Communicates incident response plan changes to
          [Assignment: organization-defined incident response
            personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and
            organizational elements]
;
and
f.  Protects the incident response plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-61

IR-8

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO

b.all stakeholders identified in the incident response plan

e.  all stakeholders identified in the incident response plan, not later than 30 days after the change is made

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
c.  at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
IR-8(b) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements.  The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
IR-8(e) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:  The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements.  The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.

IR-9; INCIDENT RESPONSE; Information Spillage Response:

The organization responds to information spills by:
a.  Identifying the specific information involved in the information system contamination;
b.  Alerting
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
of the information spill using a method of communication not associated with the spill;
c.  Isolating the contaminated information system or system component;
d.  Eradicating the information from the contaminated information system or component;
e.  Identifying other information systems or system components that may have been subsequently contaminated; and
f.  Performing other
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions].

References: None.

IR-9

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  at a minimum, the OCA, the information owner/originator, the ISSM, the activity security manager, and the responsible computer incident response center

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

f. time -sensitive actions that are necessary to limit the amount of damage or access.  Keep a log of all actions taken regarding the CS/IA incident response, including the date/time of the action, who performed the action; create and maintain records, such as tickets, as appropriate for their role.

Source: DoD Best Practice
-------------------

IR-9 (1); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Information Spillage Response - Enhancement:
Responsible Personnel

The organization assigns
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
with responsibility for responding to information spills.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IR-9 (2); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Information Spillage Response - Enhancement:
Training

The organization provides information spillage response training
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

IR-9 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IR-9 (3); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Information Spillage Response - Enhancement:
Post-Spill Operations

The organization implements
          [Assignment: organization-defined procedures]
to ensure that organizational personnel impacted by information spills can continue to carry out assigned tasks while contaminated systems are undergoing corrective actions.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

IR-9 (4); INCIDENT RESPONSE; Information Spillage Response - Enhancement:
Exposure To Unauthorized Personnel

The organization employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

MA-1; MAINTENANCE; System Maintenance Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
         commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy and associated system
         maintenance controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  System maintenance policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  System maintenance procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

MA-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all stakeholders identified in the maintenance policy

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

MA-2; MAINTENANCE; Controlled Maintenance:

The organization:
a.  Schedules, performs, documents, and reviews records of maintenance and repairs on information system components in accordance with manufacturer or vendor specifications and/or organizational requirements;
b.  Approves and monitors all maintenance activities, whether performed on site or remotely and whether the equipment is serviced on site or removed to another location;
c.  Requires that
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
explicitly approve the removal of the information system or system components from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;
d.  Sanitizes equipment to remove all information from associated media prior to removal from organizational facilities for off-site maintenance or repairs;
e.  Checks all potentially impacted security controls to verify that the controls are still functioning properly following maintenance or repair actions; and
f.  Includes
          [Assignment: organization-defined maintenance-related
            information]

in organizational maintenance records.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

MA-3 (3); MAINTENANCE; Maintenance Tools - Enhancement:
Prevent Unauthorized Removal

The organization prevents the unauthorized removal of maintenance equipment containing organizational information by:
(a) Verifying that there is no organizational information contained on the equipment;
(b) Sanitizing or destroying the equipment;
(c) Retaining the equipment within the facility; or
(d) Obtaining an exemption from
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility.

References: None.

MA-3 (3)

All Impact Levels:
d.  the information owner explicitly authorizing removal of the equipment from the facility


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

MA-6; MAINTENANCE; Timely Maintenance:

The organization obtains maintenance support and/or spare parts for
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components]

within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of failure.

References: None.

MA-6

Impact Levels 4-6:

IAW CSO SLA or minimally as follows:
Within 24 hours (Low and Moderate Availability) or immediately upon failure for (High Availability)

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

MP-1; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Protection Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
         coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and associated media
         protection controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Media protection policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
     2.  Media protection procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

MP-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all users

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

MP-2; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Access:

The organization restricts access to
[Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and
  non-digital media]

to
 [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111

MP-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
All types of digital and/or non-digital media containing information not cleared for public release

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

MP-3; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Marking:

The organization:
a.  Marks information system media indicating the distribution limitations, handling caveats, and applicable security markings (if any) of the information; and
b.  Exempts 
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of information
            system media]

from marking as long as the media remain within 
          [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas].

References: FIPS Publication 199.

MP-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  nothing unless otherwise exempted by DoDI 5200.01 and DoDM 5200.01 Vol 1-4

b.  all areas unless otherwise exempted by DoDI 5200.01 and DoDM 5200.01 Vol 1-4

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
b.  no removable media types

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
MP-3b.  Guidance: Second parameter not-applicable

MP-4; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Storage:

The organization:
a.  Physically controls and securely stores 
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of digital and/or
            non-digital media]

within 
          [Assignment: organization-defined controlled areas];
and
b.  Protects information system media until the media are destroyed or sanitized using approved equipment, techniques, and procedures.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-11

MP-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
a 1.  all digital and non-digital media containing sensitive, controlled, and/or classified information. 
 
a 2.  areas approved for processing or storing data IAW the sensitivity and/or classification level of the information contained on/within the media.
 

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  all types of digital and non-digital media with sensitive information

FedRAMP Assignment: see additional FedRAMP requirements and guidance

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
MP-4a Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: Requirement: The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.

MP-5; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Transport:

The organization:
a.  Protects and controls 
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of information
            system media]

during transport outside of controlled areas using 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards];
b.  Maintains accountability for information system media during transport outside of controlled areas;                                 c.  Documents activities associated with the transport of information system media; and
d.  Restricts the activities associated with transport of information system media to authorized personnel.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-60.

MP-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all digital and non-digital media containing sensitive, controlled, and/or classified information. 
 
a.  DoDI 5200.1R and other organizationally defined security safeguards.

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  all media with sensitive information

prior to leaving secure/controlled environment: for digital media, encryption using a FIPS 140-2 validated encryption module; for non-digital media, secured in locked container

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

MP-6; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Sanitization:

The organization:
a.  Sanitizes  
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system media]
prior to disposal, release out of organizational control, or release for reuse using  
          [Assignment: organization-defined sanitization techniques
            and procedures]

in accordance with applicable federal and organizational standards and policies; and
b.  Employs sanitization mechanisms with the strength and integrity commensurate with the security category or classification of the information.

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-60, 800-88; Web: www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/media_destruction_guidance/index.shtml.

MP-6

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all media

a.  techniques and procedures IAW NIST SP 800-88 and Section 5.9: Reuse and Disposal of Storage Media and Hardware.
 
Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

MP-6 (2); MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Sanitization - Enhancement:
Equipment Testing

The organization tests sanitization equipment and procedures 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to verify that the intended sanitization is being achieved.

References: None.

MP-6 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:
every 180 days.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
At least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Guidance: Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness

MP-7; MEDIA PROTECTION; Media Use:

The organization [Selection: restricts; prohibits] the use of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of information
            system media]

on 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems
            or system components]

using 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publication 800-111.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PE-1; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Physical And Environmental Protection Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
         management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental protection policy and
         associated physical and environmental protection controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Physical and environmental protection policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Physical and environmental protection procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-100.

PE-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

b.1 annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
b.1 at least every 3 years

All Impact Levels:
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-2; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Physical Access Authorizations:

The organization:
a.  Develops, approves, and maintains a list of individuals with authorized access to the facility where the information system resides;
b.  Issues authorization credentials for facility access;
c.  Reviews the access list detailing authorized facility access by individuals 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and
d.  Removes individuals from the facility access list when access is no longer required.

References: None.

PE-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  every 90 days

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-3; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Physical Access Control:

The organization:
a.  Enforces physical access authorizations at  
          [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points to the
            facility where the information system resides] 

by;
     1.  Verifying individual access authorizations before granting access to the facility; and
     2.  Controlling ingress/egress to the facility using 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - [Assignment: organization-defined physical access control

                systems/devices];
            - guards

          ];
b.  Maintains physical access audit logs for 
          [Assignment: organization-defined entry/exit points];
c.  Provides 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
to control access to areas within the facility officially designated as publicly accessible;
d.  Escorts visitors and monitors visitor activity 
          [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances requiring
            visitor escorts and monitoring]
;
e.  Secures keys, combinations, and other physical access devices;
f.  Inventories  
          [Assignment: organization-defined physical access devices]
every  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and  
g. Changes combinations and keys 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
and/or when keys are lost, combinations are compromised, or individuals are transferred or terminated.

References: FIPS Publication 201; NIST Special Publications 800-73, 800-76, 800-78, 800-116; ICD 704, 705; DoDI 5200.39; Personal Identity Verification (PIV) in Enterprise Physical Access Control System (E-PACS); Web: idmanagement.gov, fips201ep.cio.gov

PE-3

Impact Levels 4-6:

f.  minimally keys or any other physical token used to gain access

g. as required by security relevant events, at least annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

 

All Impact Levels:

a.2 CSP defined physical access control systems/devices AND guards

d.  in all circumstances within restricted access area where the information system resides

f.  at least annually

g. at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-3 (1); PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Physical Access Control - Enhancement:
Information System Access

The organization enforces physical access authorizations to the information system in addition to the physical access controls for the facility at 
          [Assignment: organization-defined physical spaces containing
            one or more components of the information system]
.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PE-4; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Access Control For Transmission Medium:

The organization controls physical access to  
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            distribution and transmission lines]

within organizational facilities using 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

References: NSTISSI No.  7003.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PE-6; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Monitoring Physical Access:

The organization:
a.  Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect and respond to physical security incidents;
b.  Reviews physical access logs  
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
and upon occurrence of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential
            indications of events]
;
and
c.  Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident response capability.

References: None.

PE-6

All Impact Levels:
b.at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-8; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Access Records
RENAMED: Visitor Access Records:

The organization:
a.  Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; and
b.  Reviews visitor access records
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

PE-8

All Impact Levels:
a for a minimum of one year
b.  at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-10; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Emergency Shutoff:

The organization:
a.  Provides the capability of shutting off power to the information system or individual system components in emergency situations;
b.  Places emergency shutoff switches or devices in
          [Assignment: organization-defined location by information
            system or system component]

to facilitate safe and easy access for personnel; and
c.  Protects emergency power shutoff capability from unauthorized activation.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PE-13 (2); PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Fire Protection - Enhancement:
Suppression Devices / Systems

The organization employs fire suppression devices/systems for the information system that provide automatic notification of any activation to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
and
          [Assignment: organization-defined emergency responders].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PE-14; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Temperature And Humidity Controls:

The organization:
a.  Maintains temperature and humidity levels within the facility where the information system resides at
          [Assignment: organization-defined acceptable levels];
and
b.  Monitors temperature and humidity levels
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

PE-14

DoD CSPs:
NOTE: the DoD value shown for PE-14 is equivalent to the FedRAMP value and represents industry standards.  It provides an evaluation benchmark.  While this value is not appropriate for DoD to define for all CSP's infrastructure or service offerings, DoD CSPs must follow the DoD value while Commercial CSPs may use the FedRAMP value.

DoD CSP value:

a.  For commercial grade information systems: 64.4 – 80.6 degrees F;  45% – 60% Relative Humidity;  Dew Point 41.9 ° – 59°F; measured at the air intake inlet of the IT equipment casing; For other systems, levels within manufacturer specifications

b.  Continuously unless manufacturer specifications allow for a wide enough tolerance that control is not required

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

Commercial CSPs:
a.  consistent with American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) document entitled Thermal Guidelines for Data Processing Environments
b.  continuously

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
PE-14a.  Requirements:  The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.

PE-16; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Delivery And Removal:

The organization authorizes, monitors, and controls
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of information system
            components]

entering and exiting the facility and maintains records of those items.

References: None.

PE-16

All Impact Levels:
 all information system components

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PE-17; PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; Alternate Work Site:

The organization:
a.  Employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined security controls]
at alternate work sites;
b.  Assesses as feasible, the effectiveness of security controls at alternate work sites; and
c.  Provides a means for employees to communicate with information security personnel in case of security incidents or problems.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-46.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PL-1; PLANNING; Security Planning Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
        coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and associated security planning
         controls; 
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Security planning policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Security planning procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publications 800-12, 800-18, 800-100

PL-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PL-2; PLANNING; System Security Plan:

The organization:
a.  Develops a security plan for the information system that:
     1.  Is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture;
     2.  Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system;
     3.  Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of missions and business processes;
     4.  Provides the security categorization of the information system including supporting rationale;
     5.  Describes the operational environment for the information system and relationships with or connections
          to other information systems;
     6.  Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system;
     7.  Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable;
     8.  Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements including a rationale
          for the tailoring and supplementation decisions; and
     9.  Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to plan implementation;
b.  Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the plan to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];
c.  Reviews the security plan for the information system
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
d.  Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of operation or problems identified during plan implementation or security control assessments; and
e.  Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-18.

PL-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  at a minimum, the ISSO, ISSM and SCA

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
c.  [t least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PL-2 (3); PLANNING; System Security Plan - Enhancement:
Plan / Coordinate With Other Organizational Entities

The organization plans and coordinates security-related activities affecting the information system with
          [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or groups]
before conducting such activities in order to reduce the impact on other organizational entities.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PL-4; PLANNING; Rules Of Behavior:

The organization:
a.  Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the information system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior with regard to information and information system usage;
b.  Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to information and the information system;
c.  Reviews and updates the rules of behavior
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and
d.  Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to read and resign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated.

References: NIST Publication 800-18.

PL-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  At least every 3 years

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PL-8; PLANNING; Information Security Architecture:

The organization:
a.  Develops an information security architecture for the information system that:
     1.  Describes the overall philosophy, requirements, and approach to be taken with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational information;
     2.  Describes how the information security architecture is integrated into and supports the enterprise architecture; and
     3.  Describes any information security assumptions about, and dependencies on, external services;
b.  Reviews and updates the information security architecture
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to reflect updates in the enterprise architecture; and
c.  Ensures that planned information security architecture changes are reflected in the security plan, the security Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and organizational procurements/acquisitions.

References: None.

PL-8

All Impact Levels:
b.  At least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PL-8 (1); PLANNING; Information Security Architecture - Enhancement:
Defense-In-Depth

The organization designs its security architecture using a defense-in-depth approach that:
(a) Allocates
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
to
          [Assignment: organization-defined locations and
            architectural layers]
;
and
(b) Ensures that the allocated security safeguards operate in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

PS-1; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Security Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
        coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and associated personnel
         security controls; and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Personnel security policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  Personnel security procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

PS-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-2; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Position Categorization
RENAMED: Position Risk Designation:

The organization:
a.  Assigns a risk designation to all organizational positions;
b.  Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions; and
c.  Reviews and updates position risk designations
 [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

PS-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  Annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  at least every three years

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-3; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Screening:

The organization:
a.  Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to the information system; and
b.  Rescreens individuals according to
          [Assignment: organization-defined conditions requiring
            rescreening and, where rescreening is so indicated, the
            frequency of such rescreening].


References: None.

PS-3

All Impact Levels:
b.  for national security clearances; a reinvestigation is required during the 5th year for top secret security clearance, the 10th year for secret security clearance, and 15th year for confidential security clearance.

For moderate risk law enforcement and high impact public trust level, a reinvestigation is required during the 5th year.  There is no reinvestigation for other moderate risk positions or any low risk positions

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-3 (3); PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Screening - Enhancement:
Information With Special Protection Measures

The organization ensures that individuals accessing an information system processing, storing, or transmitting information requiring special protection:
(a) Have valid access authorizations that are demonstrated by assigned official government duties; and
(b) Satisfy
          [Assignment: organization-defined additional personnel
            screening criteria].


References: None.

PS-3 (3)

All Impact Levels:
b.  personnel screening criteria – as required by specific information

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-4; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Termination:

The organization, upon termination of individual employment:
a.  Disables information system access within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period];
b.  Terminates/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual;
c.  Conducts exit interviews that include a discussion of
          [Assignment: organization-defined information security
            topics];

d.  Retrieves all security-related organizational information system-related property;
e.  Retains access to organizational information and information systems formerly controlled by terminated individual; and
f.  Notifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-35.

PS-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.   8 hrs if unable to coordinate account deactivation with the time of termination.

f.  at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for revoking credentials

f.  immediately or within 24 hours

Source: DoD RMF TAG  (a. FedRAMP High Baseline WG)
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  same day


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-5; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Transfer:

The organization:
a.  Reviews and confirms ongoing operational need for current logical and physical access authorizations to information systems/facilities when individuals are reassigned or transferred to other positions within the organization;
b.  Initiates
          [Assignment: organization-defined transfer or reassignment
            actions]

within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period following the
            formal transfer action]
;
c.  Modifies access authorization as needed to correspond with any changes in operational need due to reassignment or transfer; and
d.  Notifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

References: FIPS Publication 199; NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-39, 800-60.

PS-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  actions to ensure all system accesses no longer required are removed 

b.  24 hrs if unable to coordinate account deactivation with the time of transfer.

d.  at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for transferring credentials

d.  24 hours

Source: DoD RMF TAG  (b. FedRAMP High Baseline WG)
-------------------
Impact Level 2:
 within 24 hours of the formal transfer action

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-6; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Access Agreements:

The organization:
a.  Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems;
b.  Reviews and updates the access agreements
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
and
c.  Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information systems:
     1.  Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access; and
     2.  Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information systems when access
        agreements have been updated or
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: OMB Memorandum 04-04; NIST Special Publication 800-30, 800-39; Web: idmanagement.gov.

PS-6

Impact Levels 4-6:

c (2) when there is a change to the user's level of access, at least annually

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.  at least annually

Impact Level 2:
c.2.  [at least annually]

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-7; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Third-Party Personnel Security:

The organization:
a.  Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and responsibilities for third-party providers;
b.  Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and procedures established by the organization;
c.  Documents personnel security requirements;
d.  Requires third-party providers to notify
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period];
and
e.  Monitors provider compliance.

References: None.

PS-7

Impact Levels 4-6:
d.  at a minimum, the ISSO and personnel responsible for transferring credentials

d.  24 hrs if unable to coordinate account deactivation with the time of transfer or termination.

Source: DoD RMF TAG   (d. FedRAMP High Baseline WG)
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
d.  organization-defined time period – same day

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

PS-8; PERSONNEL SECURITY; Personnel Sanctions:

The organization:
a.  Employs a formal sanctions process for individuals failing to comply with established information security policies and procedures; and
b.  Notifies
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
when a formal employee sanctions process is initiated, identifying the individual sanctioned and the reason for the sanction.

References: None.

PS-8

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  at a minimum, the ISSO

b.  immediately

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

RA-1; RISK ASSESSMENT; Risk Assessment Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment,
        coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment
         controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  Risk assessment policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
      and
     2.  Risk assessment procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

RA-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

RA-3; RISK ASSESSMENT; Risk Assessment:

The organization:
a.  Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits;
b.  Documents risk assessment results in
          [Selection:
            - security plan;
            - risk assessment report;

            - [Assignment: organization-defined document]
          ];
c.  Reviews risk assessment results
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
d.  Disseminates risk assessment results to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; and
e.  Updates the risk assessment
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
or whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other conditions that may impact the security state of the system.

References: None.

RA-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
d.  ISSM, ISSO, AO, and PM

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.  security assessment report

c.  at least every three years or when a significant change occurs

e.  at least every three years or when a significant change occurs

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.
 
RA-3d.  Requirement: to include the Authorizing Official; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP

RA-5; RISK ASSESSMENT; Vulnerability Scanning:

The organization:
a.  Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly
            in accordance with organization-defined process]

and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system/applications are identified and reported;
b.  Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:
     1.  Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;
     2.  Formatting checklists and test procedures; and
     3.  Measuring vulnerability impact;
c.  Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments;
d.  Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities
          [Assignment: organization-defined response times]
in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk; and
e.  Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses or deficiencies).

References: None.

RA-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  every 30 days or as directed by an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs) 

d.  IAW an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs) or high-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within thirty days from date of discovery; moderate-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within ninety days from date of discovery

e.  at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  monthly operating system/infrastructure; monthly web applications and databases

d.  high-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within thirty days from date of discovery; moderate-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within ninety days from date of discovery

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
RA-5a.  Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
RA-5e.  Requirement: to include the Risk Executive; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP

RA-5 (2); RISK ASSESSMENT; Vulnerability Scanning - Enhancement:
Update By Frequency / Prior To New Scan / When Identified

The organization updates the information system vulnerabilities scanned
          [Selection (one or more):
            - [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
            - prior to a new scan;
            - when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported

          ].

References: None.

RA-5 (2)

All Impact Levels:
prior to a new scan

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

RA-5 (5); RISK ASSESSMENT; Vulnerability Scanning - Enhancement:
Privileged Access

The information system implements privileged access authorization to
          [Assignment: organization-identified information system
            components]

for selected
          [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability scanning
            activities].


References: NIST Special Publication 800-65.

RA-5 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
all information systems and infrastructure components

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
operating systems / web applications / databases

all scans

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-1; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; System And Services Acquisition Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
        commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services acquisition policy and associated
         system and services acquisition controls;
and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  System and services acquisition policy
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency];
     and
     2.  System and services acquisition procedures
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

SA-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years
b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-3; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Life Cycle Support
RENAMED: System Development Life Cycle:

The organization:
a.  Manages the information system using
          [Assignment: organization-defined system development
            life cycle]

that incorporates information security considerations;
b.  Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the system development life cycle;
c.  Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities; and
d.  Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system development life cycle activities.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SA-4 (2); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Acquisitions
RENAMED: Acquisition Process - Enhancement:
Design / Implementation Information For Security Controls

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to provide design and implementation information for the security controls to be employed that includes:
          [Selection (one or more):
            - security-relevant external system interfaces;
            - high-level design;
            - low-level design;
            - source code or hardware schematics;

            - [Assignment: organization-defined design/implementation

                information]
          ]
at
          [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].

References: None.

SA-4 (2)

All Impact Levels:
to include security-relevant external system interfaces and high-level design

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-4 (8); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Acquisition Process - Enhancement:
Continuous Monitoring Plan

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to produce a plan for the continuous monitoring of security control effectiveness that contains
          [Assignment: organization-defined level of detail].

References: None.

SA-4 (8)

All Impact Levels:
at least the minimum requirement as defined in control CA-7

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SA-4 (8) Guidance: CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.

SA-5; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Information System Documentation:

The organization:
a.  Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:
     1.  Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or service;
     2.  Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms; and
     3.  Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., privileged) functions;
b.  Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or information system service that describes:
     1.  User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those security
         functions/mechanisms;
     2.  Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, component, or service in a
          more secure manner; and
     3.  User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or service;
c.  Documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or nonexistent and
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions]
in response;
d.  Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy; and
e.  Distributes documentation to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

SA-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
e.  at a minimum, the ISSO, ISSM, and SCA

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SA-9; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; External Information System Services:

The organization:
a.  Requires that providers of external information system services comply with organizational information security requirements and employ
          [Assignment: organization-defined security controls]
in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance;
b.  Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with regard to external information system services; and
c.  Employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and
            techniques]

to monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis.

References: None.

SA-9

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  security controls defined by CNSSI 1253 and FedRAMP Security Controls Baseline(s)

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:a.  FedRAMP Security Controls Baseline(s) if Federal information is processed or stored within the external system

 

All Impact Levels:
c.  Federal/FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring requirements must be met for external systems where Federal information is processed or stored

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-9 (1); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; External Information System Services - Enhancement:
Risk Assessments / Organizational Approvals

The organization:
(a) Conducts an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services; and
(b) Ensures that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is approved by
           [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

SA-9 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  the DoD Component CIO or their delegate(s)

Source:
DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
see Additional Requirement and Guidance

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SA-9 (1).  Requirement: The service provider documents all existing outsourced security services and conducts a risk assessment of future outsourced security services.  For JAB authorizations, future planned outsourced services are approved and accepted by the JAB.

SA-9 (2); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; External Information Systems - Enhancement:
Identification Of Functions / Ports / Protocols / Services

The organization requires providers of
          [Assignment: organization-defined external information system
            services]

to identify the functions, ports, protocols, and other services required for the use of such services.

References: None.

SA-9 (2)

All Impact Levels:

All external systems where Federal information is processed, transmitted or stored

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-9 (4); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; External Information Systems - Enhancement:
Consistent Interests Of Consumers And Providers

The organization employs
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
to ensure that the interests of
          [Assignment: organization-defined external service providers]
are consistent with and reflect organizational interests.

References: None.

SA-9 (4)

All Impact Levels:
All external systems where Federal information is processed, transmitted or stored


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-9 (5); SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; External Information Systems - Enhancement:
Processing Storage And Service Location

The organization restricts the location of
          [Selection (one or more):
            - information processing;
            - information/data;
            - information system services

          ]
to
          [Assignment: organization-defined locations]
based on
          [Assignment: organization-defined requirements or
            conditions].


References: ISO/IEC 15408; NIST Special Publication 800-53A; Web: nvd.nist.gov, cwe.mitre.org, cve.mitre.org, capec.mitre.org.

SA-9 (5)

All Impact Levels:
information processing, transmission, information data, AND information services

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SA-10; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Developer Configuration Management:

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:
a.  Perform configuration management during system, component, or service
          [Selection (one or more):
            - design;
            - development;
            - implementation;
            - operation

          ];

b.  Document, manage, and control the integrity of changes to
          [Assignment: organization-defined configuration items under
            configuration management]
;
c.  Implement only organization-approved changes to the system, component, or service;
d.  Document approved changes to the system, component, or service and the potential security impacts of such changes; and
e.  Track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel].

References: None.

SA-10

Impact Levels 4-6:
e.  at a minimum, the ISSO and ISSM

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
a.  development, implementation, AND operation

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SA-10e.  Requirement: for JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.

SA-11; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Developer Security Testing
RENAMED: Developer Security Testing And Evaluation:

The organization requires the developer of the information system, system component, or information system service to:
a.  Create and implement a security assessment plan;
b.  Perform 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - unit; 
            -  integration; 
            - system; 
            - regression

          ]

testing/evaluation at 
          [Assignment: organization-defined depth and coverage];
c.  Produce evidence of the execution of the security assessment plan and the results of the security testing/evaluation;
d.  Implement a verifiable flaw remediation process; and
e.  Correct flaws identified during security testing/evaluation.

References: None.

SA-11

All Impact Levels:
b. Unit, integration; system; regression

the infrastructure level

Source:  DoD Best Practice
-------------------

SA-12; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Supply Chain Protection:

The organization protects against supply chain threats to the information system, system component, or information system service by employing 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
as part of a comprehensive, defense-in-breadth information security strategy.

References: None.

SA-12

Impact Levels 5-6:
measures of protection IAW DoDI 5200.44, "Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)"

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SA-19; SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION; Component Authenticity:

The organization:
a.  Develops and implements anti-counterfeit policy and procedures that include the means to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the information system; and
b.  Reports counterfeit information system components to 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - source of counterfeit component;
 
            - [Assignment: organization-defined external reporting

                organizations]; 
            -
[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
          
].

References: None.

SA-19

Impact Levels 5-6:
b.  at a minimum, USCYBERCOM

b.  at a minimum, the ISSO, ISSM, and PM

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-1; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; System And Communications Protection Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities,
         management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications protection policy and
         associated system and communications protection controls;
 and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  System and communications protection policy 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
     2.  System and communications protection procedures 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: None.

SC-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  at a minimum, the ISSM/ISSO

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-5; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Denial Of Service Protection:

The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following types of denial of service attacks:
           [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial of service
             attacks or reference to source for such information]

by employing 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SC-6; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Resource Priority
RENAMED: Resource Availability:

The information system protects the availability of resources by allocating 
          [Assignment: organization-defined resources]
by  
          [Selection (one or more); 
            - priority; 
            - quota;
 
            -
[Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]
       ].


References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SC-7 (4); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
External Telecommunications Services

The organization:
(a) Implements a managed interface for each external telecommunication service;
(b) Establishes a traffic flow policy for each managed interface;
(c) Protects the confidentiality and integrity of the information being transmitted across each interface;
(d) Documents each exception to the traffic flow policy with a supporting mission/business need and duration of that need; and
(e) Reviews exceptions to the traffic flow policy 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
and removes exceptions that are no longer supported by an explicit mission/business need.

References: None.

SC-7 (4)

Impact Levels 4-6:
e.  every 180 days

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-7 (8); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Route Traffic To Authenticated Proxy Servers

The information system routes 
          [Assignment: organization-defined internal communications
            traffic]

to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined external networks]
through authenticated proxy servers at managed interfaces.

References: None.

SC-7 (8)

Impact Levels 4-6:
protocols as designated by PPSM guidance (e.g. HTTPS, HTTP, FTP, SNMP)

any network external to the authorization boundary

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-7 (11); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic

The information system only allows incoming communications from  
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorized sources]
routed to  
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorized destinations].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SC-7 (12); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Host-Based Protection

The organization implements 
          [Assignment: organization-defined host-based boundary
            protection mechanisms]

at 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components].


References: None.

SC-7 (12)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS)

All information system components.

Source: DoD RMF TAG

NOTE: DISA will evaluate Commercial CSP equivalencies on a case by case basis.
-------------------

SC-7 (13); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Isolation Of Security Tools / Mechanisms / Support Components

The organization isolates  
          [Assignment: organization-defined information security tools,
            mechanisms, and support components]

from other internal information system components by implementing physically separate subnetworks with managed interfaces to other components of the system.

References: None.

SC-7 (13)

Impact Levels 4-6:
key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components such as, but not limited to PKI, Patching infrastructure, HBSS, Cybersecurity Defense Tools, Special Purpose Gateway, vulnerability tracking systems, honeypots, internet access points (IAPs); network element and data center administrative/management traffic; Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), Server farms/computing centers,  centralized audit log servers etc.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
Impact Level 2:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SC-7 (13).  Requirement: The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.

SC-7 (14); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Protects Against Unauthorized Physical Connections

The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at  
          [Assignment: organization-defined managed interfaces].

References: None.

SC-7 (14)

Impact Levels 4-6:
internet access points, enclave LAN to WAN, cross domain solutions, and any DoD Approved Alternate Gateways.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-8 (1); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Transmission Integrity
RENAMED: Transmission Confidentiality And Integrity - Enhancement:
Cryptographic Or Alternate Physical Protection

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to  
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - prevent unauthorized disclosure of information; 
            - detect changes to information
           ]

during transmission unless otherwise protected by 
          [Assignment: organization-defined alternative physical
            safeguards].


References: None.

SC-8 (1)

All Impact Levels:
prevent unauthorized disclosure of information AND detect changes to information

a hardened or alarmed carrier Protective Distribution System (PDS)


Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-8 (2); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Transmission Integrity
RENAMED: Transmission Confidentiality And Integrity - Enhancement:
Pre / Post Transmission Handling

The information system maintains the 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - confidentiality; 
            - integrity
           ]

of information during preparation for transmission and during reception.

References: None.

SC-8 (2);

Impact Levels 4-6:
Confidentiality and integrity

Source: CNSSI 1253
-------------------

SC-10; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Network Disconnect:

The information system terminates the network connection associated with a communications session at the end of the session or after  
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period of inactivity.].

References: None.

SC-10

Impact Levels 4-6:
10 minutes privileged sessions and 15 minutes for user sessions

Source:   (FedRAMP High Baseline WG)
-------------------

Impact Level 2:

no longer than 30 minutes for RAS-based sessions or no longer than 60 minutes for non-interactive user sessions

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-12; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Cryptographic Key Establishment And Management:

The organization establishes and manages cryptographic keys for required cryptography employed within the information system in accordance with 
          [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key
            generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction]
.

References: None.

SC-12

Impact Levels 4-6:
DoDI 8520.02 "Public Key Infrastructure and Public Key Enabling" and DoDI 8520.03 "Identity Authentication for Information Systems"

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SC-12 Guidance:  Federally approved cryptography

SC-12 (2); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Cryptographic Key Establishment And Management - Enhancement:
Symmetric Keys

The organization produces, controls, and distributes symmetric cryptographic keys using 
          [Selection: 
            - NIST FIPS-compliant; 
            - NSA-approved
           ]

key management technology and processes.

References: None.

SC-12 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:
NIST Approved for Unclassified systems
NSA Approved for Classified systems

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Levels 2:
NIST FIPS-compliant

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-13; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Use Of Cryptography
RENAMED: Cryptographic Protection:

The information system implements 
          [Assignment: organization-defined cryptographic uses and
            type of cryptography required for each use]

in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, and standards.

References: None.

SC-13

Impact Levels 4-6:
Protection of classified information: NSA-approved cryptography; provision of digital signatures and hashing: FIPS-validated cryptography

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------


Impact Level 2:
FIPS-validated or NSA-approved cryptography

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-15; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Collaborative Computing Devices:

The information system:
a.  Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices with the following exceptions: 
          [Assignment: organization-defined exceptions where remote
            activation is to be allowed]
;
and
b.  Provides an explicit indication of use to users physically present at the devices.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-28; DoD Instruction 8552.01

SC-15

Impact Levels 4-6:
Dedicated VTC suites located in approved VTC locations that are centrally managed

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  no exceptions
Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SC-17; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Public Key Infrastructure Certificates:

The organization issues public key certificates under an 
          [Assignment: organization-defined certificate policy]
or obtains public key certificates from an approved service provider.

References: OMB Memorandum 08-23; NIST Special Publication 800-81

SC-17

Impact Levels 4-6:
DoDI 8520.02, "Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Public Key (PK) Enabling.”

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-23 (3); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Session Authenticity - Enhancement:
Unique Session Identifiers With Randomization

The information system generates a unique session identifier for each session with 
          [Assignment: organization-defined randomness requirements]
and recognizes only session identifiers that are system-generated.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-56, 800-57, 800-111

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SC-23 (5); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Session Authenticity - Enhancement:
Allowed Certificate Authorities

The information system only allows the use of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined certificate authorities]
for verification of the establishment of protected sessions.

References: None.

SC-23 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
DoD PKI established certificate authorities.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-28; SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Protection Of Information At Rest:

The information system protects the 
          [Selection (one or more): 
             - confidentiality; 
             - integrity
           ]

of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information at rest].

References: None.

SC-28
All Impact Levels:
confidentiality AND integrity

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
SC-28.  Guidance: The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest. 

SC-28 (1); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Protection Of Information At Rest - Enhancement:
Cryptographic Protection

The information system implements cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information]
on 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components].


References: None.

SC-28 (1)
Impact Levels 4-6:
any information system components storing data defined in SC-28 (1), value 1


Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-1; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; System And Information Integrity Policy And Procedures:

The organization:
a.  Develops, documents, and disseminates to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]:
     1.  A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
        commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and
     2.  Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information integrity policy and associated
         system and information integrity controls; and
b.  Reviews and updates the current:
     1.  System and information integrity policy 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]; and
     2.  System and information integrity procedures 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

References: NIST Special Publication 800-83.

SI-1

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  all appointed information assurance personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
b.1 at least every 3 years

b.2 at least annually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-2; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Flaw Remediation:

The organization:
a.  Identifies, reports, and corrects information system flaws;
b.  Tests software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;
c.  Installs security-relevant software and firmware updates within 
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of the release of the updates; and
d.  Incorporates flaw remediation into the organizational configuration management process.

References: None.

SI-2

Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  within the time period directed by an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs) or within 30 days of release of updates

Source:
DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
c.  Within 30 days of release of updates

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-2 (2); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Flaw Remediation - Enhancement:
Automated Flaw Remediation Status

The organization employs automated mechanisms 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation.

References: None.

SI-2 (2)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Continuously with host-based monitoring software.  Annually for external scans by ( Cybersecurity Service Provider) CSSP

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
 at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-2 (3); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Flaw Remediation - Enhancement:
Time To Remediate Flaws / Benchmarks For Corrective Actions

The organization:
(a) Measures the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation; and
(b) Establishes 
          [Assignment: organization-defined benchmarks] 
for taking corrective actions.

References: None.

SI-2 (3)

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  within the period directed by an authoritative source (e.g. IAVM, CTOs, DTMs, STIGs) 

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-2 (6); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Flaw Remediation - Enhancement:
Removal Of Previous Versions Of Software / Firmware

The organization removes 
          [Assignment: organization-defined software and firmware
            components]

after updated versions have been installed.

References: None.

SI-2 (6)

Impact Levels 4-6:
All upgraded/replaced software and firmware components that are no longer required for operation

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-3; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Malicious Code Protection:

The organization:
a.  Employs malicious code protection mechanisms at information system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code;
b.  Updates malicious code protection mechanisms whenever new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;
c.  Configures malicious code protection mechanisms to:
     1.  Perform periodic scans of the information system
               [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
    
and real-time scans of files from external sources at
               [Selection (one or more);
                - endpoint;
                - network entry/exit points
               ]
     
as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational security policy; and
     2.  [Selection (one or more):
             - block malicious code;
             - quarantine malicious code;
             - send alert to administrator;

             - [Assignment: organization-defined action]
          ]

          in response to malicious code detection; and
d.  Addresses the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the information system.

References: None.

SI-3

Impact Levels 4-6:
c (2).  Block and quarantine malicious code and then send an alert to the administrator immediately (in real time) or in near real-time

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
c.1 at least weekly

to include endpoints

Impact Level 2:
c.2 to include alerting administrator or defined security personnel

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-3 (10); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Malicious Code Protection - Enhancement:
Malicious Code Analysis

The organization:
(a) Employs 
          [Assignment: organization-defined tools and techniques]

to analyze the characteristics and behavior of malicious code; and
(b) Incorporates the results from malicious code analysis into organizational incident response and flaw remediation processes.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SI-4; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring:

The organization:
a.  Monitors the information system to detect:
     1.  Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with
          [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring objectives];    and
     2.  Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;
b.  Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through
          [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods];
c.  Deploys monitoring devices:
    (i) strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined essential information; and 
    (ii) at ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;
d.  Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion;
e.  Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or 
the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence information, or other credible sources of information;
f.  Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or regulations; and
g. Provides
           [Assignment: organization-defined information system
             monitoring information]

to
           [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] 
          [Selection (one or more):
             - as needed;

             - [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]

          ].

References: None.

SI-4

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  (1) sensor placement and monitoring requirements within CJCSI 6510.01F

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

g. monitoring information related to a change in security posture and vulnerabilities that affects the DoD Mission Owner’s system/application/information

the AOs who issued the PA and the customer’s ATO, and the DoD Mission Owner’s MCD

as needed.

Source: CC SRG best practice for CSP integration with DoD processes
-------------------

SI-4 (4); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Inbound And Outbound Communications Traffic

The information system monitors inbound and outbound communications traffic 
          [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
for unusual or unauthorized activities or conditions.

References: None.

SI-4 (4)

All Impact Levels:
continually

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-4 (5); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
System Generated Alerts

The information system alerts 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
when the following indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: 
          [Assignment: organization-defined compromise indicators].

References: None.

SI-4 (5)

Impact Levels 4-6:
at a minimum, the ISSM and ISSO

Real time intrusion detection and when there are threats identified by authoritative sources (e.g. CTOs) and IAW incident categories I, II, IV, & VII  within CJCSM 6510.01B

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

All Impact Levels:
FedRAMP Additional Requirements and Guidance:
In accordance with the incident response plan.

SI-4 (12); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Automated Alerts

The organization employs automated mechanisms to alert security personnel of the following inappropriate or unusual activities with security implications:  
          [Assignment: organization-defined activities that trigger alerts].

References: None.

SI-4 (12)

Impact Levels 4-6:
When there are threats identified by authoritative sources (e.g. CTOs) and IAW  with CJCSM 6510.01B

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-4 (19); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Individuals Posing Greater Risk

The organization implements  
          [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring]
of individuals who have been identified by 
          [Assignment: organization-defined sources]
as posing an increased level of risk.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SI-4 (20); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Privileged User

The organization implements 
          [Assignment: organization-defined additional monitoring]
of privileged users.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SI-4 (22); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Unauthorized Network Services

The information system detects network services that have not been authorized or approved by 
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorization or approval
            processes]

and 
          [Selection (one or more): 
             - audits; 
             - alerts
[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or

                            roles]
            
].

References: None.

SI-4 (22)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Alerts at a minimum, the ISSM or ISSO, and the Mission Owner’s MCD

Source: DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial CSPs
-------------------

SI-4 (23); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring - Enhancement:
Host-Based Devices

The organization implements 
          [Assignment: organization-defined host-based monitoring
            mechanisms]

at 
          [Assignment: organization-defined information system
            components]
.

References: NIST Special Publications 800-147, 80-155.

SI-4 (23)

Impact Levels 4-6:
Host-based monitoring software

all components

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-5; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Security Alerts, Advisories, And Directives:

The organization:
a.  Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from 
          [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis;
b.  Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary;
c.  Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles];
             - [Assignment: organization-defined elements within the

                 organization]
            
- [Assignment: organization-defined external organizations]
          
];
and
d.  Implements security directives in accordance with established time frames, or notifies the issuing organization of the degree of noncompliance.

References: None.

SI-5

Impact Levels 4-6:
a.  At a minimum, USCYBERCOM.

c.  the ISSO and ISSM

c.  not applicable as elements are not selected as recipients of security alerts, advisories and directives

c.  JFHQ-DoDIN for vetting. JFHQ-DoDIN will pass the information to the accredited CSSPs.  CSSPs are responsible for ensuring all Mission Owner entities receive the information.  Mission Owner organizations will ensure all local Op Centers/LAN shops receive information
(i.e.  Component IT System and Security Personnel)
(e.g. ISSM, ISSOs, and system administrators)

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------
 

Impact Level 2:
a.  to include US-CERT

c.  to include system security personnel and administrators with configuration/patch-management responsibilities

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-6; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Security Functionality Verification:

The information system:
a.  Verifies the correct operation of
          [Assignment: organization-defined security functions];
b.  Performs this verification
          [Selection (one or more):
            [Assignment: organization-defined system transitional

                states];
            - upon command by user with appropriate privilege;
           
- [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
           
];
c.  Notifies 
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]
of failed security verification tests; and
d.       [Selection (one or more): 
            - shuts the information system down; 
            - restarts the information system;
 
            - [Assignment: organization-defined alternative action(s)]
           ]

when anomalies are discovered.

References: None.

SI-6

All Impact Levels:
b to include upon system startup and/or restart at least monthly

c to include system administrators and security personnel

d to include notification of system administrators and security personnel

Source: DoD RMF TAG and FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-7; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring
RENAMED: Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity:

The organization employs integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized changes to 
          [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and
            information].


References: None.

 

SI-7 (1); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information System Monitoring
RENAMED: Software, Firmware, And Information Integrity - Enhancement:
Integrity Checks

The information system performs an integrity check of 
          [Assignment: organization-defined software, firmware, and
            information]
 
          [Selection (one or more): 
           - at startup; 
           - at
[Assignment: organization-defined transitional states or

                   security-relevant events]; 
           -
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]
          
].

References: None.

SI-7 (1)

All Impact Levels:
Selection to include security relevant events and at least monthly

Source: FedRAMP v2
-------------------

SI-7 (7); SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Software, Firmware, And Information Integrity - Enhancement:
Integration Of Detection And Response

The organization incorporates the detection of unauthorized 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant changes
            to the information system]

into the organizational incident response capability.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

SI-10; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Information Input Validation:

The information system checks the validity of
       [Assignment: organization-defined information inputs].

References: None.

SI-10

Impact Levels 4-6:
All inputs except those identified specifically by the organization

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-11; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Error Handling:

The information system:
a.  Generates error messages that provide information necessary for corrective actions without revealing information that could be exploited by adversaries; and
b.  Reveals error messages only to
          [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

References: None.

SI-11

Impact Levels 4-6:
b.  the ISSO, ISSM, and SCA

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SI-16; SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY; Memory Protection:

The information system implements 
          [Assignment: organization-defined security safeguards]

to protect its memory from unauthorized code execution.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

 

 

Table 9 - Parameter Values for SLA controls/Enhancements Listed in Table 3


AC-2 (13); ACCESS CONTROL; Account Management - Enhancement:
Disable Accounts For High-Risk Individuals

The organization disables accounts of users posing a significant risk within
          [Assignment: organization-defined time period]
of discovery of the risk.

References: None.

AC-2 (13)

Impact Levels 4-6:
30 minutes unless otherwise defined in formal organizational policy

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-3 (4); ACCESS CONTROL; Access Enforcement - Enhancement:
Discretionary Access Control

The information system enforces
          [Assignment: organization-defined discretionary access
            control policies]

over defined subjects and objects where the policy specifies that a subject that has been granted access to information can do one or more of the following:
(a) Pass the information to any other subjects or objects;
(b) Grant its privileges to other subjects;
(c) Change security attributes on subjects, objects, the information system, or the information system’s components;
(d) Choose the security attributes to be associated with newly created or revised objects; or
(e) Change the rules governing access control.

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AC-12 (1); ACCESS CONTROL; Session Termination - Enhancement:
User-Initiated Logouts / Message Displays

The information system:
(a) Provides a logout capability for user-initiated communications sessions whenever authentication is used to gain access to
          [Assignment: organization-defined information resources];
and
(b) Displays an explicit logout message to users indicating the reliable termination of authenticated communications sessions.

References: None.

AC-12 (1)

Impact Levels 5-6:
a.  all

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-16; ACCESS CONTROL; Security Attributes:

The organization:
a.  Provides the means to associate
          [Assignment: organization-defined types of security attributes]
having
          [Assignment: organization-defined security attribute values]
with information in storage, in process, and/or in transmission;
b.  Ensures that the security attribute associations are made and retained with the information;
c.  Establishes the permitted
          [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes]
for
          [Assignment: organization-defined information systems];
and
d.  Determines the permitted
          [Assignment: organization-defined values or ranges]
          for each of the established security attributes.

References: None.

AC-16
Impact Levels 4-6:
c.  security attributes defined in AC-16, CCIs 2256-2258

c.  all information systems

d.  the values defined in AC-16, CCIs 2259-2261

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

AC-16 (6); ACCESS CONTROL; Security Attributes - Enhancement:
Maintenance Of Attribute Association By Organization

The organization allows personnel to associate, and maintain the association of
          [Assignment: organization-defined security attributes]
with
          [Assignment: organization-defined subjects and objects]
in accordance with
          [Assignment: organization-defined security policies].

References: None.

[Value not Defined; To be defined by CSP]

 

AU-10; AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY; Non-Repudiation:

The information system protects against an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual) falsely denying having performed
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by
            non-repudiation].


References: None.

AU-10

Impact Levels 5-6:
actions defined by DoDI 8520.02 and DoDI 8520.03

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

IA-3 (1); IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION; Device Identification And Authentication - Enhancement:
Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication

The information system authenticates
          [Assignment: organization-defined specific devices and/or
            types of devices]

before establishing 
          [Selection (one or more): 
            - local; 
            - remote; 
            - network

          ]

connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically based.

References: None.

IA-3 (1)

Impact Levels 4-6:

Selection: Minimally remote and network

DoD Supplemental guidance: Once a device is authentication it must be authorized using the principle of least privilege.

SC-7 (11); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Restrict Incoming Communications Traffic

The information system only allows incoming communications from  
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorized sources]
routed to  
          [Assignment: organization-defined authorized destinations].

References: None.

SC-7 (11)

Impact Level 4

SC-7 (14); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Boundary Protection - Enhancement:
Protects Against Unauthorized Physical Connections

The organization protects against unauthorized physical connections at  
          [Assignment: organization-defined managed interfaces].

References: None.

SC-7 (14)

Impact Levels 4-5:
internet access points, enclave LAN to WAN, cross domain solutions, and any DoD Approved Alternate Gateways.

Source: DoD RMF TAG
-------------------

SC-18 (3); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Mobile Code - Enhancement:
Prevent Downloading / Execution

The information system prevents the download and execution of  
          [Assignment: organization-defined unacceptable mobile code].

References: None.

 

SC-18 (3)

Impact Levels 5-6:

“All unacceptable mobile code such as:

(a) Emerging mobile code technologies that have not undergone a risk assessment and been assigned to a Risk Category by the DoD CIO.

(b) Unsigned Category 1 mobile code and Category 1 mobile code technologies that cannot block or disable unsigned mobile code (e.g., Windows Scripting Host).

(d) Category 2 mobile code not obtained from a trusted source over an assured channel (e.g., SIPRNet, SSL connection, S/MIME, code is signed with an approved code signing certificate)."

Source: CNSS 1253

Supplemental guidance:

For the protection of the infrastructure supporting a CSO,  CSPs should apply this control to their organizational IT systems and the infrastructure supporting their CSO(s)

For the protection of Mission Owners’, their end users, and networks; CSP CSOs must not support the downloading of mobile code which is deemed unacceptable to DoD.

See Section 5.16: Mobile Code for more information.

SC-18 (4); SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION; Mobile Code - Enhancement:
Prevent Automatic Execution

The information system prevents the automatic execution of mobile code in 
          [Assignment: organization-defined software applications]
and enforces 
          [Assignment: organization-defined actions] prior to executing
            the code.

References: NIST Special Publication 800-81

SC-18 (4)

Impact Levels 5-6:
Software applications and such as but not limited to email, scriptable document/file editing applications that support documents with embedded code (e.g., MS Office applications/documents), etc.

Prompting the user for permission.

Source: CNSS 1253, DoD RMF TAG with adjustment for Commercial CSPs

 

Appendix E - Privacy Overlay Comparative C/CE Tables and Value Tables


This appendix provides tables containing C/CE that are in addition to, or modify, the FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CE baselines.  Additional tables are provided for the C/CE which have parameter values provided by the Privacy Overlay. 

This section contains the following Tables:

  • Table 10 - FedRAMP M C/CE Modified or Required by Regulation
  • Table 11- FedRAMP+ C/CE Modified or Required by Regulation
  • Table 12 - Privacy Overlay C/CE Not Included In FedRAMP M or FedRAMP+
  • Table 13 - PII/PHI Parameter Values for FedRAMP and FedRAMP+ C/CE
  • Table 14 - PII/PHI Parameter Values for C/CE Not Included In FedRAMP M or FedRAMP+

A future release of the CC SRG will contain additional information that will define which C/CE will need to be assessed for a Privacy Overlay Rider for a CSO’s PA for those CSOs that are intended to handle PII or PHI.  Mission Owner responsibilities will also be addressed.

The Privacy Overlay provides one or more codes in association with each C/CE addressed in the overlay to indicate how it is addressed in the overlay.  These codes are as follows:

  • A plus sign (“+”) indicates the control should be selected.
  • Two “dashes” (“--”) indicates the control should not be selected. **
  • The letter “E” indicates there is a control extension.
  • The letter “G” indicates there is supplemental guidance, including specific tailoring guidance if applicable, for the control.
  • The letter “V” indicates this overlay defines a value for an organizational-defined parameter for the control.
  • The letter “R” indicates there is at least one regulatory/statutory reference that affects the control selection or that the control helps to meet the regulatory/statutory requirements.

** NOTE: there is only one CE, AC-2 (8) that has a code “--” which includes code “R” which means the CE must not be selected for regulatory reasons.

The tables begin on the next page.

 

Table 10 - FedRAMP M C/CE Modified or Required by Regulation

C/CE

SRG Type

L4

L5/6

PII L

PII M

PII H

PHI

AC-01

FR.M

X

X

+GR

+GR

+GR

+ER

AC-02

FR.M

X

X

+EGVR

+EGVR

+EGVR

+EGR

AC-02 (09)

FR.M

X

X

GVR

GVR

GVR

R

AC-03

FR.M

X

X

+EGR

+EGR

+EGR

+GR

AC-04

FR.M

X

X

 

+GR

+GR

+R

AC-05

FR.M

X

X

 

+GR

+GR

+GR

AC-06

FR.M

X

X

 

+GR

+GR

+GR

AC-06 (01)

FR.M

X

X

 

 

+GR

+R

AC-06 (02)

FR.M

X

X

 

+GR

+GR

+R

AC-06 (05)

FR.M

X

X

 

 

+R

+R

AC-06 (09)

FR.M

X

X

 

+R

+R

+R

AC-06 (10)

FR.M

X

X

 

+R

+R